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I. INTRODUCTION 
What ends do we expect health insurance to serve in our society?  
This unresolved question, which one scholar aptly terms “the struggle for 
the soul of health insurance”1 arises today in many settings.  This 
struggle pits a “social solidarity” vision of health coverage (by which 
insurance permits the risk of medical costs to be spread broadly across 
society, so that healthy persons subsidize the care received by unhealthy 
persons) against an individualistic vision of health coverage (by which 
insurance enables each person to pay an amount that reflects as closely as 
possible his own anticipated cost of care).2  The tension between these 
two views may emerge, for example, in debates over proposals to require 
community rating of insurance premiums or to mandate that insurers 
cover particular services.3 
Laws that prohibit discrimination in health insurance also highlight 
this tension.  These laws—whether they apply directly to insurance 
issuers or to employers providing health insurance coverage as an 
employment benefit—seem to embody the social solidarity view that 
persons with particular traits should neither be denied a place in the 
insurance pool nor be subjected to inferior coverage.  The application of 
these antidiscrimination laws to health insurance occupies center stage in 
controversies over whether employers are required to provide 
prescription contraceptive coverage for their employees4 and whether 
                                                     
 ∗ Dean and Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law. 
 1. Deborah A. Stone, The Struggle for the Soul of Health Insurance, 18 J. HEALTH POL., 
POL’Y & L. 287, 287 (1993). 
 2. See id. (discussing the pitfalls of an individualistic vision). 
 3. Cf. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 731 (1985) (noting that mandated 
coverage of mental health benefits responded to adverse selection in voluntary mental health 
insurance market). 
 4. See, e.g., Dan Margolies, Area Women Sue AT&T over Contraceptive Coverage, KAN. CITY 
STAR, Jan. 21, 2003, at D17 (reporting on a case against the plaintiffs’ employer for discrimination, 
alleging the company insurance plan covered sex-related drugs for men, but not contraceptives for 
women). 
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employers can terminate retiree health benefits for Medicare-eligible 
retirees.5  Existing laws address discrimination based on a variety of 
traits including race, sex, age, disability, genetic makeup, and the need 
for mental health treatment.6 
Yet while these antidiscrimination laws at first glance seem to share 
a common vision of insurance inclusiveness, inconsistencies quickly 
surface when one examines the particular terms of these laws and courts’ 
interpretations of them.  To date, courts interpreting laws prohibiting 
health-insurance discrimination have failed to articulate any consistent—
much less overarching—vision either of the scope of the protection 
against discrimination or of the justification for that protection.  
Consequently, in the course of a single opinion, a court may apply one 
standard for assessing claims of sex discrimination in health insurance 
and another for claims of disability discrimination.7  Meanwhile, state 
legislatures have supplied still another standard in passing laws 
prohibiting genetic discrimination.8  So we are left wondering what sense 
to make of existing legal approaches to health-insurance discrimination. 
We might also wonder about absences from the foregoing list of 
traits protected under federal and state antidiscrimination laws.  One 
notable absence is health status.  This absence, however, is not the result 
of legislative oversight or lack of need.  Discrimination against unhealthy 
persons is deeply ingrained in the health insurance industry and 
traditionally has been generally accepted as a legitimate application of 
underwriting and risk-classification principles.  These principles are 
consonant with the individualistic view of health coverage, where 
individuals’ costs of coverage should vary with their predicted 
consumption of medical care.  Indeed, some argue that state unfair trade 
practice laws regulating insurers mandate health-status discrimination. 
                                                     
 5. See, e.g., T. Shawn Taylor, EEOC Defends Letting Firms Drop Retiree Health Benefit, CHI. 
TRIB., May 18, 2004, § 3, at 5 (discussing a new policy adopted by the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission). 
 6. See infra Part III. 
 7. See Saks v. Franklin Covey Co., 316 F.3d 337, 344 (2d Cir. 2003) (finding that equal access 
to benefits is the proper inquiry for ADA claims, while Title VII sex discrimination claims require 
assessment of the relative comprehensiveness of coverage). 
 8. See infra Part III.B.5. 
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While lawmakers have not recognized “the unhealthy”9 as a group 
meriting protection under a civil-rights-informed antidiscrimination law, 
both state and federal law provide unhealthy people with limited 
protection against adverse differential treatment.10  For example, the 
handful of states that mandate community rating of health insurance 
protect persons with health problems from being charged higher 
premiums than their healthier peers.  More broadly, in passing the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) in 1996, Congress 
prohibited group health plans from excluding individuals from a group or 
charging them higher premiums based on their health status.11 
Ironically, though, HIPAA’s prohibitions of overt discrimination 
based on health status may have helped stimulate the development of 
forms of employer-provided coverage that discriminate more subtly 
against unhealthy persons.  The recent emergence of novel types of 
health coverage typically is attributed to consumer backlash against 
managed care cost-containment methodologies and managed care’s 
resulting inability to continue its downward pressure on health-care 
inflation.12  Also worth noting, however, is that, as employers’ health 
costs escalated, HIPAA limited employers’ ability either to keep 
unhealthy and expensive employees out of their groups or to make those 
employees pay more.  As a result, employers have increasingly turned to 
other avenues—from simply increasing enrollees’ copayments to 
adopting so-called consumer-driven health plans—to constrain their 
health benefits costs.13  The common thread uniting recent trends in 
employer-provided coverage is the shifting of insurance risk (i.e., the risk 
 
                                                     
 9. Who are “the unhealthy” to whom this Article frequently refers?  The term admittedly 
suffers from substantial imprecision, but I use it in this Article to refer broadly to those persons 
whose health status renders them heavy users of (and thus heavy spenders on) health-care services.  
Thus, while the chronically “sick” would certainly fall into this group, so too could individuals who 
require expensive screening and preventative services on a regular basis to keep them from 
becoming sick, as could an individual who simply suffers an accident or acute illness requiring 
hospitalization.  A person who has been diagnosed with one or more chronic conditions requiring 
ongoing medical care and pharmaceutical intervention is the exemplar of a member of this group. 
 10. See infra Parts III.B–IV. 
 11. See infra Part IV.C. 
 12. See James C. Robinson, Reinvention of Health Insurance in the Consumer Era, 291 JAMA 
1880, 1881 (2004) (describing the changes in managed care). 
 13. While employers concerned with profitability obviously care about rising health-care costs, 
the recent escalation in employers’ health costs has generated broader societal concern.  According 
to recent accounts, rapidly rising health costs have played a role in producing a “jobless” recovery, 
see Eduardo Porter, Costs of Benefits Cited as Factor in Slump in Jobs, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2004, 
at D1, and are negatively affecting the international competitiveness of American business, see John 
Flesher, Health-care Costs Imperil U.S. Competitiveness, GM Chief Says, CHI. TRIB., June 7, 2004, 
§ 4, at 4. 
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of incurring medical expenses) away from the insurance company or 
self-insured employer and onto the shoulders of employees. 
Logic and emerging evidence confirm what health insurers have long 
known: bearing insurance risk for unhealthy persons costs more than 
bearing insurance risk for healthy persons.  Accordingly, it stands to 
reason that as employers adopt health coverage vehicles that shift 
insurance risk from the insurer to individual insureds, the burden falling 
on unhealthy enrollees generally will be heavier than any burden on 
healthy enrollees.  In this disparity of costs shifted we can discern 
discrimination against the unhealthy.  Although employers adopting 
these new coverage vehicles in all likelihood treat their employees 
identically in providing health benefits, the coverage provided imposes a 
heavier burden on employees with health problems.  Adoption of facially 
neutral policies that disproportionately burden a particular group is, of 
course, the core definition of disparate-impact discrimination.14 
The observation that increased copayment requirements and 
consumer-driven vehicles such as health savings accounts may 
disproportionately burden the unhealthy is not novel.  Indeed, concerns 
about the inequity of this burden have been voiced at least since the 
policy debates over including a medical savings accounts demonstration 
project in HIPAA.  This Article reviews the policy arguments for and 
against the shifting of insurance risk to individual health-care consumers, 
but then moves beyond partisan debate to examine emerging research on 
the impacts of risk shifting.  This research suggests that the repercussions 
do not simply impose heavier financial costs onto unhealthy individuals; 
they also affect health-care consumption and, ultimately, health status.  
In sum, newer forms of coverage may leave unhealthy individuals 
underinsured and thereby exposed to many of the same harms that 
uninsured persons face. 
In the end, this Article briefly suggests reasons for objecting to and 
seeking to curb the trend toward the shifting of risk to individual 
insureds.  First, we might find the disproportionate burden visited upon 
the unhealthy troubling because of a sense that this disparate impact is 
somehow associated with social inequality and violates their civil rights.  
                                                     
 14. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000).  For disparate-impact discrimination to be deemed a 
violation of laws prohibiting employment discrimination based on race or sex, the disproportionate 
adverse impact must be unjustified by the employer’s “business necessity.”  See id.  The 
interpretation of the business-necessity standard remains a bone of contention in employment 
discrimination law.  As will be discussed infra notes 173–80 and accompanying text, any legal 
prohibition against health-insurance discrimination against the unhealthy, to the extent it 
incorporated disparate-impact theory, would likely similarly incorporate some type of necessity 
justification. 
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Alternatively, we might understand the inequality of burdens as 
indicating an unjust distribution of consumerism’s benefits and burdens. 
This Article proceeds as follows: Part II describes the struggle for the 
soul of health insurance and suggests how it is implicated in legislation 
regarding health coverage.  Part III reports on the federal and state laws 
that already prohibit discrimination on a variety of bases and attempts to 
discern any logic underlying inconsistencies in the coverage of and 
justifications for these laws.  Part IV examines laws that address the 
legality of health-status discrimination in health insurance.  The advent 
of a “consumerist” movement in health coverage is presented in Part V, 
along with an articulation of the policy perspectives that favor and 
disfavor the movement.  Part V also presents evidence regarding the 
financial and health effects of the consumerist movement on unhealthy 
individuals.  Part VI builds on the preceding parts to sketch rationales for 
policy responses designed to discourage or redirect the current trends in 
health coverage. 
II. THE STRUGGLE FOR THE SOUL OF HEALTH INSURANCE: 
ENCAPSULATING THE DEBATE 
The following discussion of health-insurance discrimination and the 
unhealthy will be aided by fleshing out the idea of a “struggle for the 
soul of health insurance.”15  The phrase comes from the title of Deborah 
Stone’s insightful and provocative article, which examines the competing 
concepts of solidarity and actuarial fairness in the context of health 
insurance coverage and pricing decisions.16  Stone describes the logic of 
solidarity as understanding health insurance as a form of mutual aid, in 
which community members pool their risks of incurring medical care 
expenses and share those expenses when they occur.17  Under such a 
system of mutual aid, the majority of members who are fortunate enough 
to remain healthy subsidize the care of those members who become sick 
or suffer injuries; the mutual aid system thus explicitly contemplates and 
accepts redistribution from the healthy to the sick.18  By contrast, the 
principle of actuarial fairness, in its purest form,19 cannot abide cross 
                                                     
 15. Stone, supra note 1, at 287. 
 16. Id. at 290–94. 
 17. Id. at 290–91. 
 18. Id. 
 19. According to Deborah Hellman, in an actuarially fair insurance pricing scheme, “each 
insured pays a price for coverage that is equivalent to the risk she poses of drawing from the 
insurance pool, given available information.”  Deborah S. Hellman, Is Actuarially Fair Insurance 
Pricing Actually Fair?: A Case Study in Insuring Battered Women, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 355, 
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subsidies among insurance purchasers.  Instead, the principle of actuarial 
fairness dictates that each individual should bear financial responsibility 
for his own risk of incurring medical expenses, and that each person’s 
insurance premium should reflect that person’s actuarially determined 
risk—no more and no less.20  Thus, a health insurance market that 
follows the principle of actuarial fairness in making coverage and pricing 
decisions will segment its insureds into ever-more-finely defined pools, 
each of which contains policyholders whose risks are as homogeneous as 
possible.21  In that way, no one whose health prospects are bright will be 
called upon to subsidize the medical needs for those with gloomy 
medical outlooks.22 
Stone views this tension between the competing principles of 
solidarity and actuarial fairness as reflecting more than a simple choice 
about how to structure and price health insurance.23  Instead, she asserts 
that the underlying question posed is “whether medical care will be 
distributed as a right of citizenship or as a market commodity.”24  Thus, 
the struggle for the soul of health insurance takes on a moral tenor—the 
combatants invoke political philosophy and neoclassical economics in 
the struggle. 
On the ground, however, it is the extreme skewing of medical 
spending across the population that makes this struggle unavoidable.  
Although most people are generally healthy and usually do not 
experience large health-care costs in any given year, a relatively small 
number of people suffer illnesses or accidents that result in massive 
medical spending.25  Because the risk of illness or accident remains at 
some level unpredictable, purchasing health insurance is a rational way 
                                                                                                                       
358 (1997).  As a practical matter, insurers are unlikely to implement pure actuarial fairness because 
the costs of predicting each insured’s risk as precisely as possible would outweigh the competitive 
risk selection benefits that an insurer would reap from such prediction.  Consequently, Hellman sees 
a more moderated approach to actuarial fairness as more plausible.  Id. at 398–99.  See also Stone, 
supra note 1, at 294 (noting that a perfect implementation of actuarial fairness would be the 
“antithesis of insurance” because each individual would be better off self insuring to avoid paying an 
insurer). 
 20. Stone, supra note 1, at 292–93. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 294. 
 23. Id. at 288–89. 
 24. Id. at 288. 
 25. LEN M. NICHOLS ET AL., URBAN INSTITUTE, TAX-PREFERRED MEDICAL SAVINGS 
ACCOUNTS AND CATASTROPHIC HEALTH INSURANCE PLANS: A NUMERICAL ANALYSIS OF WINNERS 
AND LOSERS 11–12 (1996), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/winlose.pdf; Timothy 
S. Jost, Private or Public Approaches to Insuring the Uninsured: Lessons from International 
Experience with Private Insurance, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 419, 433 (2001); GAIL SHEARER, CONSUMERS 
UNION, THE HEALTH CARE DIVIDE: UNFAIR FINANCIAL BURDENS 5 (2000), 
http://www.consumersunion.org/pdf/divide.pdf. 
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of seeking to protect against the risk of large medical bills.26  The 
pooling of risk, a fundamental characteristic of insurance, functions as a 
mechanism for shared savings.27  The tension between solidarity and 
actuarial fairness appears full blown, however, as soon as we recognize 
that pooling entails the sharing of losses as well as the sharing of risks, 
for then we immediately ask whose losses we share.  A disciple of 
actuarial fairness responds that a particular insured should share the 
losses only of those who share a similar risk profile.  A solidarity 
partisan responds that all members of a community, however defined,28 
should share in the community’s losses.29 
As one might expect, other scholars also have noted this tension 
between a community solidarity conception of health insurance and an 
individualistic focus, and they have used a variety of terms to describe 
the competing conceptions.30  Scholars commonly recognize this tension 
                                                     
 26. Jost, supra note 25, at 433. 
 27. The Health Care Study Group, Report: Understanding the Choices in Health Care Reform, 
19 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L. 499, 519 (1994).  Cf. Brian J. Glenn, Risk, Insurance, and the 
Changing Nature of Mutual Obligation, 28 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 295, 300 (2003) (observing that 
“the risk-spreading function of insurance plays two roles, one prior to a loss (granting peace of 
mind) and one after (distributing the costs amongst all the policyholders)”). 
 28. For purposes of discussing private health-insurance premiums, the community could be 
defined broadly as all of an insurer’s subscribers, or it could be defined somewhat more narrowly as 
those subscribers in a particular geographic area or in a particular industry.  The term “community 
rating” is used to describe a premium pricing scheme in which each insured is charged an identical 
premium (with perhaps some limited variations).  For a description of state laws requiring 
community rating, see infra Part IV.  Of course, under a single-payer health-care scheme, the 
community is defined even more broadly to include all residents of a polity covered by the single 
payer. 
 29. Cf. SHEARER, supra note 25, at ii (rejecting policy initiatives that would “split the healthy 
from the sick” and calling for measures “insuring the sick with the healthy”). 
 30. See, e.g., John V. Jacobi, The Ends of Health Insurance, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 311, 313 
(1997) (contrasting social pooling and individual responsibility visions of health insurance).  Rand 
Rosenblatt contrasts a “modestly egalitarian social contract” model of health law with a market 
competition model of health law.  Rand Rosenblatt, The Four Ages of Health Law, 14 HEALTH 
MATRIX 156, 167 (2004).  He notes, however, that proposals by leading academic proponents of a 
market model of health law include some form of cross-subsidization and guaranteed issue so that 
high-risk individuals have access to health insurance.  Id. at 178–81.  Scholars also have noted that 
other nations display a more consistent commitment to the ideal of social solidarity in health 
insurance than does the United States.  See, e.g., Jacobi, supra, at 314 (attributing America’s less-
than-firm commitment to a social solidarity ideal to Americans’ being “imbued with rugged 
individualism and a preference for voluntary action”); Jost, supra note 25, at 434 (“In most nations, 
the ideal of social solidarity also plays a significant role.”); Stone, supra note 1, at 289–90 (asserting 
that American society has only a “weak and wavering commitment” to the view that sickness is a 
condition that triggers mutual aid).  For examples of the variety of terms used to describe these 
competing conceptions, see ROBERT H. JERRY II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW 136–37 (3d ed. 
2002) (contrasting the “grouping perspective” which would permit the use of gender-based 
classifications, with the “individual perspective,” which rejects such a classification as unfair and 
noting the related issue of what type of subsidization in insurance is fair); Sharona Hoffman, 
Unmanaged Care: Towards Moral Fairness in Health Care Coverage, 78 IND. L.J. 659, 662 (2003) 
 
CROSSLEY FINAL.DOC 2/21/2006  9:55:25 AM 
80 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54 
as underlying many policy debates regarding health-care systems 
reforms.31  They also highlight that the tension is based not simply on 
differing pragmatic assessments of the most effective way of 
accomplishing a particular goal such as lowering health-care costs or 
increasing the number of people covered by health insurance.  Instead, 
many commentators appreciate that the conflicting visions pose 
fundamental moral and philosophical questions regarding desert and 
entitlement, misfortune and injustice.32 
From the foregoing it might appear that the struggle for the soul of 
health insurance accurately could be simplified to choosing between “all 
for one, and one for all” and “every man for himself” as the slogan 
governing health insurance policy.  A number of scholars, however, have 
noted that in reality the contrast between social solidarity and 
individualism is less stark.  For even if an individual seeks to obtain 
health insurance for the purely selfish purpose of protecting herself 
against the possibility of overwhelming medical costs, by purchasing 
insurance she enters into a community of risk sharers and thereby 
produces a public benefit.33  And although we might assume that 
proponents of market-based approaches to health insurance policy would 
align themselves with an actuarial-fairness vision, a number of scholars 
employing economic theory have pointed out that imperfections in the 
                                                                                                                       
(contrasting actuarial fairness with a “moral fairness” standard, which “take[s] into account values of 
just distribution”); Leah Wortham, Insurance Classification: Too Important to be Left to the 
Actuaries, 19 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 349, 359 (1985) (contrasting “traditional fair discrimination 
and antidiscrimination” approaches); Jill Gaulding, Note, Race, Sex, and Genetic Discrimination in 
Insurance: What’s Fair?, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1646, 1647 (1995) (contrasting the “efficient 
discrimination” and “antidiscrimination” perspectives).  
 31. For the most part, commentators have described policy questions regarding the structure of 
the health insurance market or regarding health-care financing reform more broadly in these terms, 
see, for example, Jacobi, supra note 30, but the tension also has been noted in other contexts.  See 
William M. Sage, Judicial Opinions Involving Health Insurance Coverage: Trompe L’Oeil or 
Window on the World?, 31 IND. L. REV. 49, 51 (1998) (suggesting that tensions about the nature of 
health insurance are revealed in coverage litigation); cf. Sara Rosenbaum & Brian Kamoie, Managed 
Care and Public Health: Conflict and Collaboration, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 191, 191 (2002) 
(suggesting a similar tension between managed care’s grafting of insurance risk avoidance principles 
into medical practice and fundamental precepts of public health). 
 32. See NICHOLS ET AL., supra note 25, at 12 (“[O]pposing views about the ‘optimal’ health 
insurance market reflect philosophical differences in approach to health system reform.”); Hellman, 
supra note 19, at 397–403 (analyzing the moral bases for differing views about risk rating). 
 33. See Roberta M. Berry, The Human Genome Project and the End of Insurance, 7 U. FLA. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 205, 227–31 (1996) (“Insurance allows self-interested individuals [to manage 
their own risk] only if they help others manage risk through the cooperative undertaking of 
insurance.”); see also Glenn, supra note 27, at 304 (“By tracing out the way that insurance spreads 
responsibility, we see . . . [that i]nsurance builds communities of interest, whether we realize it or 
not.”). 
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health insurance market34 may create a need for subsidies between low- 
and high-risk individuals and justify limitations on insurers’ pursuit of 
actuarial fairness to increase market efficiency.35  So even many who 
assert the power of market economies to maximize social welfare have 
suggested that some regulatory measures consistent with—if not inspired 
by—a solidarity vision of health insurance may be necessary to improve 
market efficiency.36  Notwithstanding some blurring of the stark contrast 
the competing visions offer, they continue to point in opposite directions 
on many questions, including health insurers’ discriminatory risk-
classification practices, to which we now turn. 
III. LAWS PROHIBITING DISCRIMINATION IN HEALTH INSURANCE 
A. Risk Classification as Discrimination 
Before examining various laws proscribing health-insurance 
discrimination, this Section will suggest the diversity of forms that 
discrimination by health insurers can take.  Of course, the most 
straightforward example is an insurer’s refusal to issue a policy to an 
individual based on a particular trait.  Such a discriminatory refusal to 
cover is also clearly inconsistent with social solidarity, for it excludes 
that person from the pooling of risks and losses that insurance coverage 
provides.  But a brief examination of risk-classification mechanisms 
commonly employed by health insurers reveals how discrimination, in 
the neutral sense of the word, inheres in numerous other insurance 
practices.37 
                                                     
 34. For an excellent explanation of inefficiencies in the market for health insurance, see 
Katherine Swartz, Justifying Government as the Backstop in Health Insurance Markets, 2 YALE J. 
HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 89 (2001).  Swartz asserts that the primary imperfection in the market is 
information asymmetry that leads to inefficient risk-screening practices by insurers seeking to avoid 
adverse selection.  Id. at 94, 98.  See also Thomas L. Greaney, How Many Libertarians Does It Take 
to Fix the Health Care System?, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1825, 1836 (1998) (characterizing the health-care 
market as “beset with problems of inadequate information and imperfect agency”). 
 35. See Greaney, supra note 34, at 1846 (stating that “controlling risk segmentation is at the 
heart of market reform efforts designed to improve efficiency”); Swartz, supra note 34, at 99–103 
(noting the inefficiencies of the health insurance market and how the government could address 
them). 
 36. A notable exception is Richard Epstein, who argues in his book that American society 
should avoid positive rights to health care, including regulation mandating cross subsidies.  
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, MORTAL PERIL: OUR INALIENABLE RIGHT TO HEALTH CARE? (1997).  
Reviewers, however, have criticized Epstein for basing his policy prescription on a commitment to 
libertarianism and for failing to pay close attention to recognized imperfections in the health-care 
market.  See, e.g., Greaney, supra note 34, at 1826–29 (claiming that Epstein “pays no attention to 
the subtleties and imperfections of the [health-care] market”). 
 37. Cf. JERRY, supra note 30, at 136 (noting that, from one perspective, “insurance is inherently 
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Private health insurers engage in risk-classification practices as part 
of their competitive strategies for capturing profitable segments of the 
health insurance market while avoiding unprofitable segments.38  Rather 
than segmenting the market by product and competing based on product 
price and quality, however, health insurers tend to segment the market by 
customer—competing in their efforts to sell policies to those customers 
considered likely to be profitable and to avoid customers who can be 
predicted to be unprofitable.39  To this end, health insurers seek to obtain 
from prospective insureds information that the insurers deem predictive 
of future health costs and to use that information in a variety of ways to 
try to avoid, or at least classify, risk. 
Many risk-classification practices employed by insurers fit easily 
into a rubric of disparate-treatment discrimination—where the insurer 
somehow treats A differently from B based on a trait of A; for example, 
the fact that A is female.40  Certainly, if an insurer decides to issue a 
particular insurance policy to B but not to A because A is female, the 
insurer has discriminated in underwriting.41  Or perhaps the insurer does 
not flatly turn A away, but instead charges A a higher premium than B for 
the same policy.  In that instance, the insurer has discriminated in its 
rating, or pricing, practices.42  In the alternative, assume that the insurer 
agrees to cover both A and B for the same price, but decides to exclude 
certain benefits only from A’s coverage or to impose a longer pre-
existing condition exclusion on A than on B.  Again, the insurer is 
discriminating against A, this time in making coverage decisions.  
                                                                                                                       
‘discriminating’ because the purpose of insurance is to divide a group of potential insureds into 
smaller categories and price each group according to its risk”). 
 38. For a lucid and accessible description of health insurance markets and how health insurers 
use risk-classification mechanisms to compete, see Swartz, supra note 34, at 95–97.  See also 
Gaulding, supra note 30, at 1651–53 (describing the role of adverse selection and competition 
among insurers in promoting risk classification). 
 39. As Kenneth Abraham notes regarding the insurance industry generally, “[i]nsurers often 
can capture more protection dollars by classifying because through classification they can offer low-
risk individuals lower prices.”  KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL 
THEORY AND PUBLIC POLICY 67 (1986). 
 40. For a description of risk-classification practices, see Gaulding, supra note 30, at 1651–52.  
Cf. Wortham, supra note 30, at 404 (“The selection competition feature probably causes people to 
most immediately make the analogy of insurance . . . classifications to civil rights laws.”). 
 41. The insurance industry defines underwriting generally as the “‘process by which an insurer 
determines whether or not and on what basis it will accept an application for insurance.’”  Karen A. 
Clifford & Russel P. Iuculano, AIDS & Insurance: The Rationale for AIDS-Related Testing, 100 
HARV. L. REV. 1806, 1807–08 (1987) (quoting HEALTH INS. ASS’N OF AM., A COURSE IN GROUP 
LIFE & HEALTH INS. pt. A, at 379 (1985)). 
 42. “Classification refers to treating an individual as a member of a class based on an individual 
trait such as gender, residential zip code, driving record, history of cancer, and so forth. . . . Rating is 
the process of transforming classifications into prices for insurance.”  Wortham, supra note 30, at 
354 n.19. 
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Through these decisions,43 the insurer segments its market based on the 
relative risk that the insurer believes A and B pose.  Segmentation occurs 
when the insurer decides who gets to participate in the pooling of risks, 
the price that different customers must pay to enter the pool, and what 
risks each customer can transfer to the pool.  Health insurers’ use of 
various types of risk classifications in making underwriting, coverage, 
and rating decisions has generated significant policy discussion and 
academic analysis regarding these practices’ legitimacy. 
But an insurer’s attempt to limit its exposure to risk may also 
produce another form of discrimination.  In contrast to disparate-
treatment discrimination, disparate-impact discrimination exists not in 
singling out a person for different treatment based on a protected trait, 
but in applying a facially neutral practice or policy that 
disproportionately and adversely impacts a group of people sharing the 
protected characteristic.44  For example, let us imagine that a health 
insurer sells the same policy to A and B for the same price, but the policy 
excludes coverage for breast cancer (while providing coverage for all 
other cancers).  The insurer is treating A and B identically in the coverage 
provided, but the exclusion of breast cancer undoubtedly would have a 
disproportionate adverse effect on women.  Aside from coverage 
determinations, insurance marketing strategies or administrative policies 
may also have a disparate impact on a particular group,45 as may an 
insurer’s reliance on a nonprotected personal trait of an insured.46  Thus, 
like disparate-treatment discrimination, the less easily recognized impact 
                                                     
 43. The cases discussed all involve instances of overt, identifiable discrimination.  Brian Glenn, 
in discussing discrimination against certain groups within the insurance industry more generally, 
points out that disparate-treatment discrimination also can take more subtle forms, such as an agent 
who fails to return certain customers’ phone calls, offers higher prices and weaker policies to 
members of certain groups, or is slower in handling claims submitted by members of certain groups.  
Brian J. Glenn, The Shifting Rhetoric of Insurance Denial, 34 L. & SOC’Y REV. 779, 779–80 (2000). 
 44. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (noting that the Civil Rights Act 
“proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory 
in operation”).  In the employment context, the disparate impact from an employer’s practice is only 
actionable if not justified by business necessity.  Id. 
 45. In employment discrimination law, the disparate impact felt is typically that members of a 
protected group have a higher rate of exclusion from the workplace or a lower rate of advancement 
within the workplace.  In the health insurance setting, the disparate impact felt by a particular group 
might take the forms of higher levels of uninsurance, higher levels of inadequate coverage, or lower 
rates of successful claims.  For example, an insurer who passes out enrollment applications at a 
health club may be likely to reach a disproportionately small number of persons with serious health 
conditions, and applications sent to an insurer who advertises primarily in homemaking magazines 
may include a disproportionately low number of male applicants.  An indemnity insurer that requires 
that all claim forms be submitted in English may disproportionately affect the ability of subscribers 
of Mexican origin to receive benefits. 
 46. See Wortham, supra note 30, at 365–66 (noting that automobile and property insurers’ use 
of residential zip code may have a disparate impact on racial minorities). 
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discrimination potentially may be found in various health insurer 
practices. 
Having suggested that discrimination of some sort lies at the heart of 
health insurers’ risk-classification practices,47 I hasten to note that most 
Americans are not subjected to these practices when they obtain 
insurance coverage.  Most Americans under the age of sixty-five receive 
health insurance coverage from their employers, and for several reasons 
insurers do not engage in risk-classification practices for large employer 
groups.48  The smaller the group for which coverage is purchased, 
however, the more likely a health insurer is to employ risk-classification 
devices, so that small employers seeking to purchase coverage are more 
likely to encounter the use of underwriting, coverage, and pricing 
mechanisms.49  By all accounts, risk-classification practices are de rigeur 
in the market for individual health insurance policies, at least where 
permitted by law.  Thus, health insurers’ discriminatory practices are 
concentrated highly in the individual market, with some infiltration in the 
small-group market.  Although the number of persons who obtain 
coverage through the individual market is relatively small, the stakes are 
typically high, for purchasers in the individual market may have no other 
coverage option.  Moreover, the continuing erosion of employer-
sponsored health coverage seems likely to cause the ranks of prospective 
purchasers in the individual market to swell.  Accordingly, the number of 
purchasers subject to discriminatory practices by insurers probably will 
increase in the short run. 
To this point, I have used “discrimination” in its neutral sense of 
drawing distinctions and have not focused on the legitimacy or legality 
of any particular basis for discrimination.  The sections that follow 
undertake the task of cataloging the various bases for health-insurance 
discrimination that the law has proscribed.  The treatment of each type of 
legally regulated discrimination is necessarily circumscribed, for this 
Part’s remaining purpose is not to provide comprehensive analysis of all 
                                                     
 47. The courts certainly are aware of this point as well.  See, e.g., Thompson v. IDS Life Ins. 
Co., 549 P.2d 510, 512 (Or. 1976) (en banc) (stating that “insurance, to some extent, always involves 
discrimination”). 
 48. See Swartz, supra note 34, at 94–95 (explaining why insurers in the large-group market are 
less concerned about adverse selection). 
 49. The small-group market generally is defined as groups having two to fifty members.  See, 
e.g., NYS Health Maint. Org. Conference v. Curiale, 64 F.3d 794, 800 (2d Cir. 1995) (noting that 
regulation 146 of the Official Compilation of Codes, Rules & Regulations of the State of New York 
defines a small group as having three to fifty members).  The frequency with which insurers 
underwrite coverage in the small-group market is not entirely clear.  See Clifford & Iuculano, supra 
note 41, at 1809 n.17 (explaining why insurers may employ risk-classification practices with respect 
to small groups). 
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such prohibitions, but instead to suggest their number, variety, and 
inconsistency of approach and rationale.  What should emerge from this 
cataloging is a recognition that society has branded as illegitimate the 
discrimination embodied in some insurance practices, but not others, 
without any distinguishable overarching justification for doing so. 
B. Laws Prohibiting or Regulating Discrimination in Health Insurance 
In cataloging the various legal proscriptions of health-insurance 
discrimination, identifying several key items will enable comparisons.  
First, and most salient, what is the individual trait placed off limits as a 
basis for risk classification?  Second, what types of discrimination are 
prohibited?  Does the law broadly prohibit both disparate-impact and 
disparate-treatment discrimination by health insurers, or does it more 
narrowly proscribe only the latter?  Third, whose actions are 
constrained?  Does the law apply directly to health insurance issuers, to 
employers providing health insurance coverage, or both?  And finally, 
what rationale justifies the legislative choice to limit insurers’ use of 
risk-classification mechanisms and thus their freedom to pursue profit in 
the marketplace? 
1. Race Discrimination 
Race is the trait that receives the strongest protection against use in 
health insurance risk classification.  Both federal and state laws forbid its 
use as a mechanism for segregating risk.  The strong prohibitions against 
racial risk classification, however, do not simply reflect a judgment that 
race is never an actuarially valid predictor of future costs.  While 
commentators have noted that the shorter average life expectancy for 
black Americans, as compared to white Americans, carries some 
actuarial significance for both life insurance and annuities,50 less noted is 
the possibility that African Americans’ generally lower health status and 
 
                                                     
 50. E.g., Robert H. Jerry II & Kyle B. Mansfield, Justifying Unisex Insurance: Another 
Perspective, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 329, 352 (1985). 
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higher disease burden51 could justify using race as a risk classifier in 
health insurance. 
Notwithstanding its potential actuarial relevance, race is deemed an 
illegitimate classifier under the insurance regulation laws of most states.  
Some states achieve this result through laws specifically directed at 
outlawing race-based classifications;52 others subsume the use of race 
within their definitions of insurance unfair trade practices.53  By their 
terms, however, state laws apply only to the use of race to treat persons 
differently; they have not generally been extended to prohibit risk 
classifications that have a racially disparate impact.54 
When an individual receives health insurance as a benefit of 
employment, federal law also prohibits racial classifications.  The 
antidiscrimination mandate of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act55 
extends to discrimination in employer-sponsored benefit plans such as 
health insurance coverage.56  Moreover, Title VII has been interpreted to 
prohibit not only different treatment based on race, but also disparate-
impact discrimination.57  Thus, at least in theory, an insurance risk 
classifier that has an unjustified disparate impact on a racial group is 
illegal under Title VII.58  Beyond the employment context, federal civil 
                                                     
 51. See Vernellia R. Randall, Racial Discrimination in Health Care in the United States as a 
Violation of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 
14 U. FLA. J. LAW & PUB. POL’Y 45, 51 (2002) (giving several examples of racial disparities in 
health status and disease incidence, including the figure that African Americans have a seventy 
percent higher rate of diabetes than white Americans); Lynette Clemetson, Links Between Prison 
and AIDS Affecting Blacks Inside and Out, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2004, at A1 (reporting that more 
than half of all new cases of HIV nationwide are among African Americans and that African-
American women make up seventy-two percent of new cases among women). 
 52. E.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 500.2082 (2002). 
 53. E.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-18-210 (2003); Gaulding, supra note 30, at 1659–60. 
 54. Some states, however, effectively have proscribed one form of potential disparate-impact 
race discrimination by explicitly prohibiting insurers from using the presence of sickle cell trait—a 
genetic trait found predominantly among African Americans—as a basis for underwriting or risk 
rating.  Hellman, supra note 19, at 381–82. 
 55. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an 
employer . . . to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin . . . .”). 
 56. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 682 (1983). 
 57. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 3(3), 105 Stat. 1071, 1071 (1991) 
(amending Title VII to provide statutory authority for disparate-impact suits); Griggs v. Duke Power 
Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (recognizing disparate-impact claim). 
 58. See EEOC Compliance Manual, Chapter 3: Employee Benefits (Oct. 3, 2000), 
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/benefits.html [hereinafter Compliance Manual] (“Disparate impact 
analysis . . . applies equally to the employer’s provision of health benefits.”); cf. EEOC v. J.C. 
Penney Co., 843 F.2d 249, 251 (6th Cir. 1988) (discussing legal uncertainty as to whether disparate-
impact theory can be used in claim based on section 703(a)(1) of Title VII); Novak v. Nationwide 
Mut. Ins. Co., 599 N.W.2d 546, 554 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999) (noting split of authority on question of 
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rights laws may limit insurers’ use of race as a classifier, even in the 
absence of state action.59 
What explains the law’s consistently strong protection against the 
use of race in underwriting, coverage, and rating decisions?  The answer 
may lie partly in that race is less valuable to insurers in predicting future 
medical expenses than are other traits such as sex, age, disability, or 
medical history—all of which, as we will see, receive more limited 
protection.  Nonetheless, data regarding the greater disease burdens 
borne by some racial groups might—from the perspective of actuarial 
fairness—support insurers’ reliance on race in classifying risks.  Perhaps 
we should understand prohibitions on racial classifications less as a 
judgment of actuarial irrelevance than as a reflection of societal 
unwillingness to allow a divisive use of race in the context of insurance.  
In this sense, the social solidarity stance discernible in laws prohibiting 
racial classifications may be better understood as a particularized 
manifestation of the more general societal judgment regarding the 
illegitimacy or repugnance of using race in determining access to societal 
benefits.60 
2. Sex Discrimination 
In contrast to the general consensus that insurers should not use race 
in classifying risks, controversy has marked attempts to prohibit sex-
based classifications61 and protections against sex discrimination in 
                                                                                                                       
whether insurance redlining is prohibited as a form of disparate-impact discrimination under the 
federal Fair Housing Act). 
 59. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000) (guaranteeing to all persons a right equal to that enjoyed by 
white citizens to make and enforce contracts); 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (2000) (guaranteeing to all citizens 
a right equal to that enjoyed by white citizens to purchase real and personal property); Wortham, 
supra note 30, at 362–63 (discussing application of these laws to race or color classification in 
insurance); cf. Thompson v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 216 F.R.D. 55, 59–61 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (approving 
proposed settlement in class action brought by non-Caucasian policyholders alleging that life insurer 
violated 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1982 by selling them policies that cost more and provided fewer 
benefits than policies sold to Caucasians). 
 60. See JERRY, supra note 30, at 136 (asserting that notwithstanding black Americans’ shorter 
life expectancy, “because our society views racial discrimination with repugnance, no one contends 
that black Americans should pay more for life insurance or receive a premium reduction for 
annuities”). 
 61. See Sharona Hoffman, AIDS Caps, Contraceptive Coverage, and the Law: An Analysis of 
the Federal Anti-Discrimination Statutes’ Applicability to Health Insurance, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 
1315, 1349 (2002) (stating that sex-based classifications “remain a vigorously disputed practice”).  
Forceful debates occurred in legislative, judicial, and academic arenas in the 1970s and 1980s 
regarding the extent to which sex discrimination should be prohibited in employer benefit plans and 
insurance.  For references to the scholarly debates, see Wortham, supra note 30, at 356–57 nn.31–
32. 
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insurance remain more limited.  The objections raised to prohibitions on 
sex-based insurance classifications are not surprising, for sex’s actuarial 
relevance in evaluating risks of various types is greater than that of race.  
In a number of settings, sex provides insurers with an inexpensive 
method of classifying risks; 62 in the health insurance setting, relying on 
sex as a classifier leads to younger women being charged higher 
premiums than men because of the risk of medical costs associated with 
pregnancy and childbirth.63  Today, the protection against insurance sex 
discrimination varies between the state and federal levels and the 
employment and nonemployment contexts. 
On the state level, insurance laws largely permit the use of sex as a 
risk classifier, at least for purposes of rate calculation.64  Despite some 
proposals to require “unisex” insurance rating,65 most states have 
declined to eliminate the practice of calculating sex-based premiums.66  
Given the permissiveness of most states’ laws and the actuarial value of 
sex as a classifier, it is not surprising that many health insurers 
discriminate against women by charging them higher premiums than 
men.67 
This permissiveness evaporates, however, when the setting shifts to 
employer-sponsored health insurance coverage, for sex is one of Title 
VII’s prohibited bases for discrimination.  As with race, therefore, an 
employer who sponsors group health coverage for its employees cannot 
discriminate based on sex in that coverage.  In addition, the Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act (PDA),68 which Congress passed in 1978 to amend 
                                                     
 62. See JERRY, supra note 30, at 133–34 (pointing out relevance to life insurance, annuities, 
health and disability insurance, and automobile insurance and stating, “[i]n these settings, gender is a 
low-cost way to differentiate risks”). 
 63. Id. at 134.  See also Diane Levick, ConnectiCare Joining Gender Trend—Health Insurer, 
Following Anthem and UnitedHealth, Plans to Charge More for Most Women¸ HARTFORD 
COURANT, Apr. 22, 2004, at E1. 
 64. Few states restrict sex classification regarding rating.  Furthermore, while a number of 
states restrict the ability of insurers to deny or limit coverage on the basis of sex, see Wortham, 
supra note 30, at 366, only Montana prohibits all sex-based classifications by insurers.  MONT. CODE 
ANN. § 49-2-309 (2003). 
 65. See, e.g., Jerry & Mansfield, supra note 50, at 359–67 (discussing justifications for unisex 
insurance); cf. Anne C. Cicero, Strategies for the Elimination of Sex Discrimination in Private 
Insurance, 20 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 211, 264 (1985) (discussing Montana’s model of unisex 
legislation); Wortham, supra note 30, at 368 (arguing that the use of sex should be prohibited in 
insurance classifications, notwithstanding its statistical association with loss). 
 66. Wortham, supra note 30, at 366. 
 67. See Levick, supra note 63 (reporting that ConnectiCare attributed its decision to switch to 
gender rating for small employers in part because of the adverse selection that occurred as a result of 
other companies using gender rating: a disproportionate share of employers with more women than 
men (i.e., high-cost employers) chose ConnectiCare). 
 68. Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978). 
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Title VII, makes explicit that discrimination based on “pregnancy, 
childbirth, or related medical conditions” is a form of sex 
discrimination.69  Interpreting these laws specifically in the context of 
employee benefit plans, the Supreme Court has held that employers 
cannot provide fringe benefits that discriminate either by charging 
members of one sex more for equivalent coverage70 or by providing 
members of one sex lesser benefits for the same contribution.71 
Moreover, in Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. 
EEOC,72 the Court indicated that even if an employer provided male and 
female employees with the same health insurance plan for the same 
contribution, the employer discriminated if the coverage provided was 
less comprehensive for members of one sex.73  Implicit in the Court’s 
reasoning are two points consistent with a strong stance against sex-
based inequality in employee benefits.  First, the Court accepted the 
plaintiffs’ invitation to consider the content, or terms, of the coverage 
provided rather than simply examining whether all employees received 
the same policy for the same price.74  Second, in establishing relative 
comprehensiveness as the touchstone for judging policy terms, the Court 
effectively incorporated an assessment of impacts into its analysis.75  An 
                                                     
 69. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2000). 
 70. L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 711 (1978) (holding that requiring 
female employees to make bigger contributions than males to employer’s pension plan violated Title 
VII). 
 71. Arizona Governing Comm. v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 1084–86 (1983) (holding that 
retirement plan that paid men a higher monthly benefit than women violated Title VII).  As Robert 
Jerry puts it: “Under the logic of [Manhart and Norris], it is a violation of Title VII for an employer 
to provide its employees any kind of insurance fringe benefit . . . unless identical benefits are 
provided to both men and women and unless contributions, if any, are the same for both genders.”  
JERRY, supra note 30, at 135. 
 72. 462 U.S. 669 (1983). 
 73. See id. at 676 (“Under the proper test petitioner’s plan is unlawful, because the protection it 
affords to married male employees is less comprehensive than the protection it affords to married 
female employees.”).  The employer in Newport News provided hospitalization and medical-surgical 
coverage for employees and their spouses.  Prior to the passage of the PDA, the plan contained a 
limitation (not applicable to any other hospital admission) on the coverage of hospitalizations for 
pregnancy.  Presumably in response to the PDA, the employer amended its health plan in 1979 to 
remove that limitation from the coverage provided to employees; it retained the limitation, however, 
in the coverage provided to the wives of male employees.  Id. at 671–73.  Accordingly, the plaintiffs 
in Newport News argued that the plan discriminated against married male employees by providing 
them with a less comprehensive level of spousal coverage than was provided to married female 
employees.  Id. at 674. 
 74. Id. at 683–85. 
 75. See id.  The Newport News Court did not explicitly adopt a disparate-impact mode of 
analysis.  The opinion can be read as applying a disparate-treatment approach to discrimination for it 
identified the plan’s exclusion of spousal hospital maternity benefits as providing male employees’ 
spouses with more limited coverage than female employees’ spouses (who never went to the hospital 
to have a baby).  Because the plan itself contained a distinction based on pregnancy-related benefits, 
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inquiry directed to the comprehensiveness of coverage is not confined to 
asking whether male and female employees receive the same policy with 
identical terms; it instead compares how thoroughly that policy actually 
covers male and female enrollees’ medical expenses.76 
Questions about the sex-relative comprehensiveness of coverage 
have arisen recently in relation to employers’ exclusion of prescription 
contraceptive coverage from their health plans.  In Erickson v. Bartell 
Drug Co.,77 a federal court found that such an exclusion violated Title 
VII because it failed to meet the “special or increased healthcare needs 
associated with a woman’s unique sex-based characteristics . . . to the 
same extent, and on the same terms, as other healthcare needs.”78  
Erickson expands on the reasoning in Newport News to conclude that an 
employer offering a health benefit plan is obligated to make certain both 
that it does not incorporate sex-based distinctions into its terms and that 
it “provides equally comprehensive coverage for both sexes.”79  In other 
words, a policy may violate Title VII by providing less inclusive 
coverage of women’s health needs, even if its terms make no reference to 
sex-based characteristics such as pregnancy or childbirth.80 
                                                                                                                       
the policy was discriminatory on its face in light of the PDA.  See id. at 684 (“The 1978 Act makes 
clear that it is discriminatory to treat pregnancy-related conditions less favorably than other medical 
conditions.”).  The Court employed a two-step analysis that enabled it to conclude that 
“discrimination against female spouses in the provision of fringe benefits is also discrimination 
against male employees.”  Id. 
 76. Cf. Hoffman, supra note 61, at 1350–51 (asserting that Supreme Court cases require a 
plaintiff to “make a direct comparison between the benefits received by men and women and show 
that in some respect the insurance coverage available to one gender is inferior to that available to the 
other sex” to prove a Title VII violation). 
 77. 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266 (W.D. Wash. 2001). 
 78. Id. at 1271. 
 79. Id. at 1272. 
 80. The court granted summary judgment to Erickson on her disparate-treatment claim because 
“prescription contraceptives are used only by women.”  Id.  As a result, the court found it 
unnecessary to consider Erickson’s disparate-impact claim.  Id. at 1277.  Some commentators, 
however, have suggested that the claim would better be analyzed as a disparate-impact claim that 
looks at the burden imposed disproportionately on women, in terms of both the financial costs of 
prescription contraceptives and the numerous burdens of unwanted pregnancy.  The disparate impact 
characterization would allow the legal finding of discrimination to survive the eventual introduction 
of male prescription contraceptives into the market.  See Lee Korland, Sex Discrimination or a Hard 
Pill for Employers to Swallow: Examining the Denial of Contraceptive Benefits in the Wake of 
Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co., 53 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 531, 552–54 (2002); Sylvia A. Law, Sex 
Discrimination and Insurance for Contraception, 73 WASH. L. REV. 363, 374–75 (1998). 
 The reasoning successfully used by the plaintiff in Erickson has not been successful in suits 
alleging a violation of Title VII in the failure of an employer’s plan to cover treatments or 
procedures responding to infertility.  See, e.g., Saks v. Franklin Covey Co., 316 F.3d 337, 348–49 
(2d Cir. 2003); Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674, 680–81 (8th Cir. 1996). 
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If one accepts Erickson’s reasoning81 it becomes evident that Title 
VII requires an employer offering health insurance coverage to be 
concerned not only with the equality of treatment of male and female 
employees, but also (to some degree) with the equality of outcome—as 
measured by comprehensiveness of coverage.  Accordingly, it seems that 
a woman who receives health insurance coverage from her employer 
receives strong protection against varied forms of sex discrimination 
under federal employment law.  By contrast, a woman who obtains her 
own coverage (even if she does so with funds contributed by her 
employer for that purpose), receives little or no protection under state 
insurance law.82  The explanation for this inconsistent treatment is not 
clear, but the inconsistency suggests that as a society we are more 
concerned about sex-based inequality in employment than we are about 
pursuing a social solidarity vision of insurance more broadly. 
3. Disability Discrimination 
At first glance, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) appears 
to be a promising source of protection against health-insurance 
discrimination for people with disabilities.  Congress passed the ADA in 
an effort to eliminate discrimination against persons with disabilities83 
across a broad swath of American society.  Regulatory and judicial 
 
                                                     
 81. The parties to Erickson eventually settled following the district court’s decision.  See 
Bartell Class-Action Settlement OK’d—Agreement on Contraceptive Coverage, SEATTLE POST-
INTELLIGENCER, Mar. 5, 2003, at B5.  Thus, there has been no appellate review of the case.  The 
court’s decision is, however, consistent with the EEOC’s approach to the question.  In 2000, the 
EEOC ruled that an employer’s exclusion of prescription contraceptives from a health plan that 
otherwise comprehensively covered pharmaceuticals was a violation of Title VII.  EEOC, Decision 
on Coverage of Contraception (Dec. 14, 2000), http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/decision-
contraception.html.  The commentators have been divided in their assessment of Erickson.  Compare 
Julia Bruzina, Erickson v. Bartell: The “Common Sense” Approach to Employer-Based Insurance 
for Women, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 463, 504–16 (2003) (supporting outcome), and Korland, supra note 
80, at 544–49 (same), with E. Renee Backmeyer, Lack of Insurance Coverage for Prescription 
Contraception by an Otherwise Comprehensive Plan as a Violation of Title VII as Amended by the 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act—Stretching the Statute Too Far, 37 IND. L. REV. 437, 446–66 (2004) 
(criticizing Erickson), and James A. Ryan, Contraceptives and Employer Health Prescription Plans: 
An Examination of Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co., 11 GEO. MASON L. REV. 215, 232–41 (2002) 
(same).  Cf. Hoffman, supra note 61, at 1351 (questioning the soundness of Erickson’s analysis). 
 82. Hellman, supra note 19, at 384 (“The individual insurance market, where most 
underwriting and risk rating takes place, is untouched by [Title VII].”); JERRY, supra note 30, at 135 
(“[T]he employer can give the employee a sum of money, and the employee can use the money to 
purchase an insurance policy whose price or benefits are calculated according to gender-distinct 
tables.”). 
 83. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (2000). 
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interpretations of the ADA, however, permit insurers to use disability as 
a risk classifier, demanding at most consistency with actuarial fairness.84 
Like Title VII, the ADA extends its prohibition of disability 
discrimination to employer-provided fringe benefits.85  The question of 
what actions should be deemed to be prohibited “discrimination” remains 
substantially murkier in the context of disability discrimination than in 
race or sex discrimination.  Without attempting to describe the numerous 
divisions among courts and commentators on this issue,86 I briefly will 
describe the position that the EEOC’s Compliance Manual87 takes on the 
ADA’s application to employer-provided health insurance.  That position 
represents what is probably the broadest plausible understanding of the 
ADA’s application, but even it describes substantially circumscribed 
protection.88  Moreover, many courts have rejected the EEOC’s positions 
and construed the ADA even more weakly.89 
The EEOC asserts that if an employer provides benefits to 
employees with disabilities that are not equal to the benefits received by 
other employees, the employer may be liable for violating the ADA if 
any inequality in benefits is based on disability.90  In the Compliance 
Manual, the EEOC interprets “equality” of benefits broadly and finds 
unequal benefits if a health plan’s terms contain a disability-based 
distinction, even if the plan is provided to disabled and nondisabled 
employees alike.91  In this sense, the EEOC’s position seems akin to the 
Supreme Court’s comprehensiveness of coverage test for sex 
                                                     
 84. See infra text accompanying notes 94–100. 
 85. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(2) (2000). 
 86. For discussions of the application of the ADA to employer-provided health insurance 
coverage, see generally Melissa Cole, Beyond Sex Discrimination: Why Employers Discriminate 
Against Women with Disabilities When Their Employee Health Plans Exclude Contraceptives from 
Prescription Coverage, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 501 (2001); Hoffman, supra note 61; Jacobi, supra note 
30; H. Miriam Farber, Note, Subterfuge: Do Coverage Limitations and Exclusions in Employer-
Provided Health Care Plans Violate the Americans with Disabilities Act?, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 850 
(1994).  The insurance issue most frequently litigated under Title I has involved not health 
insurance, but the differential in length of benefits provided for physical disabilities and for mental 
disabilities in employer-provided, long-term disability insurance coverage.  The current weight of 
the authority on this question holds that such a distinction in the benefits provided does not violate 
the ADA, on the reasoning either that the ADA was not intended to protect against discrimination 
between persons with differing disabilities and/or that the distinction falls within the insurance safe 
harbor described infra text accompanying notes 100–02.  See, e.g., Weyer v. Twentieth Century Fox 
Film Corp., 198 F.3d 1104, 1115–17 (9th Cir. 2000); Leonard F. v. Isr. Disc. Bank, 199 F.3d 99, 
102–03 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 87. Compliance Manual, supra note 58, at ch. 3. 
 88. Id. 
 89. See, e.g., Weyer, 198 F.3d at 1115–17; Leonard F., 199 F.3d at 102–03. 
 90. Compliance Manual, supra note 58, at ch. 2. 
 91. Id. at ch. 3. 
CROSSLEY FINAL.DOC 2/21/2006  9:55:25 AM 
2005] DISCRIMINATION AGAINST THE UNHEALTHY 93 
discrimination in health insurance.92  Just as a limitation on maternity 
benefits constitutes sex discrimination even if all employees receive the 
same policy, a limitation on coverage for HIV/AIDS constitutes 
disability discrimination even if all employees receive the same policy.93 
The congruity of treatment with sex discrimination ends there, 
however, on at least two counts.  First, the EEOC takes the position that 
the ADA, unlike Title VII, does not prohibit disparate-impact 
discrimination in fringe benefits.94  Second, and of more fundamental 
concern for this Article, Title V of the ADA includes a safe harbor 
provision95 for insurance that, even as construed by the EEOC, reflects a 
distinct tilt toward an actuarial fairness approach to insurance.  Section 
501(c) contains the safe harbor, which excludes from ADA coverage 
certain actions by insurers and employers sponsoring employee health 
plans.96  According to the EEOC’s interpretation of the notoriously 
ambiguous section 501(c),97 a disability-based distinction in coverage 
that produces unequal benefits violates the ADA unless the employer can 
show that the challenged provision is not a subterfuge to evade the 
purposes of the ADA.98  One of several ways that the EEOC suggests an 
employer can make this showing is to demonstrate that “the disability-
based disparate treatment is justified by legitimate actuarial data, or by 
actual or reasonably anticipated experience, and that conditions with 
comparable actuarial data and/or experience are treated the same way.”99  
In effect, the EEOC reads section 501(c) as creating a safe harbor for 
insurance classifications based on disability, as long as they are 
actuarially supported.100  The thinness of this protection stands in marked 
                                                     
 92. See supra text accompanying note 73; cf. Jacobi, supra note 30, at 353 n.167 (“Without 
section 501(c), the ADA would bar employee classifications for purposes of benefits plans on the 
basis of disability similar to Title VII’s prohibition of classification by sex.”). 
 93. See Compliance Manual, supra note 58, at ch. 2 (giving example of AIDS cap). 
 94. The current version of the Compliance Manual states as follows: “A health-related 
distinction that is not disability-based, and that is applied equally to all employees, does not violate 
the ADA.”  Id. at ch. 3.  In a regulatory precursor to this section of the Compliance Manual, the 
EEOC dropped a footnote to an identical sentence and stated explicitly in the footnote that disparate-
impact theory was not available in the context of employer-provided health insurance.  EEOC’s 
Interim Enforcement Guidance on the Application of the ADA, at n.2 (Sept. 9, 1993), reprinted in 
RUTH COLKER, THE LAW OF DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION 469 (1995).  See also Hoffman, supra 
note 61, at 1324–26 (asserting that disparate-impact analysis cannot be used in the context of 
insurance coverage). 
 95. 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c) (2000). 
 96. Id. 
 97. One judge characterized § 501(c) as “totally ambiguous on its face.”  Parker v. Metro. Life 
Ins. Co., 99 F.3d 181, 190 (6th Cir. 1996), rev’d en banc, 121 F.3d 1006 (6th Cir. 1997). 
 98. Compliance Manual, supra note 58, at ch. 4. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id.  For discussions of the scope of § 501(c) that reach this same general conclusion, see 
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contrast to the substantial protection provided by Title VII’s prohibition 
of race- and sex-based distinctions in employer-provided coverage 
regardless of any actuarial justification.101  And even the EEOC’s thin 
protection surpasses that found by the numerous courts that have read the 
safe harbor effectively to shield any insurance practice that was not 
adapted for the purpose of evading the ADA.102 
In one sense, however, the ADA would seem to provide broader 
protection against health-insurance discrimination than does Title VII, 
for the ADA applies to health insurers as well as to employers.  Title III 
of the ADA prohibits discrimination by public accommodations, a 
category that includes insurance offices,103 but courts have been quite 
stingy in applying the public accommodations provisions to 
health-insurance discrimination.  Most appellate courts that have 
considered the question have found that Title III’s prohibition does not 
apply to the contents of insurance policies, so that insurers remain free to 
use disability in establishing policy limitations, even if they have no 
actuarial justification for doing so.104  While a number of courts view 
Title III as at least potentially constraining an insurer’s decisions 
regarding whether to issue a policy to a person with a disability and at 
what price,105 insurance companies’ use of disability as a risk classifier in 
underwriting and pricing decisions is largely immunized under section 
501(c).  Some courts have interpreted the statute even more restrictively, 
finding that Title III demands only physical accessibility of insurance 
offices.106 
                                                                                                                       
Cole, supra note 86, at 534 (“Section 501(c) represents Congress’ reasoned solution to the problem 
of prohibiting discrimination on the basis of disability when such a prohibition would make 
insurance underwriting impossible.”); Hoffman, supra note 61, at 1341–44 (stating that section 
501(c) “allows employers to retain discriminatory insurance terms if they can prove a basis for them 
in sound actuarial principles”). 
 101. See supra text accompanying notes 81–82. 
 102. E.g., Weyer v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 198 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2000); Leonard 
F. v. Isr. Disc. Bank, 199 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 103. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(F) (2000). 
 104. For example, in Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 179 F.3d 557 (7th Cir. 1999), the 
Seventh Circuit rejected the plaintiff’s claim that Mutual of Omaha’s imposition of a cap on 
coverage that applied only to the treatment of HIV/AIDS violated the ADA.  The court based its 
rejection on its conclusion that Congress did not intend Title III to apply to the contents of insurance 
policies.  Id. at 560–63.  Thus, the court held that the plaintiff’s claim should be dismissed even 
though Mutual of Omaha conceded that it had no actuarial justification for its AIDS cap.  Id. at 558, 
562.  See also McNeil v. Time Ins. Co., 205 F.3d 179, 187–88 (5th Cir. 2000) (reaching same 
result). 
 105. See, e.g., Pallozzi v. Allstate Life Ins. Co., 198 F.3d 28, 33 (2d Cir. 2000) (stating that Title 
III prohibits a disability-based refusal to sell merchandise by public accommodations); Doe, 179 
F.3d at 559 (stating that an insurance company generally cannot refuse to sell insurance to a person 
with AIDS). 
 106. E.g., Weyer, 198 F.3d at 1115; Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 612–13 (3rd 
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Thus, despite the ADA’s self-proclaimed purpose of providing “a 
clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of 
discrimination against individuals with disabilities,”107 the statute as 
interpreted accepts, rather than eliminates, actuarially justified 
discrimination in health insurance.108  Congress’s inclusion of the 
insurance safe harbor reflected a conscious decision not to disrupt 
traditional underwriting practices by insurers.  Whereas Congress 
elevated equality concerns over deference to the insurance industry in 
Title VII, it largely caved to industry concerns regarding federal 
intrusion into common risk-classification practices.  As a consequence, 
people with disabilities are protected from health-insurance 
discrimination only if it is irrational or intentionally discriminatory, and 
they may not receive even that protection if they purchase their health 
insurance directly from an insurer rather than receiving it as an 
employment benefit. 
4. Age Discrimination 
As in the cases of race, sex, and disability, the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act (ADEA)109 announces a federal mandate against 
discrimination in the terms or conditions of employment or in employee 
compensation or privileges.110  But much as the ADA provides only 
meager protection against disability-based health-insurance 
discrimination, so too the ADEA’s protection against age discrimination 
in health benefits is significantly more attenuated than that provided by 
Title VII.  While courts have interpreted Title VII to prohibit both 
treating employees differently based on race or sex and failing to provide 
                                                                                                                       
Cir. 1998).  This position seems particularly difficult to justify.  Can a restaurant comply with Title 
III by making its facility completely accessible, but then refuse to serve meals to persons with 
disabilities or charge them higher prices for the meals?  The position also is unnecessary to the 
purpose of protecting insurers from having to make major changes to their underwriting practices, 
for the insurance safe harbor accomplishes that purpose. 
 107. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (2000). 
 108. This constricted meaning of discrimination applicable to the health insurance context stands 
in marked contrast to the expanded definition that the ADA gives to “discrimination” in other 
contexts.  See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2000) (stating that in the employment context 
“discrimination” includes a failure to make reasonable accommodations to the limitations of an 
individual with a disability); Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 600 (1999) (recognizing 
that under the ADA “unjustified institutional isolation of persons with disabilities is a form of 
discrimination”).  By including § 501(c) in the ADA, Congress singled out insurance as subject to a 
far more limited understanding of discrimination, albeit an understanding consistent with that used in 
state unfair trade practice laws.  See supra Part III.A. 
 109. The ADEA is codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–34 (2000). 
 110. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2000). 
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equally comprehensive coverage to both sexes, the ADEA explicitly 
allows employers to provide older workers with lesser benefits than 
younger workers.111 
Under an exemption from the ADEA’s antidiscrimination mandate 
that Congress enacted in 1990,112 an employer that provides lesser 
benefits to older workers under the terms of a bona fide benefit plan will 
not violate the Act if the older workers’ benefits cost the employer as 
much as the younger workers’ benefits.113  Courts and commentators 
have described this exemption as creating an “equal benefit or equal 
cost” test that applies generally to employee benefit plans.114  This 
exemption effectively acknowledges the higher cost of providing health 
coverage or other insurance for older employees and tolerates employer 
decisions to scale back accordingly on the coverage provided to older 
employees115—even though an analogous decision to scale back on 
women’s health benefits in light of their higher cost would certainly be 
found illegal and intolerable.  Thus, the “equal benefit or equal cost” 
approach to assessing the legality of health coverage under the ADEA 
can be understood as reflecting a congressional step away from a social 
solidarity approach to employer-provided health coverage and a step 
toward an actuarial fairness approach.  Significantly, however, the EEOC 
has signaled recently its intent to eliminate even the limited protection 
provided by the “equal cost” prong of the test, at least with respect to 
employer-provided health coverage for Medicare-eligible retirees.116 
                                                     
 111. Cf. Hoffman, supra note 61, at 1356 (stating that the ADEA “does not comprehensively 
regulate the contents of health insurance plans and does not require that individuals in different age 
categories be offered benefits that are substantively equivalent”). 
 112. The Older Workers Benefit Protection Act legislatively overruled the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Public Employees Retirement System of Ohio v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158 (1989), and amended 
the ADEA to make clear Congress’s intent that the ADEA’s purpose was to “prohibit discrimination 
against older workers in all employee benefits except when age-based reductions in employee 
benefit plans are justified by significant cost considerations.” Pub. L. No. 101-433, § 101, 104 Stat. 
978, 978 (1990). 
 113. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2)(B)(i) (2000). 
 114. The “equal benefit or equal cost” test does not apply to early retirement incentive programs, 
which only have to be voluntary and in accord with the ADEA’s relevant purposes.  29 U.S.C. § 
623(f)(2)(B)(ii). 
 115. See Auerbach v. Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 104, 110 (2d Cir. 1998) (“Realizing that the costs 
of providing certain employee benefits increases with age, Congress decided that employers need not 
provide ‘exactly the same benefits’ to older employees as they do for younger ones, when to do so 
would result in excessive benefit costs that would discourage employers from hiring older workers in 
the first place.”). 
 116. Tying the employee benefits available to an individual’s eligibility for Medicare implicates 
the ADEA because it is an exact proxy for age—Medicare eligibility is automatic for persons who 
turn sixty-five (at least for those who have paid social security taxes for a sufficient period of time).  
Cf. Gutchen v. Bd. of Governors, 148 F. Supp. 2d 151, 158 (D.R.I. 2001) (noting that Medicare 
eligibility is “inextricably tied to the retiree’s age”). 
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A decision by the Third Circuit in 2000 applying the “equal benefit 
or equal cost” test to an employer’s coordination of retiree health plans 
with Medicare coverage was the genesis of the EEOC’s eventual 
regulatory retreat from any sort of protection against discriminatory 
treatment for this subset of older persons.  In Erie County Retirees Ass’n 
v. County of Erie,117 the court held that the test applied not only to 
benefits provided to active workers, but also to benefits provided to 
retirees.  Under this holding an employer who decides to reduce or 
eliminate health benefits for retirees once they are eligible for Medicare 
coverage would violate the ADEA, unless it could show either that it 
spent as much on benefits for the older, Medicare-eligible retirees or that 
the older retirees’ benefits were equal to benefits received by younger 
retirees.118 
The EEOC initially responded to the Erie County decision by 
adopting the court’s reasoning as its national enforcement policy, but less 
than a year later, an outcry by labor unions, employers, and benefits 
experts led the EEOC to reconsider its position.119  The concern 
expressed was that because employers were not legally required to 
provide any retiree health benefits, the prospect of ADEA litigation over 
the adequacy of benefits provided to Medicare-eligible retirees might 
prompt employers to drop retiree plans altogether.120  In April 2004, the 
EEOC approved a proposed final rule creating complete exemption from 
the ADEA’s antidiscrimination rule for the practice of coordinating 
employer-sponsored benefits with eligibility for Medicare.121  This 
decision to exempt the benefits provided to Medicare-eligible retirees 
from any ADEA scrutiny drew immediate fire from retiree advocacy 
                                                     
 117. 220 F.3d 193, 216 (3rd Cir. 2000). 
 118. The court noted that, in assessing the benefits to which the older retirees were entitled, the 
government-paid coverage (Medicare) and the employer-provided coverage should be considered 
together.  Id. at 216.  Ultimately, the Third Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs had stated a claim of 
an ADEA violation, reversed the district court’s entry of summary judgment for the county, and 
remanded the case for further proceedings regarding whether the county could satisfy the “equal 
benefit or equal cost” standard.  Id. at 217. 
 119. See, e.g., Christopher E. Condeluci, Comment, Winning the Battle, but Losing the War: 
Purported Age Discrimination May Discourage Employers from Providing Retiree Medical Benefits, 
35 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 709, 714, 716 (2002). 
 120. See generally id. (arguing that Erie County would result in the elimination of retiree 
medical plans). 
 121. Age Discrimination in Employment Act; Retiree Health Benefits, 68 Fed. Reg. 41542 
(proposed July 14, 2003) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 1625, 1627).  The EEOC approved the rule 
for circulation to other federal agencies and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), but the 
rule will not become final until approved by OMB and published in the Federal Register.  The U.S. 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/regs/retiree_benefits/ 
retiree_benefits.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2005).  See also Robert Pear, Agency to Allow Insurance 
Cuts for the Retired, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2004, at A1 (reporting on the EEOC’s action). 
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groups, and as the 2004 presidential campaign intensified, the EEOC 
temporarily shelved the regulation.122  Following the election, the 
Commission renewed its pursuit of the exemption, only to have its 
proposed rule struck down as a violation of the ADEA in a challenge 
brought by the AARP.123 
This course of events illustrates how a demand for fairness in 
insurance coverage—even in the weak sense of actuarial fairness—is 
subject to being overridden by competing political concerns.  As noted, 
Congress’s enactment of the “equal benefit or equal cost” test reflects the 
adoption of an actuarial fairness approach to older employees’ claims of 
health-insurance discrimination.124  But the EEOC’s proposal to exempt 
from ADEA coverage employers’ attempts to coordinate a retiree health 
plan with Medicare coverage signals the agency’s willingness to abandon 
fairness entirely in hopes of encouraging employers to maintain their 
retiree plans.  Thus, the goal of nondiscrimination or fairness for older 
persons in employer-sponsored health coverage appears simply as one 
goal to be balanced against others. 
Ironically, the reason that maintaining retiree health plans is so 
important is that they often provide the only viable coverage option for 
younger retirees, who—because state laws do not typically proscribe age 
discrimination by insurers—may be unable to afford individual coverage 
once they retire and are no longer covered by employee plans.  Thus, the 
question for retirees may be whether they prefer to remain in the frying 
pan of retiree health plans exempt from ADEA coverage or to jump into 
the fire of the individual health insurance market. 
                                                     
 122. Employee Benefits: EEOC Proposal on Health Benefits Unlikely to Survive Due to AARP 
Opposition, BNA’S HEALTH CARE DAILY REPORT, July 30, 2004, http://pubs.bna.com/ip/BNA 
/hce.nsf/is/a0a9f0w4n4. 
 123. AARP v. EEOC, No. 05-CV-509, 2005 WL 723991, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 30, 2005).  The 
EEOC has indicated its intent to appeal the district court’s ruling to the Third Circuit Court of 
Appeals.  Press Release, The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n, EEOC Seeks to Appeal 
Court Order on Retiree Health Benefits Rule (Mar. 30, 2005), available at http://eeoc.gov/press/3-
30-05.html. 
 124. The idea that equality of employer contribution is an acceptable alternative to equality of 
benefit received is not exactly the same as the vision of actuarial fairness described earlier in this 
Article, which focused primarily on the insurer’s perception of fairness regarding the amount that 
insureds should be charged in relation to their actuarially predicted future health costs.  Instead, the 
equal cost prong addresses fairness from the perspective of an employer, in light of insurers’ 
actuarially based charges for health insurance. 
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5. Genetic Discrimination 
In contrast to race, sex, disability, and age discrimination, where the 
federal government has played the leading role in addressing 
health-insurance discrimination (albeit indirectly by prohibiting 
employment discrimination), the states have to date outstripped the 
federal government in protecting individuals from insurers’ 
discriminatory use of genetic information.  These state laws are of 
relatively recent advent, prompted by advances in genetic science that 
permit individual testing to determine the presence of a growing number 
of genetic markers associated with an elevated risk of developing 
conditions ranging from breast cancer, to diabetes, to Alzheimer’s 
disease.125  These genetic advances, while widely acclaimed for their 
potential to prevent, detect, and treat disease in the future,126 have 
simultaneously provoked fears that insurers and employers will seek to 
obtain and use genetic information about individuals.127 
Beginning in the 1990s, most state legislatures responded to these 
fears.128  Legislation broadly regulating health insurers’ use of genetic 
information for risk-classification purposes129 has been described as 
evolving from a first wave of laws that barred insurers from considering 
the results of particular genetic tests, to more recent laws that forbid 
insurers’ consideration of information about a person’s genetic 
characteristics, regardless of the information’s source.130  By prohibiting 
a variety of risk-classification uses and defining broadly the genetic 
information protected, these newer laws clearly reject an actuarial 
fairness approach to health insurance—at least with respect to this 
                                                     
 125. See Colin S. Diver & Jane Maslow Cohen, Genophobia: What is Wrong with Genetic 
Discrimination?, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1439, 1442–44 (2001) (stating that the prospect of genetic 
testing has led to apprehension, which has generated legislation). 
 126. Id. at 1441. 
 127. Id. at 1444. 
 128. According to Deborah Hellman, as of 2003, forty-six states had enacted laws prohibiting 
genetic discrimination in insurance.  Deborah Hellman, What Makes Genetic Discrimination 
Exceptional?, 29 AM. J.L. & MED. 77, 77 n.2 (2003).  Some state legislatures passed earlier laws that 
kept insurers from considering the presence of particular recessive genetic traits that were irrelevant 
to the individual carrier’s health risks.  As John Jacobi points out, these laws harmonized with “the 
general rule requiring actuarial justification” for classifications.  John V. Jacobi, Genetic 
Discrimination in a Time of False Hopes, 30 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 363, 374 (2003). 
 129. In addition to passing anti-discrimination laws preventing the use of genetic information, 
some states have passed laws establishing privacy rules to protect the confidentiality of genetic 
information and keep it out of the hands of possible discriminators.  Jacobi, supra note 128, at 367. 
 130. Id. at 374–75. 
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particular type of risk-predictive information.131  As a result, at least 
some individuals132 in some states receive strong protection against 
having their genetic information used against them by health insurers. 
By contrast, existing federal law provides far less protection against 
genetic discrimination in health insurance.  Initially, the EEOC and some 
commentators thought the ADA could be read to prohibit discrimination 
based on an asymptomatic genetic condition,133 but subsequent judicial 
interpretations of the ADA have narrowed considerably the range of 
conditions qualifying as disabilities.134  Accordingly, it seems highly 
unlikely that a court would apply the ADA to a health insurer’s reliance 
on an individual’s genetic information.  HIPAA, which is discussed in 
Part IV.C, provides some protection by prohibiting group health plans 
from excluding an individual from a group plan or charging him higher 
premiums for coverage based on “genetic conditions.”135  Beyond this 
protection for group plan members, however, current federal law does 
not regulate the ability of health insurers to use genetic information for 
risk-classification purposes.136 
                                                     
 131. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-816(19) (2000) (defining as an unfair practice an 
insurer’s use of genetic information to refuse to insure; to limit the amount, extent, or kind of 
coverage available; or to charge a different rate for the same coverage).  As Deborah Hellman points 
out, however, because so many illnesses increasingly are understood as being influenced by genetics, 
laws employing these broader definitions of the “genetic information” that insurers cannot use 
“seemingly prohibit[] almost all forms of discrimination on the basis of health, except perhaps 
illness or disability caused by accident.”  Hellman, supra note 128, at 80. 
 132. This qualification is necessary for at least two reasons.  First, some state genetic 
discrimination laws apply only to group insurers, not to issuers in the individual market.  Hellman, 
supra note 128, at 77 n.2.  Second, even in those states that have passed legislation regulating the 
nongroup market, the protection falls far short of being complete because the Employment 
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) prevents state insurance laws from being applied to self-
insured employer benefit plans.  See Eric Mills Holmes, Solving the Insurance/Genetic Fair/Unfair 
Discrimination Dilemma in Light of the Human Genome Project, 85 KY. L.J. 503, 594–97 (1996–97) 
(noting this effect of ERISA’s deemer clause). 
 133. See 2 U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, COMPLIANCE MANUAL, Order 
915.002, at 902–45 (1995) (interpreting the ADA to prohibit genetic discrimination); Paul Steven 
Miller, Is There a Pink Slip in My Genes? Genetic Discrimination in the Workplace, 3 J. HEALTH 
CARE L. & POL’Y 225, 230 (2000). 
 134. Moreover, as discussed above, even if an unmanifested genetic condition were deemed a 
disability under the ADA, that law’s protection against insurance discrimination has been read quite 
narrowly.  See supra Part III.B.3. 
 135. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-1 (2000).  HIPAA also provides that an unexpressed genetic condition 
cannot be treated as a pre-existing condition by a group health plan.  42 U.S.C. § 300gg(b)(1)(B) 
(2000). 
 136. In October 2003, the Senate unanimously passed the Genetic Information 
Nondiscrimination Act of 2003, which would have broadly barred insurance companies from using 
genetic information about an individual to grant or deny health coverage or to adjust premiums.  
Laurie McGinley, Senate Passes Bill Barring Genetic Discrimination, WALL ST. J., Oct. 15, 2003, at 
D11.  It unanimously passed a similar measure in February 2005.  Faun H. Johnson, Senate 
Overwhelmingly Passes Genetic Bias Bill; Rep. Boehner Promises ‘Another Look,’ HEALTH CARE 
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Whether health insurers should be forbidden to use an individual’s 
genetic information in a discriminatory fashion is a question that has 
generated copious scholarship.137  Central to the debate is the 
justifiability of “genetic exceptionalism.”  To wit, what justifies 
prohibiting health insurers from considering genetic characteristics, when 
they are permitted to use other types of health information in classifying 
risks?138  What is it about genetic information that justifies the 
exceptional legal protection it receives?139 
While some commentators reject genetic exceptionalism as 
unjustifiable,140 others suggest plausible reasons for the exceptional 
treatment.141  Professor Deborah Hellman, for example, notes that 
legislation prohibiting insurers’ use of genetic information may be 
necessary to enable genetic science to make good on its promises of 
health benefits to individuals and society more broadly.142  Individuals 
who fear genetic discrimination may be less likely both to seek genetic 
testing that might offer them some health benefits and to participate in 
medical research that entails testing.143  Professor John Jacobi, while 
recognizing that persons with unfavorable genetic traits may not deserve 
protection from insurance discrimination any more than persons with 
other types of health problems, nonetheless views genetic discrimination 
laws as a desirable step toward broader social solidarity reforms of health 
insurance.144 
These justifications for laws prohibiting genetic discrimination are 
notably and essentially instrumental.  Rather than invoking the “civil 
                                                                                                                       
DAILY REP., Feb. 18, 2005, http://pubs.bna.com/ip/BNA/hce.nsf/is/a0b0k8r3h5.  Notwithstanding 
broad support for the measure in the Senate and an expression of support from President George W. 
Bush, the House refused to take up the measure.  Julie Rovner, Johnson Says Genetic Discrimination 
Bill Unlikely to Move, CONG. DAILY, July 22, 2004. 
 137. In addition to the sources cited in this Section, see the sources listed in Hellman, supra note 
128, at 78 nn.5–7. 
 138. See id. at 78 (“[T]he question that dominates current literature is whether genetic 
discrimination is meaningfully different from discrimination on the basis of general health status.”). 
 139. Id. 
 140. E.g., Diver & Cohen, supra note 125, at 1445. 
 141. Hellman, supra note 128, at 83. 
 142. Id. at 92–94.  Hellman emphasizes, however, that the strength of this justification depends 
on empirical questions that are as yet unanswered.  Id. at 94.  She also suggests that genetic 
exceptionalism may be justified because “the social meaning of treating people differently on the 
basis of their genetic make-up is different from the social meaning of discrimination on the basis of 
health or illness.”  Id. at 79.  She catalogs and rejects, however, several other proffered 
rationalizations for exceptionalism, such as claims that genetic discrimination should be prohibited 
because it is irrational, because genes are beyond individuals’ control, or because a small number of 
people are especially burdened.  Id. at 84–92. 
 143. Id. at 92. 
 144. Jacobi, supra note 128, at 391–94. 
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rights” of genetically disadvantaged persons145 or demanding some form 
of justice for them,146 these scholars suggest that genetic discrimination 
laws, with their explicit rejection of an actuarial fairness approach,147 
may make sense as means to a broader purpose—whether the production 
of societal health benefits or health insurance reform.  In this view, legal 
prohibitions on discrimination against genetically disadvantaged persons 
can co-exist with legal permissiveness toward discrimination against 
otherwise unhealthy (or likely to become unhealthy) persons, not because 
of any analytically satisfying distinction between the two groups of 
individuals, but because of other policy concerns. 
6. Discrimination Against Victims of Domestic Violence 
In the same period when state legislatures were passing laws 
prohibiting health insurers’ discriminatory use of genetic information, 
insurers’ discrimination against victims of domestic abuse also was 
prompting legislative responses.148  Unlike genetic discrimination laws, 
however, which resulted from public fears of the potential uses of 
emerging genetic information, laws regulating the use of domestic abuse 
information reflected public disapproval of evidence of insurers’ actual 
use of information about an insured’s or applicant’s experience of 
domestic violence in making underwriting decisions.149  From the 
insurance industry’s perspective, information that an individual has 
experienced domestic abuse is simply information that—like information 
about an individual’s medical history, age, occupation, and sex—helps 
an insurer predict the individual’s likelihood of making future medical 
claims, so the insurer can hew to the principle of actuarial fairness in 
deciding whether and at what price to provide the individual with 
                                                     
 145. See Diver & Cohen, supra note 125, at 1473 (finding the analogy between racial 
discrimination and genetic discrimination unconvincing); Pauline T. Kim, Genetic Discrimination, 
Genetic Privacy: Rethinking Employee Protections for a Brave New Workplace, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 
1497, 1500–01 (2002) (arguing that “the analogy between genetic discrimination, and race and sex 
discrimination, is fundamentally flawed” and that the problem of genetic discrimination in 
employment should properly be understood as threatening an individual’s privacy rights). 
 146. Indeed, Deborah Hellman makes the point that genetic discrimination laws are arguably 
unjust because their health-promoting benefits are not applied evenhandedly.  Hellman, supra note 
128, at 99. 
 147. See Jacobi, supra note 128, at 375 (asserting that state genetic discrimination laws 
“demonstrate a legislative determination to shift the meaning of non-discrimination from a principle 
requiring equal treatment absent an actuarial showing of difference to one requiring equal treatment 
notwithstanding actuarial difference”). 
 148. Sheri A. Mullikin, A Cost Analysis Approach to Determining the Reasonableness of Using 
Domestic Violence as an Insurance Classification, 25 J. LEGIS. 195, 210 (1999). 
 149. See id. at 216–19 (giving reasons why use of domestic violence evidence is criticized). 
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coverage.150  The industry account, however, was not compelling enough 
to persuade the public and legislators that insurers should have free rein 
in using domestic abuse information to (as it was sometimes put) 
victimize an individual a second time, and during the 1990s a majority of 
states passed laws regulating that use.151 
The states’ legislative responses, though, are quite diverse152 and thus 
fail to reflect any consistent understanding as to when or why the use of 
domestic violence information in the underwriting process is illegitimate.  
They do, however, usefully illustrate the variety of legislative views of 
what fairness in health insurance entails.153  Some state laws merely 
instruct insurers not to deny or limit coverage “solely because” of a 
person’s status as a domestic violence victim.154  This bare prohibition, 
however, permits an insurer to consider a person’s victim status as long 
as it also relies on other, actuarially relevant information that may be 
related to abuse—such as a history of emergency room visits or the 
lingering physical or mental effects of abuse.155  These laws reject 
discrimination based purely on a person’s status, but condone application 
of general underwriting standards to information about conditions or 
injuries ancillary to that status.156  Laws that more generally prohibit any 
underwriting use of an “abuse victim” classification are only slightly 
stronger; although they prevent insurers from singling out victims of 
abuse for special treatment, they do not protect abuse victims—whether 
identified as such or not—from the possibility that a history of claims or 
existing injuries will affect their ability to obtain affordable coverage.157  
In short, both of these types of laws effectively prohibit insurers from 
treating domestic violence victims differently from other persons, while 
simultaneously embracing a vision of actuarial fairness.  Insurers cannot 
                                                     
 150. As one commentator wrote on the Web site of the Competitive Enterprise Institute, “it is 
extremely disingenuous to suggest insurers are practicing unfair discrimination when they respond to 
the higher loss costs associated with domestic violence by raising rates or denying coverage.  That is, 
after all, how insurers treat all high-risk insureds.”  Robert Detlefsen, Abusing Discrimination, 
MONTHLY PLANET, Aug. 1, 1997, http://www.cei.org/gencon/005,01239.cfm. 
 151. Since 1994, forty-one states have adopted some kind of legislative limits on insurance 
discrimination against victims of domestic violence.  WOMEN’S LAW PROJECT & PENNSYLVANIA 
COALITION AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, FYI: INSURANCE DISCRIMINATION AGAINST VICTIMS 
OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE (2002), available at www.pcadv.org (follow “Publications” hyperlink; then 
follow “Insurance FYI” hyperlink). 
 152. Hellman, supra note 19, at 404. 
 153. See id. at 404–10 (analyzing the legislation). 
 154. Id. at 404. 
 155. Id.; N.Y. INS. LAW. § 2612(d) (McKinney 2000). 
 156. See Hellman, supra note 19, at 405 (citing statute allowing for this underwriting). 
 157. See id. (“[U]sing medical histories alone may serve the insurer’s goals almost as well as 
using the prohibited abuse victim classification.”). 
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deny coverage or increase premiums because of abuse-victim status, but 
they remain free to engage in underwriting based on health status or 
medical history. 
By contrast, some states have enacted laws that more broadly limit 
insurers’ ability to underwrite coverage in ways that have a 
discriminatory impact on abuse victims, such as predicting future claims 
based on medical records of repeated emergency room visits for abuse-
related injuries.158  These laws effectively take the stance that, even if it 
is acceptable generally to consider an individual’s medical history in 
predicting future claims, it is unacceptable to underwrite based on a 
history of abuse-related injuries.159  Such laws therefore tend toward a 
social solidarity view160 of health insurance for victims of domestic 
violence. 
Of course, as with genetic discrimination laws, legislation that 
specially protects abuse victims against insurers’ pursuit of actuarial 
fairness poses the question of how to justify insulating this group from 
generally applied risk-classification practices.  In other words, how is the 
prohibited underwriting classification of “abuse victim” analytically 
distinguishable from the permissible classification of “person with 
diabetes”?  Justifications advanced for the distinctive treatment of abuse 
victims are diverse.  One justification typically advanced is instrumental: 
abuse victims should be encouraged to report their abuse and seek 
medical and other support services, and allowing insurers to use 
information gathered through reporting and the provision of services to 
deny coverage for abuse victims will discourage those desired 
activities.161  Beyond the purely instrumental justification, however, is 
the argument that domestic violence against women presents a civil 
rights issue, and therefore insurance discrimination against abuse victims 
 
                                                     
 158. See id. at 406 (describing how some laws prevent insurers from substituting one predictor 
for another). 
 159. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 33-4-20(d)(2) (2003) (allowing underwriting on the basis of a pre-
existing condition, provided that “the fact that an individual is, has been, or may be the victim of 
abuse may not be considered a physical or mental condition”). 
 160. These laws do not fully embody a social solidarity view, however, unless they also prohibit 
an insurer from either refusing to cover an existing abuse-related condition under a pre-existing 
condition clause or exclusionary waiver or charging the insured a higher premium based on the 
condition. 
 161. See Ellen J. Morrison, Note, Insurance Discrimination Against Battered Women: Proposed 
Legislative Protections, 72 IND. L.J. 259, 286 (1996) (“Insurance discrimination discourages 
battered women from seeking necessary medical treatment and legal intervention, deters them from 
filing insurance claims, and constructs one more economic barrier that prevents victims from leaving 
abusive environments.”). 
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implicates gender equality.162  Finally, Professor Deborah Hellman 
suggests a moral justification for the distinction: 
The state has a clear and uncontroversial obligation to provide crime 
protection and to do so on a fair basis . . . .  The suspicion that an 
illegitimate tolerance toward domestic violence has affected the amount 
of protection afforded domestic abuse victims, and consequently, the 
degree of safety they enjoy, means that the state has likely failed to 
provide the required crime protection fairly.  As a result, the 
community should share the cost the abuse victim faces by virtue of the 
fact that she is a poor insurance risk.163 
In this view a social solidarity approach is justified for abuse victims 
because society itself bears some responsibility for their high-risk 
status.164 
In sum, no single understanding has emerged regarding either when 
or why insurers’ use of domestic abuse information in classifying risks is 
illegitimate.  Notwithstanding this lack of consensus, the variety of both 
legislative restrictions on that use and the justifications offered for the 
restrictions well illustrate the tensions between an actuarial fairness 
vision of health insurance and a social solidarity vision, as well as the 
challenges in justifying the extension of a social solidarity approach to 
some, but not all, members of a community. 
7. Discrimination Against Persons with Mental Illness 
Legislation prohibiting health insurers from limiting coverage for 
mental health-care services presents yet one more instance in which 
legislators have intruded on insurers’ freedom, but this instance has a 
different look and feel.165  Unlike the laws discussed previously, mental 
health parity legislation does not on its face follow an antidiscrimination 
                                                     
 162. See id. at 285–86 (relying on congressional enactment of the Violence Against Women Act 
of 1994); see also Hellman, supra note 19, at 383 (pointing out that gender equality justification is 
significantly weakened by the fact that states typically permit health insurers to use sex in rating 
risks). 
 163. Hellman, supra note 19, at 410. 
 164. Id. at 411.  Although much of Hellman’s discussion assumes the justifiability of risk rating 
generally, she also acknowledges that the “strong outcry” against the use of abuse information in 
underwriting may suggest a more fundamental concern about the fairness of risk classification 
generally.  Id. at 359.  In that case, she supports legislative prohibitions against the use of abuse 
information “as an important first step toward a fairer system of health insurance pricing.”  Id. 
 165. See John V. Jacobi, Parity and Difference: The Value of Parity Legislation for the Seriously 
Mentally Ill, 29 AM. J.L. & MED. 185 (2003) (describing state and federal mental health parity 
legislation). 
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model.  Instead, rather than prohibiting health insurers from taking an 
individual’s mental health condition into account in deciding whether to 
issue or how to price a policy, mental health parity laws govern the 
benefits that health insurers are required to include in their policies.  For 
example, the federal Mental Health Parity Act of 1996166 provides that 
employer-sponsored plans governed by the Act cannot include annual or 
lifetime limits on coverage of mental health services that are more 
restricted than parallel limits on physical health coverage.167  More 
aggressively, some states have enacted parity laws compelling health 
insurers to cover mental health services as generously in all regards as 
physical health services.168 
In sum, mental health parity legislation focuses on the content and 
terms of insurers’ generally provided coverage packages rather than 
focusing on who receives or is denied coverage.  The purpose of the 
focus on content, however, is to assure persons with mental illness or 
disability that health insurance will cover their health needs as fully as it 
covers the health needs of persons with only physical ailments.  In this 
way, parity legislation echoes the Supreme Court’s conclusion in 
Newport News that insurance policies discriminate based on sex if they 
fail to cover the medical needs of men and women equally 
comprehensively.169  So understood, mental health parity laws explicitly 
forbid disparate-impact discrimination (or at least specified types of 
disparate-impact discrimination) against persons with mental illness, 
without addressing disparate-treatment discrimination. 
What has motivated legislatures to pass mental health parity laws?  
In part these laws seek to correct traditional imbalances in insurance 
coverage of mental and physical health treatments—imbalances that 
today are understood to embody both misconceptions of the nature of 
mental illness and deep-seated prejudices against persons with mental 
illness.170  In this sense, parity legislation stands in line with state and 
                                                     
 166. Pub. L. No. 104-204, 110 Stat. 2944 (1996) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1185a (2000) and 42 
U.S.C. § 300gg-5 (2000)). 
 167. Id.  Because its obligations are quite limited (most fundamentally, the Act does not require 
employers to provide mental health coverage) and subject to separate exemptions for employers with 
fifty or fewer employees and for employers whose health costs increase by one percent or more as a 
result of compliance, commentators have doubted the legislation’s actual impact on coverage for 
persons with mental illness.  See Patrick J. Kennedy, Why We Must End Insurance Discrimination 
Against Mental Health Care, 41 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 363, 366 (2004) (characterizing the law’s 
impact as slight); see also Jacobi, supra note 165, at 192 (describing the law as “very mild”). 
 168. See Jacobi, supra note 165, at 190–91 (describing state parity legislation). 
 169. See supra text accompanying note 73. 
 170. See Kennedy, supra note 167, at 364 (stating that millions hide mental disease for “fear of 
prejudice”); see also Brian D. Shannon, Paving the Path to Parity in Health Insurance Coverage for 
 
CROSSLEY FINAL.DOC 2/21/2006  9:55:25 AM 
2005] DISCRIMINATION AGAINST THE UNHEALTHY 107 
federal civil rights laws that forbid discrimination against members of 
historically disadvantaged groups.171  This civil rights justification, 
however, dovetails with government interests in ensuring that persons 
with mental health needs have access to needed care and thereby avoid 
the social and economic costs of untreated mental illness.172  
Accordingly, these laws seek simultaneously to combat inequality and 
inadequacy in health insurance coverage. 
8. What to Make of All These Laws 
Undertaking to place all the foregoing laws into some harmonious 
and analytically coherent framework is likely a futile effort, and one that 
is certainly beyond the scope of this Article.  Nonetheless this Part’s 
descriptions prompt several observations germane to my project of 
considering whether government should intervene when health insurance 
coverage discriminates—in treatment or effect—against unhealthy 
people.  First, the variety of laws prohibiting discrimination in health 
insurance demonstrates that insurer freedom to pursue actuarial fairness 
is not sacrosanct.  The laws described in this Part confirm lawmakers’ 
willingness to place an assortment of constraints on insurers’ and 
employers’ autonomy; they also display a remarkable lack of consistency 
in how they do so.  The various antidiscrimination laws examined supply 
differing levels and types of protection, depending on the trait at issue.  
Some protect only against different treatment; others extend to disparate-
impact discrimination.  Demands for actuarial fairness by insurers and 
employers, as well as political expediency, significantly limit the laws’ 
protections in some cases (for example, disability and age 
discrimination), but not in others. 
More importantly, no single justification motivates each of the 
antidiscrimination laws described in this Part.  Civil rights and social 
equality concerns certainly inspire some of the protections, but in other 
instances (for example, laws forbidding discrimination based on genetic 
or domestic violence information), instrumental goals regarding the 
                                                                                                                       
Mental Illness: New Law or Merely Good Intentions?, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 63, 66–69 (1997) 
(discussing insurance discrimination for people with mental illnesses, based partially on prejudice 
and stigma). 
 171. See Kennedy, supra note 167, at 364 (referring to a “civil rights struggle remaining to be 
fought”); see also Deborah Stone, Beyond Moral Hazard: Insurance as Moral Opportunity, 6 CONN. 
INS. L.J. 11, 40 (1999) (noting how advocates for improved mental health coverage “successfully 
invoked equality to improve coverage”). 
 172. See Kennedy, supra note 167, at 370–72 (stating that costs to society of mental illness are 
staggering); see also Jacobi, supra note 165, at 189–90 (discussing public costs of uninsured). 
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advancement of tangential social concerns appear to play significant 
roles.  Moreover, underlying a number of the laws is the recognition of 
the vital importance of health insurance to ensuring that individuals who 
need medical care have adequate access to it.  In sum, no single model 
exists for laws regulating discrimination in health insurance, and 
therefore an advocate for limiting discrimination against the unhealthy in 
health insurance may choose among varying rationales for the limits 
sought.  The next Part examines the limited extent to which such 
protections have already been enacted. 
IV. LAWS ADDRESSING HEALTH-STATUS DISCRIMINATION 
The previous Part demonstrates that federal and state lawmakers 
have encroached on the ability of health insurance providers to 
discriminate on a variety of bases.  Notably absent from that Part’s 
catalog of proscribed bases for discrimination, however, is health status.  
Admittedly, some forms of prohibited discrimination are closely related 
to an individual’s current health status—disability discrimination, genetic 
discrimination, and discrimination against victims of domestic violence 
certainly fall into this category.  Further, the Mental Health Parity Act, 
by prohibiting differential coverage limits for physical and mental health 
care, provides some protection directly to persons with mental illness.  
Nonetheless, the laws discussed so far do not instruct insurers or 
employers providing health coverage that they cannot make decisions 
regarding the issuance, terms, or pricing of insurance coverage based on 
an individual’s current or past health status.  None of these laws forbids 
an insurance provider from taking into account that an individual has 
high cholesterol, has received treatment for depression, or has been 
diagnosed with cancer.173 
                                                     
 173. The exception, of course, is if an individual’s health condition rises to the level of a 
disability so that the protections of the Americans with Disabilities Act apply.  A person qualifies as 
an “individual with a disability” if she can show that she either (1) has a “physical or mental 
impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities,” (2) has a “record of” such an 
impairment, or (3) is “regarded as having such an impairment.”  42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2000).  
Although this definition is potentially expansive, the courts—led by the United States Supreme 
Court—have construed the definition narrowly.  See, e.g., Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 527 
U.S. 516, 523 (1999) (finding that an employee with high blood pressure was not disabled under the 
ADA).  Consequently, the legal thresholds for an individual to prove either that whatever health 
impairment she suffers “substantially limits” her performance of a “major life activity” or that she is 
“regarded as” having such an impairment are today higher than the proponents and drafters of the 
Act expected them to be.  See Chai R. Feldblum, Definition of Disability under Federal Anti-
Discrimination Law: What Happened? Why? What Can We Do About It?, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & 
LAB. L. 91, 93 (2000). 
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This Part takes up the task of examining the extent to which existing 
law constrains the ability of insurance providers to rely on health-status 
information.  To put it more bluntly: does the law prohibit health insurers 
from discriminating against the unhealthy?  Admittedly, posing this 
question often provokes an incredulous response: isn’t that exactly what 
health insurers do all the time?  Indeed, when an insurer classifies an 
individual or small group on the basis of risk, medical information about 
the prospective insured is typically central to the classification process.  
One might wonder whether any valid predictive basis for risk 
classification exists if an insurer cannot classify risks of future medical 
expenses based on an applicant’s past or existing health conditions.  
While some other bases for predicting future medical expenses might 
remain, a complete ban on using individuals’ health-status information 
would significantly limit insurers’ capacity for accurate risk prediction. 
Rather than debate whether that outcome would represent an advance 
or setback in health insurance policy, this Part adopts the more discrete 
and concrete purpose of briefly examining the current legal landscape for 
limits on this type of discrimination.  For starters, neither the states nor 
Congress has taken up a “no discrimination against the unhealthy” 
banner, and state laws regulating insurance have even been interpreted as 
compelling such discrimination.  At the same time, though, federal law 
regulating group health coverage and a number of state laws regulating 
health insurance premiums function to limit insurance providers’ ability 
to engage in some forms of health-status discrimination. 
A. State Laws Prohibiting “Unfair Discrimination” in Health Insurance 
Because the states are primarily responsible for regulating insurance, 
it makes sense to look first to state law for any prohibitions on health-
status discrimination.  As discussed previously, a number of states have 
laws prohibiting or limiting insurers’ use of particular types of 
information in classifying risks, and some of this off-limits 
information—such as genetic information or information about domestic 
violence—may in fact be linked to an individual’s health status.  
Notwithstanding these specific prohibitions, states do not have laws that 
generally preclude health insurers from using health status as a risk 
classifier.  Indeed, the most relevant state laws dealing with 
health-insurance discrimination generally have been interpreted by some 
courts as requiring health-status discrimination. 
All states have passed some form of unfair trade practices legislation 
applicable to health insurance, and among the unfair trade practices that 
health insurers are forbidden to engage in is “unfair discrimination.”  
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These statutes are based, to varying degrees, on the model Unfair Trade 
Practices Act (UTPA)174 promulgated by the National Association of 
Insurance Commissioners, which bans health insurers from “unfair 
discrimination between individuals of the same class and of essentially 
the same hazard.”175  Without further explication, this language simply 
re-presents the central question at the “struggle for the soul of health 
insurance.”  To wit, is it “fair” for each insured to pay a premium that 
reflects as closely as possible his own predicted costs of medical care 
(the actuarial fairness view),176 or is it “fair” for risks to be pooled 
broadly so that persons who are poor risks are not required to carry their 
burdens alone (the social solidarity view)? 
Although commentators and regulators adopted varying stances on 
what discrimination is “unfair” under these state laws, the resolution of 
the debate in the late 1980s regarding insurers’ use of HIV-testing results 
suggests that, at least with respect to health-status classifications,177 an 
actuarial fairness understanding has become dominant.  The debate arose 
in the mid-1980s, when several states passed laws or regulations 
restricting insurers’ efforts to determine insurance applicants’ HIV 
status.178  By restricting insurers’ ability to classify risks based on an 
individual’s HIV status, the laws functioned to prevent discrimination 
based on a particular medical condition.  Predictably, the insurance 
industry argued forcefully that the HIV-testing laws misapprehended the 
basic tenets of insurance underwriting and would unfairly force 
uninfected persons to shoulder the considerable costs of covering persons 
with HIV and AIDS.179  In challenges to regulations banning HIV 
testing, courts accepted these arguments regarding the meaning of fair 
                                                     
 174. MODEL UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES ACT (Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs 2001). 
 175. Id. § 4(G)(2). 
 176. This view is espoused by Clifford & Iuculano, supra note 41, at 1811 (“[U]nder [UTPA] 
insurers have a positive duty to separate insureds with identifiable, serious health risks from the pool 
of insureds without those risks.”). 
 177. By contrast, as discussed supra note 53 and accompanying text, some states reached the 
conclusion that the use of racial classifiers were prohibited as a form of unfair discrimination.  
Although race may be a weaker predictor of future losses than health-status information, 
commentators have pointed out that the differing life expectancies between black persons and white 
persons provide racial classifications with some actuarial basis.  See Jerry & Mansfield, supra note 
50, at 352. 
 178. See JERRY, supra note 30, at 145–47 (describing concerns about the potential for breaches 
of confidentiality and the potential for covert discrimination against homosexual men as prompting 
these bans). 
 179. Clifford & Iuculano, supra note 41, at 1811 (suggesting that a failure of insurers to assess 
the AIDS risk of prospective insureds would represent “a forced subsidy from the healthy to the less 
healthy”).  These commentators also argue that laws restricting insurers’ ability to require HIV 
testing “substantially impede the insurance industry’s ability to assess risk, thereby undercutting the 
industry’s financial stability and compromising its ability to pay future claims.”  Id. at 1815. 
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discrimination and struck down the regulations as exceeding the 
regulators’ statutory authority.180  Thus, few today would argue that state 
unfair discrimination laws protect unhealthy individuals from risk-
classification practices that conform to actuarial fairness. 
B. State Laws Regulating Health Insurance Premiums 
Although state insurance unfair trade practice acts have been 
interpreted to incorporate an actuarial fairness standard, the passage of 
state laws reforming the small-group and individual health insurance 
markets beginning in the early 1990s significantly infringed upon 
insurers’ ability to discriminate against unhealthy persons based on 
health status.181  Legislators concerned about rising levels of uninsurance 
and evidence of market failure in the small-group and individual 
insurance markets undertook these reforms in an attempt to make private 
health insurance more available and affordable.182  Thus, these reforms 
can be understood as efforts to “shore up” the weakest aspects of the 
private health insurance market and stave off calls for more 
comprehensive reform.183 
                                                     
 180. E.g., Health Ins. Ass’n of Am. v. Corcoran, 551 N.Y.S.2d 615, 622–23 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1990), aff’d, 565 N.E.2d 1264 (N.Y. 1990); Life Ins. Ass’n of Mass. v. Comm’r of Ins., 530 N.E.2d 
168, 173 (Mass. 1988).  In addition, on the legislative front, most of the statutory bans were 
subsequently repealed. 
 181. A clarification is called for here.  To the extent that small-group market reforms 
implemented community rating or other reforms for small-group policies, these laws cannot be 
understood as protecting any particular individual against health-status discrimination.  Instead, the 
small-group market reforms prohibit certain types of insurer discrimination between healthy and 
unhealthy groups.  Although we cannot understand the group reforms as providing protection to any 
particular individual against health-status discrimination, I discuss the small-group and individual 
health insurance market reforms together in this section because both types of reform display a 
conviction that unhealthy persons (whether group members or those seeking individual coverage) 
should not be denied access to health insurance or have to bear the expected cost of their predicted 
poor health.  Thus, these laws embody some level of commitment to the social solidarity view that 
entails a pooling of risk.  For a useful compilation of state-level health insurance reforms (including 
both individual and small-group markets) as of August 1, 2001, see a chart compiled by the National 
Association of Health Underwriters at http://www.nahu.org/government/resources/state_health_%20 
reforms_1101.pdf. 
 182. See BETH C. FUCHS, ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND., EXPANDING THE INDIVIDUAL 
HEALTH INSURANCE MARKET: LESSONS FROM THE STATE REFORMS OF THE 1990s 1 (Research 
Synthesis Report No. 4, 2004), available at http://www.rwjf.org/publications/synthesis/ 
reports_and_briefs/pdf/n04_synthesisreport.pdf (explaining that the states “enacted laws designed to 
increase the availability and affordability of individual health insurance” hoping to keep the 
uninsured rate from growing); Jacobi, supra note 30, at 369–70 (discussing market failure as a cause 
of high uninsurance rates). 
 183. Mark A. Hall, Public Choice and Private Insurance: The Case of Small Group Market 
Reforms, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 757, 766. 
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One element of these private market reforms was laws passed by a 
minority of states that required insurers to employ community rating in 
pricing their policies.  Under a system of community rating, insurers 
charge the same premium to all insureds in a geographic location for a 
particular benefit package.184  Although some states enacting 
community-rating reforms allowed insurers to vary premiums based on 
demographic characteristics such as age or gender, the community-rating 
laws prohibited insurers’ use of health information in setting premiums.  
In this sense, the states that passed community-rating laws outlawed 
discrimination against the unhealthy in the pricing of health coverage.185  
These laws favor the social pooling of risk, explicitly call for good health 
risks to subsidize the cost of poor health risks, and, from the insured’s 
point of view, establish a right to pay no more than the community 
average cost of insurance.186 
Of course, as the earlier discussion of the various ways that health 
insurers discriminate suggests, if state legislation precludes 
discrimination in pricing, insurers are likely to simply shift their focus to 
underwriting and coverage decisions as mechanisms for segmenting the 
market by health status.187  Although other elements of the small-group 
and individual market reforms of the 1990s limited insurers’ ability to 
engage in discriminatory underwriting or coverage practices,188 most 
                                                     
 184. Russell Korobkin, Determining Health Care Rights from Behind a Veil of Ignorance, 1998 
U. ILL. L. REV. 801, 816. 
 185. Most states, however, did not include community rating laws in their insurance market 
reforms and instead passed laws imposing “rating bands” on health insurers.  See Hall, supra note 
183, at 765 (stating that adjusted community rating and rating bands are used more commonly than 
pure community rating for setting premiums).  These laws permit insurers to use health-status factors 
as a basis for varying the premiums charged within particular demographic classifications, but limit 
the range of variation permitted.  Id.  Rating-band laws, therefore, permit insurers to continue to 
engage in health-status discrimination in pricing their products, but limit the extent of that 
discrimination.  One might interpret these laws as reflecting the opinion that health-status 
discrimination in pricing health insurance policies is a legitimate practice, but that its impact on 
insureds should be somehow limited. 
 186. Jacobi, supra note 30, at 374–75; Korobkin, supra note 184, at 817.  Some analysts suggest 
that the cross subsidy required by community rating flows from the young to the old.  See The 
Health Care Study Group, supra note 27, at 522 (explaining that the young should contribute 
because they will not always be young).  Such a subsidy may be objected to as a regressive 
intergenerational transfer of wealth.  Cf. Hall, supra note 183, at 769 (articulating Epstein’s 
objection).  Other commentators, however, suggest that if we adopt a lifespan approach (under 
which we each expect to be both young and then old), the subsidy is more appropriately understood 
as a subsidy by the (predicted) healthy of the (predicted) unhealthy.  Korobkin, supra note 184, at 
818. 
 187. Swartz, supra note 34, at 98 (“[I]f a state has only one or two of these regulations in place, 
the carriers can use other mechanisms that are not proscribed to accomplish the same objective.”). 
 188. Laws imposing guaranteed issuance or renewal obligations on insurers can be understood as 
prohibiting health-status discrimination in underwriting decisions, while restrictions on pre-existing 
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states failed to enact the full battery of these reforms.189  Consequently, 
one state might include protection from discrimination in pricing, but 
permit discrimination in underwriting.  Ultimately, the state health 
insurance market reforms of the 1990s were focused on addressing 
market failures and provided unhealthy persons (and groups) only 
limited and incomplete protection against health-status discrimination.190 
Aside from the failure to address the full range of insurers’ 
discriminatory practices, state-level insurance market reforms of the 
1990s provide only incomplete protection against health-status 
discrimination for another reason.  Because the preemption provision of 
the Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) prevents 
states from applying insurance laws to self-insured employer health 
benefit plans,191 individuals who receive health coverage through their 
employer’s self-insured plan receive no protection.  The states’ inability 
to control the practices of self-insured employers, along with continuing 
public fears about the perceived fragility of existing health insurance 
coverage, contributed to the enactment of a federal response to health 
insurers’ risk-selection practices. 
C. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
In 1996 Congress enacted the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA) to address fears that voters would lose their 
health insurance when they really needed it.192  Rather than attempting 
comprehensive health-care reform, HIPAA focused primarily on 
addressing the security and portability of health insurance coverage.193  
                                                                                                                       
condition exclusions and mandated-benefits laws can be understood as limiting discrimination in 
benefits covered. 
 189. See Swartz, supra note 34, at 98 (asserting that states’ attempts to limit risk-segmenting 
practices “have almost always set up regulations that block the use of only one or two of these 
mechanisms”). 
 190. The evidence is also mixed and inconclusive regarding the extent to which the reforms (1) 
accomplished their goals of increasing the affordability and availability of insurance and thereby 
increased rates of coverage and (2) avoided the unintended (but predicted) consequence of 
contributing to adverse selection in the small-group and individual market.  For a synthesis of the 
research regarding the effects of the individual market reforms, see FUCHS, supra note 182.  For a 
brief examination of empirical evidence regarding the effects of the small-group market reforms, see 
Hall, supra note 183. 
 191. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachussetts, 471 U.S. 724, 732–47 (1985) (interpreting and 
applying ERISA’s preemption provision). 
 192. See Jacobi, supra note 30, at 376–77 (discussing HIPAA’s “guaranteed issue/guaranteed 
renewal” and pre-existing conditions provisions). 
 193. See id. at 376 (characterizing the portability provisions as the “centerpiece” of HIPAA).  
HIPAA was an omnibus measure that also contained provisions addressing health-care fraud and 
 
 
CROSSLEY FINAL.DOC 2/21/2006  9:55:25 AM 
114 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54 
To deal with these issues, HIPAA includes provisions limiting group 
plans’ use of pre-existing condition clauses, preventing gaps in coverage 
when workers change jobs, and imposing guaranteed issue and 
guaranteed renewal obligations on insurance issuers in the small-group 
market. 194  To further reassure insured Americans, the law also prohibits 
group health insurers from discriminating against individual participants 
on the basis of health status in establishing eligibility rules and setting 
premiums.195 
HIPAA has been characterized as inaugurating the federal regulation 
of the content of private health insurance,196 and certainly the statute’s 
nondiscrimination provisions take a significant step by protecting an 
unhealthy member of a group plan from being singled out for exclusion 
from the plan, lesser coverage, or higher premiums.  The statute 
explicitly forbids a group health insurance provider from relying on any 
“health status-related factors”197 of an individual198 in establishing 
eligibility rules199 or setting individual premiums,200 and the regulations 
implementing HIPAA make clear that the prohibition on discriminatory 
eligibility rules extends to rules relating to available benefits.  According 
to the regulations, an issuer that enrolls an individual with a medical 
condition, but limits the benefits available to her based on the condition, 
violates HIPAA’s nondiscrimination provision.201  Thus, HIPAA applies 
                                                                                                                       
abuse, created a demonstration project for medical savings accounts, and set in motion the creation 
of privacy regulations. 
 194. Id. at 376–77.  As John Jacobi points out, when combined with the nondiscrimination 
provisions, the effect of these provisions is to permit “all groups to obtain insurance, and for all 
members of groups to gain coverage without regard for their actual or expected health status.”  Id. at 
378. 
 195. Id. at 377–78. 
 196. See Jack A. Rovner, Federal Regulation Comes to Private Health Care Financing: The 
Group Health Insurance Provisions of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 
1996, 7 ANNALS HEALTH L. 183, 184 (1998) (“Federal regulation of the content of private health 
care financing was upon us.”). 
 197. The Act defines these “health status-related factors” as including the following: “(A) Health 
status; (B)Medical condition (including both physical and mental illnesses); (C) Claims experience; 
(D)Receipt of health care; (E) Medical history; (F)Genetic information; (G)Evidence of insurability 
(including conditions arising out of acts of domestic violence); (H)Disability.”  29 U.S.C. § 1182 
(a)(1) (2000).   
 198. The Act also prohibits discrimination based on a health status-related factor of a dependent 
of an individual within the group.  Id. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. § 1182(b). 
 201. The regulations issued by the Department of Labor (DOL) provide the following 
illustration: 
Example 5.  (i) Facts.  A group health plan applies a $2 million lifetime limit on all 
benefits.  However, the $2 million lifetime limit is reduced to $10,000 for any participant 
or beneficiary covered under the plan who has a congenital heart defect. 
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a “disparate-treatment” understanding of nondiscrimination to group 
plans’ use of health-status information; the Act generally requires that all 
similarly situated202 individuals within a group health insurance plan be 
treated identically with respect to eligibility for enrollment, benefits 
covered, and premiums charged. 
By contrast, HIPAA expressly disavows any attempt to impose a 
particular benefit package or premium level on employer plans or 
insurers.203  As long as the benefits provided under a plan are “uniformly 
available to all similarly situated individuals,”204 the plan “is not required 
to provide coverage for any particular benefit.”205  Accordingly, a plan 
may not impose a lower lifetime coverage limit on a person with HIV 
than it imposes on other group members, but it may cap coverage of 
HIV-related expenses for all group members.206  Thus, HIPAA clearly 
rejects any attempt to regulate impact discrimination: as long as all 
similarly situated group members receive the same benefits at the same 
individual cost, it is irrelevant that group members with a particular 
health condition receive a package that fails to cover (or inadequately 
covers) their actual medical needs. 
HIPAA’s nondiscrimination provisions stand as the sole federal 
legislation giving individuals any protection against health-status 
                                                                                                                       
(ii) Conclusion.  In this Example 5, the lower lifetime limit for participants and 
beneficiaries with a congenital heart defect violates this paragraph (b)(2)(i) because 
benefits under the plan are not uniformly available to all similarly situated individuals 
and the plan’s lifetime limit on benefits does not apply uniformly to all similarly situated 
individuals. 
29 C.F.R. § 2590.702(b)(2)(i)(D) (2004). 
 202. The DOL regulations make clear that the determination of which group members are 
“similarly situated” depends on bona fide employment classifications and not health status: “a plan 
or issuer may treat participants as two or more distinct groups of similarly situated individuals if the 
distinction . . . is based on a bona fide employment-based classification consistent with the 
employer’s usual business practice.”  Id. § 2590.702(d)(1). 
 203. 29 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2).  See also Rovner, supra note 196, at 201 (“HIPAA permits plans 
and insurers to select, on a nondiscriminatory basis, the coverage and benefits they wish to offer and 
the premiums they want to charge.”). 
 204. 29 C.F.R. § 2590.702(b)(2)(i)(B). 
 205. Id. § 2590.702(b)(2)(i)(A). 
 206. Again, the regulations provide a pertinent example: 
Example 4.  (i) Facts.  A group health plan has a $2,000 lifetime limit for the treatment of 
temporomandibular joint syndrome (TMJ).  The limit is applied uniformly to all similarly 
situated individuals and is not directed at individual participants or beneficiaries. 
(ii) Conclusion.  In this Example 4, the limit does not violate this paragraph (b)(2)(i) 
because $2,000 of benefits for the treatment of TMJ are available uniformly to all 
similarly situated individuals and a plan may limit benefits covered in relation to a 
specific disease or condition if the limit applies uniformly to all similarly situated 
individuals and is not directed at individual participants or beneficiaries. 
Id. § 2590.702(b)(2)(i)(D). 
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discrimination in health insurance.207  In some cases, the protection will 
be significant.  For a person with an expensive health condition who 
obtains a job with an employer offering health benefits, HIPAA’s 
protection is considerable.  That person cannot be excluded from health 
insurance coverage and cannot be forced to pay more than coworkers for 
the same coverage.  As long as that person is an employee, she is in the 
pool and her costs are shared across the group,208 which is consistent 
with a social solidarity vision of health insurance. 
HIPAA’s protective shield, however, is substantially limited in two 
distinct ways.  First, although HIPAA shields an unhealthy group 
member from paying more for coverage, it does nothing to protect an 
employer from whatever premium increase an insurer might charge 
based on the presence of an unhealthy employee in the group.  Under 
HIPAA, an insurer can still employ risk rating for the entire group,209 
leaving the employer to figure out how to respond to the higher premium 
price, with one possibility being to cancel coverage altogether.210  
Second, although HIPAA defends actual or prospective group members 
who are unhealthy from exclusion or different treatment, it does little to 
safeguard the interests of individuals not affiliated with an entity 
providing group coverage.  The statute’s nondiscrimination provision 
applies only to group plans, not to issuers in the individual market.211  
Although the statute includes a “guaranteed-issue” provision granting 
rights to some would-be purchasers of an individual policy,212 most 
                                                     
 207. Although ERISA contains a nondiscrimination provision, 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (2000), it has 
been interpreted as not preventing employers from discriminating based on participants’ health 
conditions when they create or modify benefit plans.  See McGann v. H & H Music Co., 946 F.2d 
401 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that an employer did not unlawfully discriminate against an employee 
for exercising rights under an ERISA-qualified medical benefits plan simply because it substantially 
reduced the maximum benefits payable to any employee afflicted with AIDS within seven months of 
an employee’s submission of an AIDS-related claim). 
 208. This is true whether the employer purchases health insurance for its employees from a 
commercial insurance carrier or HMO or self-insures its employee health benefits.  The application 
of HIPAA to both insured and self-insured plans sets it apart from state laws regulating health 
insurance, because ERISA preempts the application of any state law (even one regulating insurance) 
to an employee benefit plan itself. 
 209. See Jacobi, supra note 30, at 383–84 (noting that HIPAA’s market-reform provisions 
enforce intraplan, but not interplan, social pooling). 
 210. See Alexandra Marks, Healthcare Costs: Big Woe for Small Firms, CHRISTIAN SCI. 
MONITOR, Sept. 15, 2004, at 1 (reporting that the number of small firms providing coverage has 
fallen from sixty-eight percent in 2001 to sixty-three percent in 2004 and that some companies have 
stopped offering insurance). 
 211. Jacobi, supra note 30, at 383–84. 
 212. The guaranteed-issue provision for the individual market limits the ability of issuers in that 
market to refuse coverage to an applicant who has lost access to group coverage and who satisfies 
several other conditions.  See Swartz, supra note 34, at n.17 (noting that HIPAA does not prevent 
issuers from engaging in risk-selection practices with respect to the “great majority” of persons 
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persons seeking to purchase coverage in the individual market remain 
subject to any underwriting and coverage practices that comply with state 
law.213  This result is in harmony with HIPAA’s general focus on 
protecting the health insurance “haves” from loss of coverage, while 
doing little to help the health insurance “have nots” access coverage. 
Ironically, although HIPAA’s nondiscrimination provision shelters 
unhealthy group members from discrimination in coverage or premiums, 
the statute may be something of a mixed blessing for those persons, for 
its constraints may have contributed to the recent trend toward shifting 
insurance risk onto individual insureds in an employee benefit plan.  
HIPAA’s nondiscrimination provision limits how an employer can 
respond to premium hikes attributable (at least in part) to the presence of 
unhealthy group members.214  The employer cannot pursue the actuarial 
fairness principle by making expensive employees pay their own way 
(either by exclusion from the group or charging higher premiums215), but 
it can try to moderate its own health insurance cost burden by shifting 
some of that burden onto employees as a group.  As we will see in the 
next Part, the rise of consumerism in health coverage reflects the choice 
of many employers to shift the cost of paying for care onto individual 
insureds. 
                                                                                                                       
seeking an individual health insurance policy); cf. Jacobi, supra note 30, at 376–77 (asserting that if 
a person meets all the statutory conditions, a carrier cannot reject the person or impose pre-existing 
condition limitations based on her risk of medical expenses). 
 213. See Jacobi, supra note 30, at 384 (stating that both state and federal regulations are 
enforceable). 
 214. See Edmund L. Andrews, Health Care Heights: Soaring Rates Leave Little Companies in a 
Bind, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2004, at G1 (“Because they are rated largely on the age and health 
experience ratings of their workers, businesses with a slightly older work force or a handful of 
employees with significant medical bills can see their rates soar 20 or 30 percent.”).  While felt 
particularly in small businesses, employees’ health can also impact the premiums of larger 
businesses.  Andrews reports that an employer with more than 300 employees faced a twenty-four 
percent premium increase in one year, partly attributable to a handful of employees who required 
expensive hospital care in the preceding years.  Id.  Another factor accounting for premium growth is 
insurers’ attempts to maximize their profits.  See Kaiser Family Foundation, Employer Health 
Benefits 2003 Annual Survey, http://www.kff.org/insurance/ehbs2003-abstract.cfm (follow 
“Complete Report” hyperlink) (noting that premiums increased faster than the cost of underlying 
claims experience). 
 215. Yet another way to make expensive employees pay their own way is to terminate their 
employment so their inclusion in the employer’s group is no longer assured by HIPAA.  See Joseph 
Pereira, Parting Shot: To Save on Health-Care Costs, Firms Fire Disabled Workers, WALL ST. J., 
July 14, 2003, at A1 (stating companies are firing disabled employees as health insurance costs rise).  
Some evidence exists that employers have begun to pursue this strategy, despite the legal risks it 
poses.  Id. 
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V. DISCRIMINATION AGAINST THE UNHEALTHY IN CONSUMERIST 
HEALTH CARE 
A. From Managed Care to Consumerism 
Significant changes have occurred in the market for health insurance 
products during the past half decade.  Managed care grew to market 
dominance during the 1990s and succeeded for a period of time in 
reining in health-care cost inflation through a variety of techniques 
designed to constrain the supply of unnecessary health-care services to 
plan enrollees.216  By the early 2000s, however, it had become clear that 
managed care’s successes were not to be long lived.  Even as one pair of 
commentators proclaimed managed care’s dominance of U.S. health 
care,217 another scholar was describing managed care proponents as 
being “in full retreat” and suggesting the emergence of a new 
“consumerism” trend in health-care coverage.218 
Various explanations have been offered for managed care’s inability 
to sustain its dominance in the health benefits market.219  Undoubtedly, 
the “managed care backlash” by physicians and consumers played a role 
in defanging managed care’s cost-control mechanisms, whether by 
prompting state legislation regulating managed care or by influencing 
employers’ purchasing decisions (and consequently plans’ product 
designs).220  Coincident with the waning of managed care’s strength, five 
                                                     
 216. See Robinson, supra note 12, at 1884 (characterizing managed care’s use of network 
contracting and utilization review as efforts to limit supply). 
 217. R. Adams Dudley & Harold S. Luft, Managed Care in Transition, 344 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
1087, 1087 (2001).  As the title suggests, however, these authors too recognized that managed care 
had an uncertain future.  Id. at 1091. 
 218. James C. Robinson, The End of Managed Care, 285 JAMA 2622, 2622 (2001). 
 219. See David Orentlicher, The Rise and Fall of Managed Care: A Predictable “Tragic 
Choices” Phenomenon, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 411, 412 (2003) (listing the various explanations); see 
also Clark C. Havighurst, The Backlash Against Managed Health Care: Hard Politics Make Bad 
Policy, 34 IND. L. REV. 395, 397 (2001) (noting that public opinion does not favor managed care).  
Nonetheless, phrases such as “the death of managed care” are probably overblown, for many 
structures and elements characteristic of managed care remain part of the health coverage landscape, 
either on their own or in conjunction with newer product designs.  See Debra A. Draper & Gary 
Claxton, Ctr. for Studying Health Sys. Change, Managed Care Redux: Health Plans Shift 
Responsibilities to Consumers (March 2004), http://www.hschange.org (follow “Issue Briefs” 
hyperlink) (noting that in some instances managed care practices are being used in conjunction with 
newer products).  What is remarkable is that the grouping of features known as managed care, which 
rapidly ascended to dominance in the health benefits marketplace, has in a similarly short period of 
time, lost both the vigor of its cost-containment techniques and its dominance of the marketplace.  
Cf. Robinson, supra note 218, at 2625 (stating that “once the consumer and physician backlash 
against managed care began, it quickly swirled into an unstoppable political tornado”). 
 220. See Mark A. Hall, The Death of Managed Care: A Regulatory Autopsy, 30 J. HEALTH POL., 
POL’Y & L. 427, 431–32 (2005). 
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consecutive years of double-digit increases in employers’ health-care 
costs have been witnessed.221  This dramatic escalation left employers 
scrambling in their search for the next “new thing” to control costs. 
Given that a chief objection to managed care was the plans’ 
sometimes draconian limits on patients’ choice of doctor, hospital, or 
therapy, it is hardly surprising that the latest trend in health coverage 
emphasizes expanded choices for consumers of health care.  In the early 
2000s, reporters, benefits managers, and health insurance industry 
analysts started using the phrase “consumer-driven health care” to 
describe the new movement.222  Lacking a single definition, the phrase 
has come to refer generally to health plans that give employees both 
greater responsibility for designing their own benefit packages and 
choosing their providers (often with the assistance of Web-based 
information tools), as well as greater financial risk for their health-care 
costs.223  One version of consumer-driven plans provides employees with 
some form of discretionary medical spending account combined with 
catastrophic health coverage.  While promising consumers a broader 
choice of providers and greater control over their medical decisions, 
consumer-driven plans promise employers cost savings flowing from the 
                                                     
 221. See Vanessa Fuhrmans, Health Care Costs to Rise in 2004: Employers Expect Increase of 
12%, Fifth Year in a Row of Double-Digit Gains, WALL ST. J., Sept. 29, 2003, at A6 (stating that 
2004 marked the fifth year of double-digit percentage increase in employers’ health-care costs).  
Premium rates have increased even faster than average for small companies.  See Andrews, supra 
note 214. 
 222. See Jon R. Gabel et al., Employers’ Contradictory Views About Consumer-Driven Health 
Care: Results from a National Survey, HEALTH AFF. W4-210, Apr. 21, 2004, http://content. 
healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w4.210v1. 
 223. See Robinson, supra note 12, at 1881 (“The contemporary transformation in benefit design 
centers around this increase in consumer cost-sharing provisions, the multiplication of benefit 
options offered to each consumer, and the shift from insured toward noninsured, albeit discounted, 
services.”); Jon R. Gabel et al., Consumer-Driven Health Plans: Are They More than Talk Now?, 
HEALTH AFF.  W395, Nov. 20, 2002, http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff. 
w2.395v1.pdf.  Gabel et al. distinguish the term “consumer-driven health plan” from the term 
“defined contribution plan.”  While “consumer driven refers to health plan design,” “defined 
contribution refers to an employer contribution strategy whereby employers set a fixed contribution 
for health insurance and place the employee at risk for costs beyond that point.”  Gabel et al., supra, 
at W395.  As the authors point out, the two forms are not mutually exclusive, but neither does a 
consumer-driven health plan necessarily entail a defined-contribution strategy by the employer.  Id.  
It is true, though, that the emergence of consumer-driven health plans can be seen as consistent with 
the broader trend in which employers seek to limit their future financial exposure for employee 
benefits by moving away from defined-benefit plans and toward defined-contribution plans.  See 
Robinson, supra note 218, at 2623 (suggesting that the movement to defined-contibution pension 
plans, like consumerism in health benefits design, signals a “change from a paternalistic corporate 
culture to one that defines itself as supporting rather than restricting employee choice”).  For an 
overview of defined-contribution approaches to health coverage, see American Academy of 
Actuaries, Understanding Defined Contribution Health Plans, ISSUE BRIEF, June 2002, available at 
www.actuary.org/pdf/health/dc_june02.pdf. 
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combination of greater efficiency in the purchasing decisions of cost-
conscious consumers224 and a shifting of health-care costs to employees.  
Notwithstanding these promises, commentators quickly recognized 
consumerism’s potential negative consequences, particularly for persons 
with chronic conditions.225 
Accompanying the decline of managed care and the early 
development of consumer-driven plans was a far more widespread move 
by employers sponsoring health plans to increase employees’ financial 
obligations either by raising premium contributions or by increasing 
cost-sharing obligations.226  A contemporaneous development was 
employers’ increasing reliance on “tiered” pharmacy benefits, in which 
the patient’s cost-sharing obligation varies among different tiers of drugs.  
While less closely associated with consumer-driven health care, these 
two developments similarly shift financial risk for medical expenses to 
the enrollee and thereby encourage cost-conscious choices.  Therefore, 
this Article treats consumer-driven plans, tiered benefit plans, and 
employer cost shifting as close allies in a consumerist movement.227  To 
date, increased cost sharing and tiered prescription drug benefits have 
been more widely implemented than plans typically designated as 
consumer-driven products,228 but surveys suggest that consumer-driven 
                                                     
 224. Gabel et al. provide an apt contrast between managed care, whose temporary success in 
constraining employer health costs was “because a third party (or, in some cases, an at-risk 
physician) was placed in the role of saying no to patients,” and consumer-driven health care, which 
represents “an effort to put patients in a position to say no to themselves.  This can happen only if 
consumers are aware of the true cost and have a personal stake in it, and if they have enough 
information and confidence to make treatment decisions.”  Gabel et al., supra note 223, at W396. 
 225. Milt Freudenheim, A New Health Plan May Raise Expenses for Sickest Workers, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 5, 2001, at A1. 
 226. See Gabel et al., supra note 222, at W4-211 (noting that increased employee cost sharing is 
occurring in both consumer-driven plans and in traditional plans like preferred-provider 
organizations); Sally Trude, Ctr. for Studying Health Sys. Change, Patient Cost Sharing: How Much 
is Too Much? (Dec. 2003), http://www.hschange.org/CONTENT/630/630.pdf (indicating that 
employers confronted with the higher premiums following the managed care backlash started 
shifting health-care costs to workers). 
 227. Cf. John V. Jacobi, After Managed Care: Gray Boxes, Tiers and Consumerism, 47 ST. 
LOUIS U. L.J. 397, 400–01 (2003) (identifying three emerging trends as the loosening of controls 
over patients’ choices, the stratification of health insurance offerings into tiers, and employers’ 
interest in emerging “patient-directed” plans). 
 228. Compare Gabel et al., supra note 223, at W404 (estimating that about 1.5 million 
Americans were enrolled in consumer-driven plans in November 2002), with Draper & Claxton, 
supra note 219 (finding tiered pharmacy arrangements to be in extensive use).  Gabel et al. classify 
consumer-driven plans into “three loosely defined groups.”  These include (1) plans that allow 
employees to specify the benefits and the networks that will be in their packages, but impose 
responsibility on the employee for any amount by which the resulting premium exceeds a fixed 
employer contribution; (2) “customized package” plans in which employees choose from among 
preset benefits and network offerings; and (3) “health reimbursement arrangements” (HRAs) in 
which the employee has a health spending account combined with a high deductible health plan.  
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products likely will gain ground during the next several years, 
particularly with the creation of health savings accounts.229 
This Part first describes the different vehicles by which a 
consumerist tide is rising in health benefits and summarizes some of the 
debates regarding the trend’s positive and negative policy implications.  
The Part proceeds to examine some of the still relatively limited research 
into the predicted and actual effects of these changes in health coverage.  
Based on this research, I argue that the changes are likely to leave 
persons with chronic conditions and those experiencing episodes of acute 
illness or injury underinsured, and thus subject to many of the same 
health and financial consequences faced by the uninsured.  In other 
words, the adoption of consumerist mechanisms produces an adverse 
disparate impact on the unhealthy and thus can be understood as 
discriminatory. 
B. Vehicles of the Consumerist Movement 
1. Increased Cost Sharing by Employees 
Managed care’s inability to continue controlling health-care costs 
has prompted increasing employer use of cost-sharing devices such as 
deductibles, copayments, and coinsurance.  Historically, health insurers 
offering indemnity coverage employed deductibles and coinsurance 
requirements to reduce moral hazard by giving patients a financial stake 
in treatment decisions,230 but managed care systems minimized cost 
sharing and instead controlled the consumption of services through 
administrative devices or gatekeeping physicians.  The new twist in 
twenty-first century cost sharing lies both in its acceleration and in 
                                                                                                                       
Gabel et al., supra note 223, at W396.  As discussed below in Part V.B.3, the most recent adaptation 
in the HRAs’ evolutionary chain is the health savings account (HSA).  Because of the projected 
growth in the adoption of HSAs as a result of their creation in the Medicare Modernization Act, this 
Article will focus on HSAs in its discussions of consumer-driven health plans. 
 229. See, e.g., Consumer-Directed Health Plan Enrollment Expected to Grow in 2004, BNA 
HEALTH CARE DAILY, Mar. 15, 2004, http://pubs.bna.com/ip/BNA/hce.nsf/is/a0a8e9q5d2 (reporting 
survey results that thirty-two percent of large companies expect to offer a consumer-driven plan next 
year, as compared to twenty-one percent currently offering such coverage); Report Sees Consumer-
Directed Plans Growing into Large Insurance Market Force, BNA HEALTH CARE DAILY, Aug. 19, 
2003, http://pubs.bna.com/ip/BNA/hce.nsf/is/a0a7glc4m6 (reporting projection by Forrester 
Research that by 2010 the number of enrollees in consumer-driven plans will reach 43 million).  In 
addition, Gabel et al. suggest that the results of such surveys may understate the prospects for the 
growth of consumer-driven plans, because once adopted by large employers, such plans are likely to 
diffuse to mid-size and smaller firms.  Gabel et al., supra note 222, at W4-210. 
 230. See Swartz, supra note 34, at 96 n.12 (noting that increasing cost sharing can reduce moral 
hazard). 
CROSSLEY FINAL.DOC 2/21/2006  9:55:25 AM 
122 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54 
employers’ reliance on cost-sharing elements not only to draw 
employees’ attention to rising health-care costs,231 but also to decrease 
(or, more precisely, limit the degree of increase in) the employers’ 
premiums.  Because cost sharing makes employees rather than insurers 
responsible for some portion of employees’ medical expenses, an 
increase in cost sharing represents a decrease in covered benefits.  Thus, 
during the past several years, employers have “bought down” their health 
insurance premiums by reducing coverage via increased cost sharing.232 
These increases have involved the full range of cost-sharing 
mechanisms.  Health plans’ average annual deductibles have 
increased,233 as have the size of copayment obligations.  Plans have 
begun using higher coinsurance (in which the consumer bears an 
indefinite obligation to pay a percentage of the charges for services 
received) as an alternative to higher copayments (in which the 
consumer’s obligation is a definite amount).234  Some employers have 
adopted new mechanisms, such as adding separate cost-sharing 
obligations for inpatient hospital services.235  If employers sought to use 
cost sharing to make employees feel the pain of rising health-care costs, 
they have succeeded with a vengeance.  In addition to its probable 
impact on employees’ accessing needed medical care,236 employer plans 
to increase cost sharing have been bones of contention in a number of 
recent labor disputes,237 and increased cost sharing is one reason cited for 
 
                                                     
 231. See Sally Trude & Joy M. Grossman, Ctr. for Studying Health Sys. Change, Patient Cost-
Sharing Innovations: Promises and Pitfalls (Jan. 2004), http://www.hschange.org/ 
CONTENT/643/643.pdf (stating that employers’ enthusiasm for increased cost sharing stems from 
“two main desires: to restore patient cost sharing to comparable levels before the advent of managed 
care or to give workers a greater financial stake in care decisions”). 
 232. See Lydia E. Regopoulos & Sally Trude, Ctr. for Studying Health Sys. Change, Employers 
Shift Rising Health Care Costs to Workers: No Long-term Solution in Sight (May 2004), 
http://www.hschange.org/CONTENT/677/677.pdf (discussing employers’ anticipated continued use 
of cost-sharing strategies); see also Vanessa Fuhrmans, Shifting Burden Helps Employers Cut Health 
Costs, WALL ST. J., Dec. 8, 2003, at B1 (stating that in 2003 employers slowed their “runaway” 
health-care costs mainly by shifting costs to employees). 
 233. See Laura Landro, The Informed Patient: When It’s Your Money, You Spend Differently, 
WALL ST. J., May 8, 2003, at D3 (noting single-year jump of seventy-five dollars in the average 
annual deductibles in preferred provider plans). 
 234. See Trude, supra note 226 (stating that employers have begun using both higher 
copayments and coinsurance); cf. Trude & Grossman, supra note 231 (noting that a switch from a 
flat copayment to a percentage coinsurance approach will “capture patients’ attention quickly”). 
 235. Kaiser Family Foundation, supra note 214, at § 7. 
 236. See infra Part V.D.2. 
 237. See Fuhrmans, supra note 232 (citing California grocery workers’ strike); Barbara 
Martinez, Shifting Burden: With Medical Costs Climbing, Workers are Asked to Pay More, WALL 
ST. J., June 16, 2003, at A1 (stating that cost shifting prompted strikes at General Electric, Lockheed 
Martin, and Hershey Foods). 
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the growing number of employees choosing not to participate in 
employer-sponsored health plans.238 
Of course, increasing cost sharing is not the sole way employers 
could shift health-care costs onto employees: increasing employees’ 
contributions toward group health insurance premiums also shifts 
costs.239  Employee premium contributions have also escalated 
significantly in the past several years,240 but research indicates employers 
primarily have relied on cost-sharing increases to shift costs to 
employees.241  Although both mechanisms shift health costs from 
employers to employees, two differences significant for purposes of this 
Article bear noting.  First, premium contribution increases shift to 
employees greater financial responsibility for purchasing insurance 
coverage; cost-sharing increases shift to employees greater responsibility 
for their own medical expenses.  In other words, an employee who pays 
only an increased premium contribution has less money in his pocket, but 
remains as well insured as before.  By contrast, an employee who faces 
increased cost sharing becomes partially self-insured.  Cost-sharing 
mechanisms, by making insureds responsible for a portion of their 
medical costs, shift insurance risk to the employee. 
A second, related difference lies in how the costs shifted by premium 
or cost-sharing increases are distributed among employees.  Increases in 
premium contributions shift higher costs equally to all employees 
choosing a particular coverage.242  By contrast, cost-sharing increases 
shift costs only to those employees who consume medical services 
having a cost-sharing obligation.  In other words, a healthy employee 
who needs no doctors’ services or prescription drugs bears no additional 
costs from cost sharing, but an employee who experiences health 
problems and seeks medical treatment does bear additional costs.  This 
undisputed inequality in how cost-sharing devices shift costs among 
employees is central to an understanding of consumerist mechanisms as 
discriminatory. 
                                                     
 238. See Regopoulos & Trude, supra note 232 (suggesting that increases in premium 
contributions and cost sharing probably have caused some employees to drop coverage). 
 239. Trude, supra note 226. 
 240. See Martinez, supra note 237 (citing Kaiser Family Foundation study finding that workers’ 
average monthly premium contribution for family coverage more than tripled between 1998 and 
2002). 
 241. Trude, supra note 226. 
 242. Actual premium contributions may vary depending on whether the employee signs up for 
single, spouse, or family coverage and, if the employer offers more than one coverage option, on 
which option the employee chooses.  But each employee enrolling in a particular type of coverage 
faces the same contribution. 
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2. Tiered Plans 
Another consumerist mechanism, the tiered benefit plan, combines 
increased cost sharing (to shift costs to employees) with differential cost 
sharing (to prod subscribers toward the use of particular products).243  
The term “tiered plans” refers generally to health insurance products that 
group providers or prescription drugs into tiers based on cost (or 
potentially some other criteria) and encourage subscribers to choose 
lower-tier products or providers by imposing higher copayment amounts 
on higher-tier choices.244  For example, in one tiered pharmacy plan, 
subscribers pay a five-dollar copay if they purchase a generic drug, a 
twenty-dollar copay for a brand-name drug on the plan’s “preferred” list, 
or from thirty dollars to more than fifty dollars for nonpreferred, brand-
name drugs on the third tier.245  The health insurance industry has applied 
the tiering concept to prescription drugs, hospitals, and physicians, with 
varying degrees of market penetration.246  Adopting a tiered plan offers 
the potential for additional cost savings both by encouraging subscribers 
to choose lower-cost products and by giving insurers an enticement 
(inclusion in a lower tier) to offer providers when negotiating for 
discounted charges.247 
During the past five years, tiered pharmacy plans have become a 
common feature in employer-sponsored benefits packages.248  Among 
                                                     
 243. Jacobi, supra note 227, at 403. 
 244. Glen P. Mays et al., Ctr. for Studying Health Sys. Change, Tiered-Provider Networks: 
Patients Face Cost-Choice Trade-Offs (Nov. 2003), http://www.hschange.org/CONTENT/ 
627/627.pdf. 
 245. Cyril T. Zaneski, Patients are Swallowing More of the Cost of Pills: Employers and 
Insurers Shift Rising Prices to Users, BALT. SUN, Feb. 24, 2004, at 1A (describing CareFirst 
BlueCross BlueShield plan).  See also Cindy Parks Thomas, Incentive-Based Formularies, 349 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 2186, 2187 (2003) (describing a tiered approach to drug copayments). 
 246. See generally Mays et al., supra note 244 (discussing hospital and physician resistance to 
tiered systems and technical difficulties of a tiered approach).  While tiered pharmacy benefits are 
already widespread, the adoption of tiered hospital and physician networks has to date been far more 
limited, in part because the developer’s decisions about how to divide providers into tiers is more 
complicated, and providers may offer greater resistance to the imposition of a tiered structure. 
 247. Id. 
 248. Zaneski, supra note 245 (describing an “industrywide wave” of adoptions, with sixty-three 
percent of employees with employer-sponsored drug coverage having tiered copay plans in 2004, up 
from twenty-seven percent in 2000).  See also Thomas, supra note 245, at 2188 (calling the use of 
incentive-based formularies “standard practice”); Draper & Claxton, supra note 219 (finding that in 
most of the twelve nationally representative communities visited, tiered pharmacy arrangements are 
in extensive use).  Several reasons may have contributed to the rapid uptake of tiered pharmacy 
products.  First, the escalation in prices for prescription drugs has been the single biggest driver in 
overall health-care cost inflation; therefore employers have a particularly strong incentive to try new 
ways of controlling these costs.  See Thomas, supra note 245, at 2187.  Second, because many 
employers provide prescription drug coverage to employees through a separate plan, employers can 
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pharmacy plans, a three-tier design like that described above is the most 
common, though the products offered continue to evolve.  Tiering 
copayment amounts by products provides a somewhat more refined 
incentive structure than a uniform increase in copayment obligations, 
because combining copayments with tiers encourages the consumer to 
think about not only whether to take money out of his pocket to consume 
a product, but also which product to consume.249  To the extent that they 
encourage consumers to choose which drug to purchase based solely on 
cost, without consideration of effectiveness, existing standard three-tier 
products remain a fairly blunt instrument.  Further refinement is possible, 
however, if insurers can devise incentives to purchase drugs proven to be 
the most cost effective over time.250 
3. Health Savings Accounts 
While market forces generated both the general increase in cost-
sharing obligations in employer-sponsored health plans and the evolution 
of tiered plans, federal legislation created the third embodiment of the 
consumerist movement that this Part examines.  The Medicare 
Prescription Drug Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003251 
(MMA) included a provision for individuals to create a health savings 
account (HSA),252 which is essentially a tax-favored savings account that 
individuals can use for medical expenses.  The MMA did not conceive of  
HSAs out of whole cloth.  Rather, the HSA is the most recent link in an 
evolutionary chain of consumer-directed products providing some sort of 
tax-favored discretionary spending account for individuals; its forebears 
include the flexible spending account, the health reimbursement account, 
and the Archer medical savings account.253  Congress’s goal in the MMA 
                                                                                                                       
experiment with a tiered pharmacy benefit without signing onto major changes in the rest of their 
health coverage.  Third, some level of agreement seems to exist among commentators that sorting 
prescription drugs into tiers is a more straightforward process than sorting hospitals or physicians. 
 249. Cf. Thomas, supra note 245, at 2187 (noting that savings from tiered plans are 
accomplished “by both decreasing the number of medications purchased per member and increasing 
the proportion of lower-cost brand-name drugs and generic drugs used”). 
 250. See generally Trude & Grossman, supra note 231 (discussing future trends in health 
insurance cost sharing); see also Thomas, supra note 245, at 2188 (noting that employers and 
insurers are trying to “fine-tune their tiered formularies to make them ‘value-based,’ with 
copayments determined on the basis of the relative cost effectiveness of a drug”). 
 251. Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003) (primarily amending 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (2000)). 
 252. The MMA did so by adding section 223 to the Internal Revenue Code.  26 U.S.C.S. § 223 
(LexisNexis 2005). 
 253. For a description of each of these devices, see Nina Owcharenko, Heritage Foundation 
Health Savings Accounts: How to Broaden Health Coverage for Working Families, WebMemo #481 
(Apr. 16, 2004), http://www.heritage.org/Research/HealthCare/wm481.cfm. 
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was to allow for the creation of a medical spending account that would 
be more widely available and more attractive to employers and 
consumers. 
The introduction of HSAs raises a number of complex questions 
about their integration into existing health benefits schemes,254 but the 
HSA’s basic operation is fairly straightforward.255  The MMA enables an 
“eligible individual” to make contributions to an HSA, which is a tax-
exempt account established exclusively for the purpose of paying 
qualified medical expenses of the individual (and potentially the 
individual’s family).  To be an eligible individual, a person must be 
covered by a high-deductible health plan (HDHP), but have no other 
health coverage.256  To qualify as an HDHP, a policy must have a 
deductible of at least $1000 for individual coverage or $2000 for family 
coverage,257 and must establish an annual limit on out-of-pocket medical 
expenses of $5000 for individual coverage or $10,000 for family 
coverage.258  The individual or her employer can contribute up to $2600 
for an individual or $5150 for a family annually to the account on a tax-
favored basis,259 but the contribution cannot exceed the HDHP’s 
                                                     
 254. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 2004-45, 2004-22 I.R.B. 971 (discussing HSAs interaction with flexible 
spending arrangements and health reimbursement arrangements). 
 255. The I.R.S.’s Notice providing guidance on HSAs provides fuller detail for those interested 
and is available at I.R.S. Notice 2004-2, 2004-2 I.R.B. 269.  See also Stanley D. Baum, The 
Advantages of Health Savings Accounts—the Code’s Newest Healthcare Arrangement, 100 J. TAX’N 
101, 101–11 (2004) (explaining HSAs and associated tax issues); Stephan R. Leimberg & John J. 
Mcfadden, Health Savings Accounts—An Important New Tool for Estate Planners, 31 ESTATE 
PLANNING 194, 194 (2004) (considering advantages and disadvantages of HSAs). 
 256. Individuals can obtain HDHP coverage either by participating in an employer-sponsored 
plan that offers an HDHP or by purchasing an HDHP in the individual market.  A survey of 270 
companies reported by Hewitt Associates at the end of March 2004 found that, although six out of 
ten employers likely would offer HSAs to their employees in the near future, a much smaller number 
(only one-third) currently offered an HDHP.  Most Firms in Survey Plan to Offer HSAs but Fewer 
Have the Requisite Health Plans, BNA HEALTH CARE DAILY, Apr. 5, 2004, 
http://pubs.bna.com/ip/BNA/hce.nsf/is/a0a8h4e4q2. 
 257. See 26 U.S.C.S. § 223(c)(2)(A) (LexisNexis 2005) (stating that the term “high deductible 
health plan” means a health plan which has an annual deductible which is not less than $1000 for 
self-only coverage, and twice the dollar amount for family coverage).  The law provides, however, 
that an HDHP is allowed to provide first-dollar coverage for preventive care services.  26 U.S.C.S. § 
223(c)(2)(C). 
 258. See 26 U.S.C.S. § 223(c)(2)(A) (stating that to qualify as a high deductible health plan, the 
sum of the annual deductible and the other annual out-of-pocket expenses required to be paid under 
the plan for covered benefits cannot exceed $5000 for self-only coverage, or twice the dollar amount 
for family coverage).  Such out-of-pocket expenses may include amounts paid to satisfy the 
deductible and any cost-sharing obligations once the deductible has been satisfied.  Not included are 
the premiums paid to purchase the HDHP. 
 259. A contribution made by an individual is deductible “above the line,” i.e., it is not included 
in the individual’s adjusted gross income.  A contribution made by an individual’s employer is not 
taxable income for the employee and is tax deductible by the employer. 
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deductible.260  Funds in the HSA can be invested in mutual funds or other 
investment vehicles, and unspent amounts roll over from year to year.  
Moreover, the HSA is “portable”—it is the property of the eligible 
individual and thus follows her upon any change in employment.  Once 
an HSA is established, distributions from the account are not taxed as 
long as they are used for medical expenses such as covering deductibles 
or copays, purchasing over-the-counter drugs, or paying for noncovered 
services.261 
As commentators have noted (whether to their delight or chagrin), 
the tax advantages HSAs offer are remarkable.262  The funds an eligible 
individual contributes to an HSA are not taxed; the funds in an HSA can 
be invested and grow tax free; and distributions made from an HSA are 
not taxed, as long as they are used for qualified medical expenses.263  
This exceptionally favorable tax treatment signals the desire of 
congressional backers264 to provide strong incentives for individuals to 
establish HSAs.  The proponents of HSAs seek to stimulate their 
widespread establishment to dampen health-care cost inflation,265 but the 
                                                     
 260. The maximum annual contribution is scheduled to increase annually, and under a “catch-
up” provision, individuals older than fifty-five can contribute more.  26 U.S.C.S. § 223(b)(3), (g). 
 261. Untaxed distributions cannot be used to purchase health insurance, except when the account 
holder is either purchasing COBRA continuation coverage or is unemployed.  Distributions 
generally can, however, be used to pay the premiums for long-term care insurance, and Medicare-
eligible individuals can use distributions to pay either (1) Medicare premiums and out-of-pocket 
expenses relating to Medicare, or (2) any employee premium needed to maintain retiree coverage 
under an employer plan.  26 U.S.C.S. § 223(d)(2). 
 262. See Robert Greenstein & Edwin Park, Ctr. on Budget & Pol’y Priorities, Health Savings 
Accounts in Final Medicare Conference Agreement Pose Threats both to Long-term Fiscal Policy 
and to the Employer-Based Health Insurance System (Dec. 1 2003), http://www.cbpp.org/10-27-
03health.pdf (stating that “[t]o allow an account to feature both tax-deductible contributions and tax-
free withdrawals is unprecedented”); see also Marla Brill, Will Health Savings Accounts Have a 
Market?, FINANCIAL ADVISOR, Mar. 2004, http://www.fa-mag.com/Past_issues.php?idArticle= 
320&idPastIssue=81 (characterizing the tax treatment of HSAs as the “equivalent of a tax home 
run”). 
 263. If an individual less than sixty-five years old uses a distribution from an HSA for purposes 
other than a qualified medical expense, the distribution is taxed and subject to a ten-percent penalty.  
An individual aged sixty-five years or older who so uses a distribution must pay tax on the 
distribution, but is not subject to the penalty.  26 U.S.C.S. § 223(f)(4)(A), (C). 
 264. In a surprise to many health insurance lobbyists, the language creating HSAs was added as 
an amendment to the House of Representatives prescription drug bill only when it reached the House 
floor in the summer of 2003.  Although most Democrats opposed the provision regarding HSAs, its 
inclusion helped rally support from conservative Republicans who were hesitant to approve a new 
and expensive Medicare benefit.  See Jeff Dufour, Interest in HSAs Runs Rampant, but Big Sales 
Will Wait Until 2005, THE HILL, Mar. 4, 2004, http://www.hillnews.com/executive/ 
030404_hsas.aspx (“[M]ost Democrats opposed the HSA provision.  However, the provisions helped 
secure crucial support from some conservatives, and the legislation narrowly passed the house.”). 
 265. Supporters of HSAs predict that they will “help[] to re-engage employees with their health 
care spending while giving employers the ability to make the transition from a defined benefit 
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primary philosophical goal is one of individual empowerment.  An 
analyst from the Heritage Foundation highlights the individualistic focus 
of consumerism in describing HSAs: 
Health Savings Accounts offer Americans a new coverage option for 
their health care needs.  They give them a new choice in coverage 
design, greater control of their health care spending, and the ability to 
own their own health care plans.  These are all key features in moving 
America’s health care system to a consumer-based system.266 
Advocates for HSAs are less likely to focus on the individual risk 
that accompanies enhanced choice and control.  First, it bears emphasis 
that the HSA is not itself an insurance vehicle; it does not transfer risk to 
an insurer or spread risk over a group.  Instead, it is a mechanism 
designed to encourage, through tax benefits, individual savings for 
uninsured medical expenses.267  An HSA’s tax benefits are available, 
however, solely to individuals who have catastrophic health-care 
coverage (the HDHP) and no other coverage.  Thus, the necessary result 
(and intent) of the HSA is that consumers have less comprehensive 
insurance coverage than has typically been provided by employers.  The 
decision to contribute to an HSA requires the consumer to assume the 
financial risks of medical expenses up to the amount of the deductible.  
In some cases, employers may help employees shoulder this increased 
risk by contributing to employee HSAs, but these contributions are not 
required. 
From this perspective, a common thread shared by the three 
consumerist mechanisms described in this Part becomes visible.  Each 
shifts to the individual greater financial responsibility for medical 
expenses.  These are not simply cost-shifting mechanisms (for healthy 
individuals who consume no medical services will bear no additional 
costs), but are more properly understood as risk-shifting mechanisms.  
                                                                                                                       
system, with open-ended costs, to a defined contribution system in which health care spending can 
be better managed.”  Owcharenko, supra note 253. 
 266. Id.  See also John C. Goodman, Nat’l Center for Pol’y Analysis, Health Savings Accounts 
Will Revolutionize American Health Care (Jan. 15, 2004), http://www.ncpa.org/pub/ba/ba464/ (“The 
concept of HSAs is not conservative or liberal.  It’s an empowerment idea.”). 
 267. Accord Robinson, supra note 12, at 1882 (stating that HSAs’ design is “important as 
representing the evolution from collective insurance toward individual prepayment as the guiding 
principle of health care coverage”); Brill, supra note 262 (asserting that HSAs “are designed to help 
individuals save for qualified medical and retiree health expenses on a tax-favored basis”).  For this 
reason, the Department of Labor has taken the position that while employer-sponsored HDHPs are 
group health plans subject to ERISA, HSAs generally will not be deemed ERISA-covered employee 
benefit plans.  HSAs Generally Will Not Constitute Employee Welfare Benefit Plans, DOL Says, 
BNA HEALTH LAW REPORTER, Apr. 15, 2004, http://Pubs.bna.com/ip/BNA/hlr.nsf/is/a0a8h9r6e6. 
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This shifting of risk leaves the individual less well insured against the 
costs of poor health or accidents.  Admittedly, HSAs offer some 
individuals a “sweetener” in the form of tax benefits to make the 
assumption of greater risk more attractive.268  But all three mechanisms 
shift risk to the consumer in hopes that consumers who feel the impact of 
medical decisions in their own wallets will make wise decisions about 
what care to consume. 
C. Policy Implications of Consumerism in Health Coverage 
The accelerating consumerist movement raises several policy 
concerns that have stimulated public debate.269  The preceding paragraph 
hints at two areas of concern directly relevant to consumerism’s 
potentially discriminatory effects: First, because the trend seeks to endow 
individuals simultaneously with greater autonomy to make health-care 
decisions and incentives to make those decisions in a cost-conscious 
fashion, some have questioned individuals’ abilities to make sound, cost-
effective decisions regarding medical care.  Second, many commentators 
have suggested the possibility that consumerism may harm, rather than 
benefit, persons with health problems (and particularly unhealthy persons 
who also earn low incomes).  A third concern relates less directly to any 
impact on the unhealthy, but directly implicates the tension between 
social solidarity and actuarial fairness visions of health coverage.  It asks 
what effect the consumerism trend—and specifically the development of 
HSAs—will have on the continued viability of employer-sponsored 
group health coverage.  This section will briefly explicate these concerns 
and sketch the opposing viewpoints on each question. 
1. The Effectiveness of Consumer Decision Making 
In emphasizing individual authority to make health-care decisions, 
without constraints imposed by third parties, consumerism rides the wave 
of public sentiment against managed care.  Yet proponents of consumer-
driven health care do not argue for consumers to have totally 
unconstrained choices; instead, the consumer’s financial responsibility 
                                                     
 268. The benefit offered to employees whose employer raises cost-sharing obligations or adopts 
a tiered plan is far less salient, but it may exist in the employer’s ability to moderate health-care 
costs that might otherwise lead it to drop coverage. 
 269. The debate has been ongoing at least since Congress included a provision authorizing a 
demonstration project for medical savings accounts (MSAs) in HIPAA.  For a description of the 
debates that preceded this inclusion, see Jacobi, supra note 30, at 367 n.234. 
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(at some level) for the choices made is a constraint that simultaneously 
maximizes consumer autonomy and minimizes the wasteful consumption 
of health care traditionally encouraged by over-generous insurance 
coverage.270  The ideal of consumerism thus envisions informed 
individuals operating as rational consumers of health-care services and 
products, thereby producing an efficient allocation of health-care 
resources.  Because of patients’ traditional deference to their physicians’ 
recommendations and managed care administrators’ more recent 
assumption of decision-making authority, patients historically have not 
had enough information to enable competent decision making,271 but 
consumerists promote the use of Internet-based tools to educate 
consumers regarding treatment options and to provide information 
regarding the quality and cost of different providers.  Ultimately, a 
central philosophical tenet of consumerism is the marriage of control and 
responsibility regarding medical decisions in the hands of the individual. 
Others, however, are less sanguine about individuals’ capacities to 
make cost-effective decisions regarding discrete medical treatment 
choices.272  Commonly voiced concerns are that medical decisions are 
more important and complicated than most consumer decisions and that 
accurate consumer-friendly indicators of provider or product quality 
remain stubbornly in the development stage.  Professor Mark Hall points 
out two additional ways that the distinctive nature of health care renders 
                                                     
 270. Compare id. at 379–80 (noting his arguments supporting tax-favored MSAs), with Michael 
F. Cannon, Hillary’s Worst Nightmare (May 9, 2004), http://www.cato.org/cgi-bin/scripts/ 
printtech.cgi/dailys/05-09-04.html (noting Hillary Clinton’s opposition to health savings accounts). 
 271. Cf . MARK A. HALL, MAKING MEDICAL SPENDING DECISIONS: THE LAW, ETHICS, AND 
ECONOMICS OF RATIONING MECHANISMS 44 (1997) (noting that consumer ignorance might be 
viewed as “an artifact of the historical noncompetitiveness of the medical market”). 
 272. See Jacobi, supra note 227, at 408 (asserting that “[c]ost-conscious consumers are 
notoriously poor at differentiating between unneeded and therefore dispensable treatments and those 
necessary to preserve life and health”); see also Dwight McNeill, Do Consumer-Directed Health 
Benefits Favor the Young and Healthy?, 23 HEALTH AFF., Jan.–Feb. 2004, 186, 192 (asserting that 
“the notion that consumers can make better judgments about their care . . . than their physician 
counterparts is not well supported”).  It is important to distinguish between market enthusiasts who 
seek to engage individuals as rational consumers in choosing a health plan or benefit package in a 
market for health insurance coverage, and those who assert the importance of individuals making 
consumption choices in a market for health-care products and services.  In the former scenario, an 
individual is subject to financial incentives in choosing a level of coverage; in the latter, an 
individual is subject to financial incentives in choosing what care to receive.  Leading academic 
advocates of a heavier reliance on markets in allocating health-care resources have proposed the 
former scenario.  See Rosenblatt, supra note 30, at 178–80 (describing proposals of Alain Enthoven 
and Clark Havighurst).  The forms of consumer-driven health care discussed in this Article embody 
the latter scenario.  Some products also falling under the umbrella of “consumer-driven health plans” 
emphasize consumer decision making at the benefit design level, rather than at the service purchase 
level.  See supra note 253 for a description of such products.  Consumers’ abilities to make sound 
decisions regarding what level of coverage to purchase is less contested than their ability to make 
sound decisions regarding what medical care to receive. 
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the efficiency of patient decision making problematic.  First, because a 
person typically faces momentous medical decisions only infrequently 
and at a time of crisis,273 consumers usually do not have the opportunity 
to accumulate knowledge by repeatedly making a particular medical 
decision.274  Second, even as quality information regarding different 
health-care options develops, patients confronted with medical decisions 
likely still will rely heavily on their personal physicians’ advice, which 
may not produce optimal (from the patients’ perspectives) spending 
decisions.275  Hall concludes, “[f]or these reasons, it is not feasible to 
expect a viable consumer-driven market to develop for discrete treatment 
decisions.”276  Not surprisingly, proponents of consumerism respond that 
these concerns insult the public’s intelligence and insist that empowered 
consumers will rise to the occasion.277  Regardless of one’s level of 
optimism regarding patients’ competency to make cost-effective medical 
decisions, however, this competency is indisputably a central premise of 
consumerism.  Without it, patients’ decisions may be as likely to harm as 
to promote their health. 
2. Consumerism’s Winners and Losers 
a. The Distribution of Consumerism’s Costs and Burdens 
The suggestion that adoption of consumerist mechanisms might 
harm some patients’ health throws into focus another policy implication 
of the consumerist trend: how will the benefits and burdens flowing from 
the shifting of risk from insurers to individuals be distributed?  Indeed, 
criticism leveled at increased cost-sharing and consumer-driven health 
plans has included impassioned charges that these trends disadvantage 
persons with chronic health conditions and low-income persons.  
Although these charges often treat the reason for this disadvantage as 
 
                                                     
 273. See McNeill, supra note 272, at 192 (noting that humans’ hope for living longer and getting 
well “make the decision process more emotional than rational”). 
 274. HALL, supra note 271, at 45. 
 275. Id. at 45–46. 
 276. Id. at 46.  Other commentators suggest that consumers might be better able to make rational 
choices about prescription drug purchases than about how to treat a life-threatening illness.  Gabel et 
al., supra note 223, at W406. 
 277. Cannon, supra note 270.  Cannon, who is director of health policy studies at the Cato 
Institute, anticipates that HSAs will stimulate a “cultural change”: “[H]ealth savings accounts breed 
the . . . values of personal responsibility and self-reliance.  Where socialized medicine requires a 
culture of submission, health savings accounts will accustom millions to making their own 
decisions.”  Id. 
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self-evident, it is worth briefly unpacking the nature and incidence of the 
detriment, which on close inspection reveals multiple dimensions. 
First, if we focus only on the cost-sharing aspects of consumerist 
mechanisms (whether across-the-board cost-sharing obligations, tiered 
copays, or a high deductible for catastrophic coverage), they clearly shift 
some portion of medical expenses incurred from the insurer to the 
insured.  This result is desirable for an employer seeking to control 
premiums, and it is philosophically consistent with consumerism’s 
reliance on informed, cost-bearing consumers as decision makers.  The 
question, however, is not whether employees as a group should therefore 
be seen as “losers;” instead, I am here concerned with whether some 
individuals suffer more detriment than others from this shifting. 
The answer, of course, is that some individuals are more 
disadvantaged.  Because copayments and deductibles impose costs on an 
insured person only when care is accessed, those persons who most 
frequently seek care shoulder the highest financial cost.  Thus, a person 
with a chronic condition who requires regular and ongoing care or a 
person who experiences a serious injury or acute illness will be 
disadvantaged financially; he will pay more in copayments or spend his 
entire deductible, while healthier persons will experience fewer out-of-
pocket costs.278  Identifying disproportionate financial costs, however, 
does not by itself fully capture the nature of the disadvantage at stake.  
Of perhaps greater importance is the extent to which imposing financial 
costs burdens the person bearing those costs.  A particular absolute level 
of financial costs may or may not constitute a financial burden—in the 
sense of affecting a person’s ability to satisfy her other needs—but it is 
obvious that out-of-pocket medical expenses are far more likely to be 
burdensome for persons with low incomes.279  Thus, boosting cost-
sharing obligations imposes disproportionate financial costs on persons 
with health problems, and disproportionate financial burdens on persons 
with lower incomes. 
Two final steps in this unpacking process are in order, for the onus 
imposed by increased cost sharing is not wholly financial.  Instead, it 
may also entail a health burden.  The potential health burden derives 
from the possibility that an individual who must pay to access care may 
                                                     
 278. See Robinson, supra note 12, at 1885 (suggesting that “the new benefit designs serve to 
protect healthy nonusers from chronically ill users because all users pay premiums but the 
chronically ill users pay much more in deductibles and coinsurance”). 
 279. See Jacobi, supra note 227, at 404 (making the point that tiered plans “stratify” members by 
enabling wealthy members “to use their greater disposable incomes to see their providers of 
choice . . . [while] [t]hose of lesser means will increasingly face substantial co-payments and 
coinsurance that will bar them from some providers”). 
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choose to delay or forgo even necessary care and may suffer negative 
health consequences as a result.280  Moreover, this scenario may play out 
even when the immediate financial cost of accessing care, viewed 
objectively, may not seem terribly burdensome (e.g., a fifteen-dollar 
copay rather than a five-dollar copay for visiting a doctor’s office).  
Because increased cost-sharing shifts insurance risk to the insured, a 
person deciding whether to visit her own doctor today cannot foresee 
whether it is more important to save that fifteen dollars for a copay in 
case her daughter is sick next month.281  In economic terms, the 
unpredictability of health-care needs hinders a consumer’s ability to 
make informed, rational decisions about the most valued uses of her 
money.  It stands to reason that persons with chronic conditions—who 
recognize themselves as heavy, but not entirely predictable, consumers—
may be more likely to forgo care for this reason than persons in generally 
good health.  Therefore, following this line of reasoning to its 
conclusion, it is reasonable to anticipate that augmenting cost-sharing 
obligations will produce a disproportionate burden of negative health 
effects for both persons with lower incomes and persons with chronic 
conditions. 
b. The Distribution of the Benefits of HSAs 
The foregoing discussion helps elucidate the concern that 
consumerist measures entailing increased cost-sharing obligations 
disproportionately will harm unhealthy persons and persons with low 
incomes.  Standing alone, however, this analysis presents only half of the 
benefits/burdens calculus, for we have yet to consider the substantial tax 
advantages that HSAs offer to some people, but not others.282  These tax 
advantages accrue disproportionately to persons in the highest tax 
brackets, on both an annual and long-term basis.283 
                                                     
 280. See Gabel et al. supra note 223, at W406 (characterizing consumer-driven health care as a 
price-based rationing system that will favor high-income over low-income persons “who are more 
likely to delay care if they lack the resources to pay for it”). 
 281. Cf. Jacobi, supra note 227, at 406 (“Those of lesser means may spend reluctantly, 
attempting to husband their spending accounts against the advent of an emergency, thereby 
foregoing medically appropriate care.”). 
 282. An increase in cost sharing or the adoption of tiered plans seems to offer little if any benefit 
to insureds, except that these measures may forestall the necessity of an employer’s raising 
employee premium contributions or dropping coverage altogether. 
 283. Leonard E. Burman & Linda J. Blumberg, Urban Institute, HSAs Won’t Cure Medicare’s 
Ills (Nov. 21, 2003), http://www.urban.org/url.cfm?ID=1000578 (calling HSAs “[t]oday’s tax cut for 
rich people”). 
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In a single year, the money that an eligible individual contributes to 
an HSA up to the statutory limit is not included in that person’s taxable 
income.  The tax savings afforded by this deduction are significant for 
someone in the top tax bracket, but it may produce no savings at all for 
someone whose income is already so low that she pays no taxes.284  An 
additional tax advantage flows to persons who accumulate funds in their 
HSAs over time, rather than draining the account each year to pay for 
uninsured medical expenses, because funds invested in an HSA grow tax 
free.  Again, in general terms, this favors high-income persons whose 
investment returns ordinarily would be subjected to the highest rate of 
taxation, but more precisely it favors those who are able to accumulate 
funds in their account over time.  That group is likely to include 
relatively healthy persons (who have few medical expenses for which 
they would take HSA distributions) and wealthy persons (who can 
contribute the maximum allowable to their HSAs, but pay for any 
medical expenses up to their deductible with non-HSA funds).  For this 
reason, financial planners already have recognized HSAs’ value as tax 
shelters for wealthy individuals.285  Thus, both the short- and long-term 
benefits of the tax preferences that HSAs offer disproportionately favor 
wealthy and healthy individuals. 
c. Responses by Proponents of Consumerism 
Commentators who look upon the consumerist trend with favor offer 
several responses to these distributional concerns regarding consumerism 
generally, and HSAs in particular.  Rather than emphasizing the burdens 
that cost-sharing may impose, they view its financial bite as essential to 
giving Americans incentives to make cost-conscious (and hopefully 
efficient) health-care purchasing decisions and to take greater personal 
responsibility for the consequences of their health-related behavior.286  
                                                     
 284. See Linda J. Blumberg, Urban Institute, Health Savings Accounts and Tax Preferences for 
High Deductible Policies Purchased in the Non-Group Market: Potential Impact on Employer-Based 
Coverage in the Small Group Market 8 (Mar. 18, 2004), http://www.urban.org/url.cfm?ID=900696.  
Blumberg stated, 
A $5,150 HSA contribution, the maximum permitted under the law, would generate a tax 
reduction of $1,802 per year to a household in the top income tax bracket.  The value of 
the tax benefit would be less than half as much for a moderate-income family.  And it 
would be worth much less than that if the family could not afford to contribute very much 
into the account. 
Id. 
 285. See Brill, supra note 262 (describing the ideal HSA “savers” scenario); see also Greenstein 
& Park, supra note 262, at 2–3. 
 286. See Cannon, supra note 270 (asserting that HSAs “empower individuals to become 
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The idea is that, if we know we will bear the financial costs of poor 
health, we may eat better, exercise more, stop smoking, and engage in 
fewer risky behaviors. 
Fans of consumerism also argue that the personal control of health-
care decisions and the free choice of providers that consumerist health 
care offers is particularly valuable to and desired by heavy consumers of 
health care, such as persons with chronic conditions.287  In this view, any 
additional financial costs are offset by the nonfinancial benefits of 
heightened patient autonomy.  Moreover, they note, accurately, that 
persons who use the most medical care may end up financially better off 
by establishing an HSA.  The MMA requires that HDHPs have a 
maximum annual limit on out-of-pocket expenses, which may be lower 
than the limits in some more traditional coverage options.  Thus, an HSA 
combined with an HDHP may provide superior protection against truly 
catastrophic costs.288 
Finally, advocates assert that HSAs’ tax preferences are “designed to 
correct a major flaw in tax law” by “giv[ing] deposits to HSAs the same 
tax advantages formerly granted only to [employer-paid] health 
insurance premiums.”289  They view previous law as unfairly penalizing 
persons who—rather than participating in an employer’s health plan or 
seeking to purchase their own individual coverage—simply self-insure 
by saving to cover their medical expenses.290  From this perspective, 
granting tax preferences to HSA contributions is a matter of tax equity 
between individuals and employers; the regressive effect of the 
preference is no different from that of other individual tax deductions. 
                                                                                                                       
stewards of their own health care dollars rather than force people to depend on their employer to 
spend those dollars wisely”); cf. Robinson, supra note 12, at 1886 (“A greater sense of personal 
responsibility among patients for their own health and health care will attenuate some forms of cost 
inflation and support the prevention and treatment of many chronic conditions.”). 
 287. Gabel et al., supra note 223, at W403 (noting that “[c]onsumer-driven plan executives 
contended that people with chronic conditions have the potential to gain the most from the increased 
flexibility afforded by their products”). 
 288. Of course, given the highly skewed character of medical expenditures, this conclusion also 
throws into question the level of cost savings that consumer-driven plans can offer.  As Gabel et al., 
point out: “Large deductibles will not tend to reduce utilization for persons who experience 
expensive episodes of care, or those with chronic diseases, because the annual deductible will be 
met, and stop-loss insurance coverage will provide for nearly all of the remaining costs.”  Id. at 
W402. 
 289. See Goodman, supra note 266, at 1. 
 290. Id. (“The result is a tax law that lavishly subsidizes third-party insurance and severely 
penalizes individual self-insurance.”).  Given the variability and unpredictability of medical 
expenses, it is questionable whether a rational person would ever choose to forgo insurance coverage 
altogether in favor of self-insuring.  Accordingly, the tax benefits of HSAs are available only to an 
individual enrolled in a HDHP. 
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Notwithstanding these responses by consumerist advocates, a strong 
argument remains that, when predictable distributional effects are 
considered, healthy and high-income persons receive a disproportionate 
share of the advantages flowing from the trend toward consumerism (and 
HSAs in particular), while unhealthy persons and low-income persons 
bear a disproportionate share of the disadvantages.  This skewing of 
effects on both the benefits and burdens sides of the ledger shows that 
consumerist health plans are likely to create real winners and losers.  In 
this light, the portrayal of consumerist mechanisms as producing a 
discriminatory disparate impact on the unhealthy becomes quite salient, 
as do the limits of the protection offered by existing law.  While a person 
with a chronic condition cannot under HIPAA be excluded from her 
employer’s health plan or be charged a higher premium to participate, if 
her employer adopts consumerist coverage mechanisms, she will likely 
bear heavier costs and burdens than will her healthier coworkers. 
3. HSAs’ Impact on the Health Insurance Market 
Certainly, one might reasonably respond to the foregoing discussion 
by asking: if HSAs and other consumerist vehicles are such a bad deal 
for unhealthy persons, then why do they not just enroll in more 
conventional forms of coverage?  In the short run, at least, that tactic 
may protect unhealthy persons whose employers simply add HSAs or 
tiered plans as additional coverage options, but the question raises the 
third policy concern that exists regarding HSAs.  While less central to 
consumerism’s discriminatory impact on the unhealthy (and therefore 
more briefly examined here), a crux of the debate regarding HSAs’ 
creation has been their potential impact on the broader health insurance 
market, which brings us back to where we started, with the struggle for 
the soul of health insurance.291 
                                                     
 291. John Jacobi made this point with respect to tax-favored MSAs, as follows: 
The fundamental principled disagreement between proponents and opponents of MSAs 
concerns the ends of health insurance.  If the purpose of health insurance is to make 
coverage available through social pooling of risk, MSAs are anathema, even if they have 
a limited cost-reducing effect.  On the other hand, if the purpose of health insurance is to 
accurately assess risk in order to “fairly” charge for coverage, MSAs are appropriate 
financing vehicles. 
Jacobi, supra note 30, at 381–82.  At the time he wrote, Jacobi viewed MSAs as “outside the stream 
of the developing insurance system’s structure,” which he viewed as trending toward a social 
solidarity understanding of health insurance.  Id. at 382.  Today, the tide has reversed, and HSAs are 
on the leading edge of the current consumerist wave. 
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Critics of HSAs assert that, even if employers initially maintain other 
coverage options, the financial benefits that HSAs offer to healthy and 
wealthy persons will siphon those enrollees from conventional insurance 
groups, leaving group participants who are on average sicker and poorer.  
In response, the group insurer will raise its premiums for traditional 
group coverage, and a cycle of adverse selection proceeds.292  The fear is 
that, as premiums for conventional coverage escalate, employers and 
employees will eventually be unable or unwilling to bear those costs, and 
employers may simply eliminate conventional coverage.293  In short, the 
availability of HSAs—by allowing healthier persons to choose to “go it 
alone” without facing risks of truly catastrophic costs—may ultimately 
drive low-deductible coverage out of the market.294  At that point, 
insurers offering HDHPs would be free to engage in risk-based 
underwriting practices that could render even that limited coverage 
unaffordable or unavailable to high-risk individuals or groups.295 
In sum, opponents of HSAs forecast that as healthier persons choose 
to self-insure for noncatastrophic costs, unhealthy persons first will face 
increased premiums for low-deductible coverage and eventually may 
lose that coverage option entirely.  Thus, from this perspective, the status 
of HSAs as “just one option among many” is likely to be short lived, so 
that the distributional effects of HSAs discussed in the previous section 
will become entrenched and our reliance on health insurance as a 
mechanism for sharing and distributing risk will be sorely diminished.296 
                                                     
 292. Swartz, supra note 34, at 96 (noting that, while adverse selection in the form of a member 
of a large employer group opting out of employer-sponsored coverage entirely is uncommon, 
adverse selection is a concern when an employer offers a choice of plans). 
 293. See Greenstein & Park, supra note 262, at 3–4; cf. Jacobi, supra note 30, at 380 
(articulating this argument with respect to tax-favored MSAs). 
 294. SHEARER, supra note 25, at 5.  As Shearer notes, this result could be avoided if some form 
of risk adjustment of premiums were required to eliminate any premium advantage that flows solely 
from the enrollment of healthier than average persons.  The MMA, however, contains no mechanism 
for risk adjusting HDHP premiums. 
 295. See Gabel et al., supra note 223, at W404 (noting that many consumer-driven plan 
executives “admitted to screening out employers that they judged to be high risks”). 
 296. James Robinson captures well how the implementation of HSAs represents a significant 
step away from a social solidarity vision of health insurance: 
The principle of collective insurance is that most enrollees will not use the benefits to 
which they are entitled because they are in good health, thereby leaving their premium 
payments to help finance the care of unhealthy enrollees with high expenditures.  This 
“use it or lose it” logic contrasts with the “use it or save it” logic underlying the HSA 
benefit design.  Although the HSA product retains insurance principles for catastrophic 
care (above the high deductible), the savings account itself reflects noninsured 
prepayment principles, as unspent balances are retained by healthy enrollees rather than 
diverted to pay for the care of others. 
Robinson, supra note 12, at 1882. 
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HSA proponents counter that the group insurance sky will not fall 
simply as a result of HSAs.  First, they emphasize the benefits of 
flexibility and autonomy that HSAs offer to persons with chronic 
conditions.297  Because of these benefits, and based on reports by some 
vendors of health reimbursement accounts (a vehicle similar to HSAs), 
they suggest that people with health problems may find opening an HSA 
attractive.298  If healthy people and unhealthy people open HSAs at the 
same rate, then the dire predictions of adverse selection will not come to 
pass.  More fundamentally, however, fans of HSAs accept the 
disproportionate distribution of costs to unhealthy persons as a 
limited299and unobjectionable example of actuarially fair pricing. 
D. Research Findings Regarding the Effects of Consumerism 
As the foregoing description of the policy debates regarding 
consumerist health care suggests, many of the policy arguments rely on 
predictions of the real-world consequences that will follow the adoption 
of consumerist approaches to health coverage.  But are these predictions 
anything more than partisan spin on the relevant questions?  Because the 
rise of consumerist mechanisms is still recent, only limited quantitative 
or empirical research has been conducted regarding its actual or 
predictable impact.  Nonetheless, several studies have been published of 
late that bear on the persuasiveness of the foregoing policy arguments. 
In an attempt to assess the strength of this Article’s claim that 
consumerist mechanisms are likely to produce disproportionate adverse 
effects on unhealthy persons, both in terms of financial costs and burdens 
and in terms of health burdens resulting from delayed or forgone medical 
care, this Part examines the findings of new (and some not so new) 
research.  The first section describes recent research regarding the 
distribution of consumerism’s financial costs; the second describes 
research relevant to the impact of increased cost-sharing on patients’ 
access to needed medical care.300 
                                                     
 297. See Elizabeth White, Federal Worker Unions Fight Inclusion of Health Savings Accounts in 
FEHBP, BNA HEALTH CARE DAILY, Feb. 23, 2004, http://pubs.bna.com/ip/BNA/hce. 
nsf/is/a0a8c3k9t2 (quoting the director of the Galen Institute’s Center for Consumer Driven Health 
Care). 
 298. Id. 
 299. Under the MMA, the combination of an HDHP and an HSA limits the account holder’s 
maximum out-of-pocket medical expenses.  See supra Part V.B.3. 
 300. Because it relates less directly to this Article’s thesis regarding the discriminatory impact of 
consumerism on unhealthy people, this Part does not examine research regarding the impact of 
consumerist mechanisms, particularly HSAs or the like, on the health insurance market.  A number 
of analysts have projected these impacts and have predicted that the availability of tax-favored 
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1. Research Regarding the Distribution of Consumerism’s Financial 
Costs 
Several recent studies have produced findings relevant to 
consumerism’s distribution of financial costs and burdens.  One study by 
Sally Trude, a scholar at the Center for Studying Health Care Change, 
used actuarial models to estimate the expected out-of-pocket costs for 
individuals covered by health plans with six different cost-sharing 
configurations.301  The study reached the unsurprising finding that as 
cost-sharing obligations increased, so did enrollees’ average annual out-
of-pocket expenditures.  Trude emphasized, however, that focusing on 
average increases “masks the differences between those who use services 
and those who do not . . . .  Increased patient cost sharing raises out-of[-
]pocket costs more for people with chronic conditions, those in poor 
health and people with at least one hospitalization.”302  For example, 
under a benefit structure with moderate cost-sharing requirements, the 
average annual out-of-pocket amount was projected to be $236, but 
persons in poor health would have out-of-pocket costs of $862 on 
average, and persons with at least one hospitalization would pay 
$1066.303 
                                                                                                                       
medical spending accounts would result in significantly higher premiums for conventional coverage.  
See, e.g., LEN NICHOLS ET AL., supra note 25, at 24 (concluding that the availability of MSAs for 
healthier individuals would leave those less healthy in traditional plans with much higher premiums 
and would likely crowd out comprehensive coverage from the market over time); cf. AMERICAN 
ACADEMY OF ACTUARIES, THE IMPACT OF CONSUMER-DRIVEN HEALTH PLANS ON HEALTH CARE 
COSTS: A CLOSER LOOK AT PLANS WITH HEALTH REIMBURSEMENT ACCOUNTS 9 (Jan. 2004), 
http://www.actuary.org/pdf/health/cdhp_jan04.pdf [hereinafter IMPACT OF CDHPS] (stating that 
“[t]he impact of adverse selection . . . can potentially worsen over time as high and low users 
become increasingly segmented and no longer spread costs among both groups”); SHEARER, supra 
note 25, at 35 (projecting that if twenty percent of the healthiest eighty percent of employees 
enrolled in an MSA, the average per capita health care costs of those remaining in traditional 
coverage would increase by fifteen percent).  These projections are premised on healthier workers’ 
disproportionately choosing to open the spending accounts.  Advocates for consumer-directed plans 
have relied on reports from purveyors of such plans to challenge that assertion.  See Press Release, 
Galen Institute, Galen Institute Event Dispels Myths about Consumer Choice Care (Feb. 18, 2004), 
http://www.galen.org/fileuploads/Feb11_Press.pdf (stating that an executive from Definity Health 
reported that his company was enrolling individuals with significant risk factors).  Ultimately, any 
reliable data regarding selection effects of HSAs will come only with the passage of time and careful 
research. 
 301. Trude, supra note 226, at 2. 
 302. Id. 
 303. Id.  This moderate cost-sharing plan imposed a $20 copay for physician visits, a $150 copay 
for emergency department visits, and a $250 per day inpatient hospital copay.  The health-based out-
of-pocket differentials are even larger in benefit structures that more closely resemble HSAs.  For 
example, Trude estimated that the average out-of-pocket costs for all persons covered by an 
insurance plan with a $1000 deductible and a twenty- to thirty-percent coinsurance rate would be 
$763, but that the averages for people in poor health and people with at least one hospitalization 
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Recognizing that the hardship posed by a particular financial cost 
depends largely on a person’s income, Trude went on to evaluate how 
often out-of-pocket spending exceeded 10% of a person’s income.  
Although only 1% of all persons covered by a plan having no deductible 
and a $10 physician copayment would experience such high out-of-
pocket costs, the figure rose to 13% for all persons whose coverage 
required a $2500 deductible and a coinsurance rate of 30% or higher.  
Moreover, at this high cost-sharing level, a majority of people in poor 
health or with at least one hospitalization could be expected to face out-
of-pocket costs over the 10% threshold.304  But for the study’s 
assumption of a maximum out-of-pocket limit of $1500 greater than each 
plan’s deductible, these percentages could well have been higher.305  
Based on her findings, Trude sounds a cautionary note: “As out-of-
pocket costs increase . . . both the financial and medical consequences 
for seriously ill and low-income people increase.”306 
In a similar study, Dwight McNeill used a simulation and 
demographic analysis to compare out-of-pocket spending of consumers 
enrolled in conventional managed care plans with that of enrollees in a 
consumer-driven plan to test the hypothesis that such plans would favor 
young and healthy persons while disfavoring older and sicker persons.307  
His study divided consumers into four groups—the “healthy,” the 
“slightly sick,” the “moderately sick,” and the “very sick”—and 
generated average benefits paid by the insurer and consumer out-of-
pocket expenditures for each plan.308  McNeill found that healthy 
enrollees saved an average of $584 in out-of-pocket spending by 
                                                                                                                       
would be $1883 and $2355, respectively.  Under an insurance plan with a $2500 deductible and a 
thirty- to fifty-percent coinsurance rate, the average payments for all insureds would be $1051, but 
the expenditures would rise to $2942 and $3768 for persons in poor health and people with at least 
one hospitalization.  Id. 
 304. See id. (“Under the $2500 deductible scenario, 22 percent of the chronically ill, 53 percent 
of those in poor health and 66 percent of hospitalized patients would have out-of-pocket costs 
exceeding 10 percent of income.”).  Not surprisingly, the percentage of persons bearing oppressive 
out-of-pocket costs increased as incomes decreased.  For example, under the $2500 deductible 
scenario, only 6% of persons whose income exceeded 400% of the poverty level would spend more 
than 10% of their income on health expenses, while 47% of persons living in poverty would do so.  
Id. 
 305. See id. (“Maximum out-of-pocket limits are set at $1500 more than the deductible for each 
scenario.”).  In other words, according to the design of the study, persons enrolled in the $2500 
deductible plan would have their annual out-of-pocket expenditures limited to $4000. 
 306. Id. 
 307. McNeill, supra note 272, at 186.  The consumer-driven health plan used in the study was a 
$1000 health reimbursement account (HRA) with deductibles of $1500, $2500, and $3500.  The 
maximum out-of-pocket limit for the consumer-driven plan equaled the deductible.  Id. at 187. 
 308. Id. at 188.  McNeill included in his calculation of out-of-pocket expenses the consumer’s 
premium contribution.  Id. 
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enrolling in the consumer-directed plan, as compared to the conventional 
plan.  By contrast, people in the slightly sick and moderately sick groups 
lost an average of $250 and $581, respectively.  The very sick who 
enrolled in a consumer-driven plan, however, would save $300 on 
average.  Based on this simulation of gains and losses, together with an 
analysis of enrollees’ demographic characteristics, McNeill concluded 
that his results “support the hypothesis that the healthy, especially young 
men, are the potential winners with these plans.”309 
These studies validate worries that cost-sharing increases will have a 
disproportionate financial impact on unhealthy persons by quantifying 
the projected level of that impact, and they highlight the costs imposed 
by high-deductible plans.  Because the high-deductible plans that Trude 
and McNeill used do not exactly match the HDHPs that must accompany 
HSAs, however, neither study can be read as projecting the precise 
impact of HSAs.  Particularly important is each study’s assumption of a 
lower annual limit on maximum out-of-pocket expenses than the limit 
mandated by the MMA.310  Thus, these studies’ results may under predict 
the extent of financial exposure for individuals who establish HSAs.  On 
the other hand, depending on how generously employers subsidize 
employee coverage via HDHP and HSA contributions, the studies could 
also over predict the actual costs borne by employees.311  Regardless of 
                                                     
 309. Id. at 191.  See also NICHOLS ET AL., supra note 25, at 28 (concluding that younger and 
healthier male workers were more likely to be winners in the switch to tax-favored HSA).  In a 
similar project, the American Academy of Actuaries examined how the adoption of employer-
funded health reimbursement accounts coupled with high-deductible health plans, in contrast to an 
actuarially equivalent PPO, would affect hypothetical health plan participants with low, medium, 
and high health-care usage levels.  The AAA’s actuarial model found that low users would spend 
$360 less out of pocket under the CDHP than under the PPO, but that medium and high users would 
spend $615 and $650 more, respectively.  IMPACT OF CDHPS, supra note 300, at 3–4. 
 310. See McNeill, supra note 272, at 189 (choosing to use a consumer-driven product that 
effectively limited the amount of risk that each consumer bore to the size of the “gap” between 
exhaustion of the $1000 HRA (funded by the employer) and the deductible, thus limiting out-of-
pocket expenditures for medical care to $2500); Trude, supra note 226 (including a maximum out-
of-pocket limit of $1500 greater than each plan’s deductible, so that the plan with the highest 
deductible ($2500) would have a $4000 maximum).  By contrast, the MMA allows the HDHP to set 
out-of-pocket limits as high as $5000 for individual coverage (or $10,000 for group coverage).  For 
this reason, McNeill’s result that the very sick actually saved money under a consumer-driven plan 
may not be replicated under HSAs. 
 311. For example, if an employer were to purchase HDHP coverage with a deductible of $1000 
and a low out-of-pocket limit for an employee and were also to contribute the maximum amount of 
$1000 to that individual’s HSA, the individual would face less financial exposure.  Given the current 
desperation on the part of most employers to minimize their health-care costs, it seems improbable 
that many employers would offer such generous and costly coverage.  See Press Release, Mercer 
Human Res. Consulting, U.S. Employers See a Role for New Health Sav. Accounts in their Benefit 
Programs (June 8, 2004), http://wrg.wmmercer.com/content.asp?article_id=20046474&t=&p=&ar=1 
(reporting that in a survey of 991 employers, thirty-nine percent indicated that, if they were to offer 
an HDHP with an HSA to employees, they would not contribute any money to the employees’ HSA 
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this imprecision, however, this research bolsters the arguments that 
consumerist coverage options will tend to hurt unhealthy and poor people 
while helping healthy and wealthy people.312 
Another recent study by Ha Tu used survey data to examine the out-
of-pocket cost burdens experienced by people with chronic conditions.313  
Among all privately insured persons with chronic conditions, Tu found 
that in 2003, 12% had out-of-pocket costs exceeding 5% of their 
income.314  Tu’s findings also confirm the greater incidence of this 
burden among low-income persons, 42% of whom spent more than 5% 
of their income on medical expenses.315  Moreover, the survey’s 
documentation of dramatic increases between 2001 and 2003 in the 
percentage of insured persons with chronic conditions experiencing cost 
burdens suggests the profound impact of employers’ escalation of cost-
sharing obligations during that time period.316 
2. Research Regarding Cost-Sharing’s Impact on Access to Needed 
Care 
Along with the evidence suggesting that the adoption of consumerist 
mechanisms distributes financial costs disproportionately to unhealthy 
persons, research demonstrates the impact of high out-of-pocket costs on 
access to medical care and, by extension, on patients’ health.  For 
example, the survey discussed immediately above also speaks to the 
question of how high out-of-pocket costs affect access to needed medical 
care.317  The survey responses showed that among privately insured 
                                                                                                                       
accounts and seventy-seven percent said that their contribution amount would be less than the 
HDHP’s deductible level).  In addition, neither Trude’s nor McNeill’s calculations accounted for any 
offsetting tax savings from the HSA. 
 312. See AMERICAN ACADEMY OF ACTUARIES, MEDICAL SAVINGS ACCOUNTS: COST 
IMPLICATIONS AND DESIGN ISSUES, PUBLIC POLICY MONOGRAPH 29 (1995), http://www.actuary. 
org/pdf/health/msa_cost.pdf (concluding that if tax-favored MSAs were implemented, the greatest 
savings would accrue to individuals with only minimal health expenditures and the greatest losses 
would be experienced by those with substantial health expenditures, primarily pregnant women and 
older persons). 
 313. Ha T. Tu, Ctr. for Studying Health Sys. Change, Rising Health Costs, Medical Debt and 
Chronic Conditions (Sept. 2004), http://www.hschange.org/CONTENT/706/706.pdf.  The study says 
that people with chronic conditions are conservatively estimated to include thirty-three percent of the 
working age population.  Id. at 1. 
 314. Id. at 2. 
 315. Id. 
 316. See id. (finding that for all privately insured persons with chronic conditions the percentage 
went from 10% in 2001 to 12% in 2003 and for low-income (defined as having a family income of 
less than 200% of the federal poverty level) privately insured persons with chronic conditions, the 
percentage went from 28% in 2001 to 42% in 2003, an increase of 50% in just two years). 
 317. Id. at 3. 
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persons with chronic conditions, one in six reported that their family 
experienced difficulties in paying medical bills in the previous year, and 
the researcher found that the existence of large medical bills had 
significantly affected access to medical care.318  Chronically ill insured 
persons whose families had trouble paying their health-related bills were 
three to four times as likely as those whose families reported no bill-
paying difficulties to delay care, fail to fill a prescription, or simply go 
without needed care because of cost.319  These results are consistent with 
those of another recent survey of households regarding the prevalence of 
difficulties in paying medical bills and the impact of those difficulties,320 
and together the studies suggest that fears of ever-accumulating medical 
debt may lead even insured people with chronic illnesses to cut back on 
needed medical care.321  Moreover, these fears are not idle.  Recently 
published research found that about half of personal bankruptcies have 
medical causes and about one-third of those filers had health insurance at 
the time of filing.322 
In addition to research into the prevalence and impact of medical 
debt, several recent studies have focused specifically on how increased 
copays and tiered pharmacy plans influence prescription drug usage.  For 
example, one study relied on pharmacy claims data to model how 
                                                     
 318. Id. at 2–3. 
 319. Id. at 3.  Among chronically ill insured people with family-medical-bill-paying problems, 
10% went without needed care, 30% delayed care, and 43% failed to fill a prescription, all because 
of cost.  Id.  Among chronically ill insured people with no family-medical-bill-paying problems, the 
figures were 3%, 8%, and 9% respectively.  Id. 
 320. Jessica H. May & Peter J. Cunningham, Ctr. for Studying Health Sys. Change, Tough 
Trade-Offs: Medical Bills, Family Finances and Access to Care (June 2004), http://www.hschange. 
org/CONTENT/689/689.pdf.  These researchers found that one in seven American families reported 
problems in paying medical bills in the previous year.  Id. at 1.  Among insured families, more than 
one in ten reported medical-bill-paying problems, but the rate was significantly higher among 
families with members having greater health needs.  Id. at 2–3.  About one in four insured families 
that had either a member with a hospital stay or an emergency room visit or a member in fair or poor 
health reported bill-paying difficulties.  Id. at 3 and tbl.2.  But families with high out-of-pocket costs 
(above $2000) were the most likely to report bill-paying troubles, with more than one in three having 
problems, and the researchers noted the role of rising cost-sharing obligations in producing high out-
of-pocket costs.  Id. at 2.  This survey’s findings also lend weight to concerns about the impact of 
large medical bills on access to needed care.  Among insured families alone, families reporting 
medical bill problems were four times as likely as families with no medical bill problems to say that 
a family member had experienced an unmet medical need in the previous year because of cost, with 
similar disparities reported regarding delaying care or failing to get needed prescription drugs.  Id. at 
2 and tbl.3. 
 321. Tu, supra note 313, at 3 (“These results suggest that once families have trouble paying 
medical bills, concerns about accumulating more bills and further straining family finances may 
cause many people with chronic conditions to curtail their use of needed medical care.”). 
 322. David U. Himmelstein et al., MarketWatch: Illness and Injury as Contributors to 
Bankruptcy, HEALTH AFF., Feb. 2, 2005, http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/content/ 
full/hlthaff.w5.63/DC1. 
CROSSLEY FINAL.DOC 2/21/2006  9:55:25 AM 
144 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54 
doubling the copayment for drugs in eight widely prescribed therapeutic 
classes affected privately insured consumers’ use of the drugs.323  
Doubling the copay resulted in substantial spending reductions for all 
drug classes, but the reduction’s extent varied among different drug 
classes and different types of patients.324  Overall, patients with chronic 
illnesses reduced their usage of medicines prescribed for those conditions 
somewhat less than the average reduction, but patients with diabetes 
were as likely as the overall population to decrease their spending.325  
The concern that diabetes patients facing increased copays may suffer ill 
health effects from cutting back on their medications is at least partially 
borne out by the findings of a recent study linking cost-related underuse 
of medications to worse health outcomes among diabetes patients.326 
Another study demonstrates that the consumption effects of higher 
copayments may be particularly pronounced in tiered pharmacy plans.327  
It found both that while patients’ use of medications for high blood 
pressure remained stable when copayments increased in a single-tier 
plan, the overall usage of those drugs declined as copayment amounts 
increased in multi-tier plans and that the consumption of more costly 
(and more effective) drugs declines as the differential between 
copayments for generic and brand-name drugs increased.328  In another 
study, researchers examined how levels of usage and spending on 
medications commonly used to treat three chronic conditions changed 
when two large employer groups implemented two different tiering 
structures.329  These researchers found that employees who faced a more 
dramatic change in prescription benefits were twice as likely as 
                                                     
 323. Dana P. Goldman et al., Pharmacy Benefits and the Use of Drugs by the Chronically Ill, 
291 JAMA 2344 (2004). 
 324. Id. at 2344. 
 325. Id. at 2348. 
 326. John D. Piette et al., Health Insurance Status, Cost-Related Medication Underuse, and 
Outcomes Among Diabetes Patients in Three Systems of Care, 42 MED. CARE 102, 102 (2004). 
 327. Sachin Kamal-Bahl & Becky Briesacher, How do Incentive-Based Formularies Influence 
Drug Selections and Spending for Hypertension?, HEALTH AFF., Jan.–Feb., at 227, 227 (2004). 
 328. Id. at 231–32.  See also Thomas S. Rector et al., Effect of Tiered Prescription Copayments 
on the Use of Preferred Brand Medications, 41 MED. CARE 398, 398 (2003) (finding that tiered 
copayments were “associated with a significant shift from nonpreferred to preferred brand 
medications” but noting need for further research regarding clinical effects of these changes). 
 329. Haiden A. Huskamp et al., The Effect of Incentive-Based Formularies on Prescription-Drug 
Utilization and Spending, 349 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2224, 2224 (2003).  One employer made modest 
changes in its pharmacy benefit, switching from a two-tier plan to a three-tier plan by simply adding 
a third, higher copay tier without altering the copay in the two existing tiers.  Id. at 2225.  The other 
employer made more dramatic changes by simultaneously moving from a plan with a single copay to 
a three-tier plan and raising its lowest copay.  Id.  The study examined the impact on usage of ACE 
inhibitors which treat hypertension and heart failure; proton pump inhibitors, which treat acid reflux 
disease; and statins, which are prescribed primarily to reduce cholesterol levels.  Id. 
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employees in a comparison group to stop using a particular class of drugs 
altogether.  By contrast, more incremental changes to the other 
employer’s drug benefit produced only minor effects on the likelihood 
that a patient would stop using a drug.330 
The findings from these studies are admittedly less than conclusive 
regarding how increasing copayments generally or imposing differential 
copayments in a tiered benefit plan affects decisions by patients with 
chronic conditions to purchase prescription drugs.  Indeed, the findings 
suggest that the effects of increased copayments may vary depending on 
the type of drug, the type of patient, and details of the benefit plan’s 
structure.331  Nonetheless, these studies unquestionably raise a yellow 
caution flag regarding the likelihood that chronically ill patients may 
respond to increased copayments by forgoing needed medications.  The 
research teams themselves highlighted this concern:332 one group 
concluded by stressing the importance of “discourag[ing] the adoption of 
cost containment systems that encourage poor medication choices in the 
first place.”333  Unfortunately, while the extant research reaches no 
definitive conclusions, it does reinforce concerns that significant cost 
incentives may often lead consumers—even those with life- and 
disability-threatening conditions—to disregard the venerable proverb that 
“an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure.” 
Other research lends further credence to the proposition that 
consumerism’s cost-sharing burdens create the prospect of harmful 
health consequences for individuals—consequences that, like the 
financial costs themselves, are likely to be concentrated among unhealthy 
                                                     
 330. Id. at 2227–30.  The comparison group consisted of health plan enrollees not affected by 
changes in plan design.  Id. at 2225. 
 331. See Goldman et al., supra note 323, at 2349 (“Patients do not respond indiscriminately to 
co-payment increases.”).  See also John Hsu et al., Cost-Sharing: Patient Knowledge and Effects on 
Seeking Emergency Department Care, 42 MED. CARE 290, 290 (2004) (finding that patients’ 
perceptions regarding the size of their insurance copayment for emergency department visits were 
“strongly associated with avoidance of or delays in emergency care”); Jared T. Lurk et al., Effects of 
Changes in Patient Cost Sharing and Drug Sample Policies on Prescription Drug Costs and 
Utilization in a Safety-Net-Provider Setting, 61 AM. J. HEALTH-SYS. PHARMACY 267, 267 (2004), 
available at http://www.ajhp.org/cgi/reprint/61/3/267.pdf (finding that increases in the copay for 
prescription drugs “were associated with significant decreases in prescription drug utilization”). 
 332. See Goldman et al., supra note 323, at 2349 (“[S]ignificant reductions in the use of 
antidiabetic agents or medications to treat dyslipidemia may have short- and long-term clinical 
consequences.”); Huskamp et al., supra note 329, at 2231 (“The discontinuation of the use of 
medications such as statins and ACE inhibitors that are needed for the treatment of chronic illnesses 
raises important questions about potentially harmful effects of formulary changes and the associated 
changes in copayments.”); Kamal-Bahl & Briesacher, supra note 327, at 235 (concluding that their 
finding suggests “that people with limited personal resources might be forced to do without 
necessary medications or use less costly (but probably less effective) ones”). 
 333. Kamal-Bahl & Briesacher, supra note 327, at 235. 
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persons.  In the early 1970s the RAND Corporation conducted a rigorous 
empirical study into the effect of different levels of health coverage334 on 
patients’ treatment decisions and health outcomes.  Among the study’s 
numerous findings, a few are particularly relevant to this discussion.  
First, the researchers found that patients who faced higher cost-sharing 
obligations did cut back on visits to the doctor or hospital, but not in a 
way that differentiated between needed and unnecessary care.335  Thus, 
the imposition of cost sharing led to cost-conscious, but not cost-
effective, decisions about accessing care.  By contrast, once a high cost-
sharing patient consulted a doctor for treatment, that patient received just 
as much care as a patient without financial incentives.336  In other words, 
once care is accessed, decisions about what services to use did not appear 
to be cost conscious.  As Professor Mark Hall summarizes, “These 
findings confirm that increased cost sharing will lower health care 
spending, but they cast considerable doubt on whether catastrophic 
insurance alone will result in improved cost effectiveness.  Efficiency 
entails not just saving money but choosing wisely how to spend it.”337 
Admittedly, the participants in the RAND study did not have the 
benefit of Internet-based decision support and information tools now 
becoming available.  Thus, that study’s findings may not accurately 
predict the experience of people enrolled in today’s consumer-driven 
health plans.  Nonetheless, it remains unproven whether these tools 
enable real patients making real spending choices to make cost-effective 
decisions.338  Until that case is made, the apprehension will remain strong 
that any immediate cost savings generated by consumerism may come at 
the expense of patients’ health.339 
                                                     
 334. The levels of coverage ranged from participants enrolled in “free care” plans requiring 
payment of five percent of the cost of treatment or less, to a catastrophic plan requiring participants 
to pay ninety-five percent of their costs up to an annual maximum of the lesser of $1000 or a 
percentage of their income.  HALL, supra note 271, at 48 (describing RAND Health Insurance 
Study).  Although some HSA account holders may purchase (or receive from their employer) an 
individual HDHP with a deductible of only $1000, some HDHPs will have higher deductibles, and 
the law allows them to set their annual out-of-pocket maximum expenditure as high as $5000 (or 
$10,000 for family coverage).  Thus, the catastrophic plan employed in the RAND study is roughly 
equivalent to the most comprehensive insurance coverage available to HSA holders. 
 335. Id. at 49. 
 336. Id. 
 337. Id. 
 338. See Robinson, supra note 218, at 2626 (“[T]he headlong retreat of the public and private 
sectors from the thankless job of controlling costs is delegating to the consumer a very broad array 
of tasks for which many are not prepared.”). 
 339. See HALL, supra note 271, at 48 (reporting that RAND study found that “[u]nder some 
measures of health status, participants were demonstrably worse off as a result of greatly increased 
cost sharing, although not to a very dramatic extent” and that “these effects where [sic] more 
pronounced for low-income participants”). 
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Indeed, survey findings confirm that patients’ inability or reluctance 
to attain needed care may carry adverse health consequences.  According 
to the results of a 2002 survey, among insured Americans who reported 
postponing medical care that they or their family needed within the 
previous year, thirty-six percent attributed a temporary disability 
(including significant pain and suffering) to the delay, while fourteen 
percent said it caused a long-term disability.  Those with insurance who 
failed completely to obtain needed care were even more likely to report 
serious consequences.340 
Finally, the large body of research on the health effects of being 
uninsured also sheds light on how large cost-sharing obligations are 
likely to affect unhealthy persons.  Of course, people who have coverage 
through consumerist mechanisms are not in fact uninsured.  But because 
of their heightened exposure to insurance risk for their medical needs, 
some people with consumerist coverage may share important 
characteristics with the uninsured, notably a reluctance to seek care, 
difficulty in accessing care, and problems in paying for care.  In other 
words, high cost-sharing obligations may in some cases render people 
underinsured. 
Far less scholarly and political attention has been paid to the 
challenges faced by the underinsured than to the problems of the 
uninsured.  In general terms, “the underinsured” refers to persons who 
have some health insurance, but whose coverage is inadequate to protect 
them against excessive out-of-pocket costs if they experience a 
catastrophic level of medical need.341  The role that substantial cost-
sharing obligations play in rendering insurance coverage inadequate is 
well recognized.342  As former Secretary of Health and Human Services 
                                                     
 340. Kaiser Comm’n on Medicaid and the Uninsured, Kaiser Family Found., Fact Sheet, 
Underinsured in America: Is Health Coverage Adequate? (2002), available at www.kff.org/ 
uninsured/4060-index.cfm (follow “Fact Sheet” hyperlink). 
 341. Cf. Rashid Bashshur et al., Defining Underinsurance: A Conceptual Framework for Policy 
and Empirical Analysis, 50 MED. CARE REV. 199, 206 (asserting that underinsurance exists when 
out-of-pocket medical costs result in a serious financial burden or coverage limitations hinder the 
insured’s ability to access needed care); Kaiser Comm’n on Medicaid and the Uninsured, supra note 
340 (“The underinsured have health insurance but face significant cost sharing or limits on benefits 
that may affect its usefulness in accessing or paying for needed health services.”).  Although no 
single definition of underinsurance exists, a commonly cited approach finds that people are 
underinsured if their coverage exposes them to out-of-pocket expenses exceeding ten percent of their 
family income in the event of a catastrophic illness.  See Pamela Farley Short & Jessica S. Banthin, 
New Estimates of the Underinsured Younger than 65 Years, 274 JAMA 1302, 1303 (1995) (using 
this approach to estimate the number of underinsured). 
 342. See, e.g., Kevin T. Stroupe et al., Does Chronic Illness Affect the Adequacy of Health 
Insurance Coverage?, 25 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L. 309, 314–15 (2000) (classifying lower-
income individuals as underinsured based on deductible levels and coinsurance rates); John 
Dorschner, Underinsured: 29 Million of Us Don’t Have Adequate Coverage, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 
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Donna Shalala described the “big crisis” of the underinsured, high cost-
sharing obligations mean that the underinsured “can’t afford to use their 
insurance.”343 
Herein lies the affinity between the uninsured and the underinsured: 
like the uninsured, persons who have inadequate coverage are more 
likely to delay obtaining needed care or even forgo it entirely,344 and a 
substantial body of research demonstrates that receiving too little or 
delayed medical care harms uninsured persons.  In its report, Care 
Without Coverage: Too Little, Too Late, a committee of the Institute of 
Medicine reviewed that research and found that “the quality and length 
of life are distinctly different for insured and uninsured populations, with 
worse health status and shortened lives among uninsured adults.”345  The 
committee found specific evidence of harmful effects across a range of 
health services, including preventive services, cancer care, and care for 
chronic diseases.346  While confining its focus to the health effects of 
uninsurance, it acknowledged that being underinsured posed similar, 
though generally less severe, problems.347  Accordingly, to the extent that 
consumerism’s elevated cost-sharing obligations leave unhealthy people 
underinsured, we have good reason to anticipate that some of those 
persons will suffer negative health consequences.348 
Taken together, the research described in this Part lends significant 
force to the argument that consumerist approaches to health coverage can 
be expected to disproportionately affect unhealthy persons, with the 
ramifications including burdensome medical debt and avoidable poor 
                                                                                                                       
20, 2003, at 22G (asserting that the problem of the underinsured will worsen as employers attempt to 
control costs by continuing to increase deductibles and copays); Kaiser Comm’n on Medicaid and 
the Uninsured, supra note 340 (noting the potential for uncovered services and cost-sharing to mount 
up and become onerous).  Other health insurance policy features that may render coverage 
inadequate include the following: (1) permanent pre-existing condition exclusions and lack of out-
of-pocket maximum limits, see Stroupe et al., supra, at 314, (2) failure to cover prescription drugs, 
see Claudia L. Schu et al., Lack of Prescription Coverage Among the Under 65: A Symptom of 
Underinsurance, COMMONWEALTH FUND ISSUE BRIEF, Feb. 2004, available at http://www.cmwf. 
org/usr_doc/Schur_under65.pdf, and (3) failure to cover particular expensive treatments, see Amy 
Dockser Marcus, Sorry, Only Half of That Surgery is Covered, WALL ST. J., Mar. 12, 2003, at D1. 
 343. Dorschner, supra note 342 (quoting Shalala’s remarks). 
 344. Cf. id. (quoting researcher from the Kaiser Family Foundation as stating that “[b]asically, 
it’s the same problem as the uninsured”). 
 345. COMM. ON THE CONSEQUENCES OF UNINSURANCE, INST. OF MED., CARE WITHOUT 
COVERAGE: TOO LITTLE, TOO LATE 7 (2002). 
 346. Id. at 7–13. 
 347. Id. at 5.  See also COMM. ON THE CONSEQUENCES OF UNINSURANCE, INST. OF MED., 
COVERAGE MATTERS: INS. AND HEALTH CARE 1 (2001). 
 348. The overlap between the underinsured and people enrolled in the types of benefit plans 
described in this Article has not been quantified, and its potential size should not be exaggerated.  
Certainly, without data, we cannot assume that most people enrolled in such plans are underinsured. 
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health outcomes, including unnecessary hospitalizations, preventable 
disability, and shortened lives.349  Undoubtedly, the many questions 
regarding the effects of consumerism justify further careful research; the 
research to date is by no means definitive.  Nonetheless, the existing 
research strongly suggests that any cost savings that consumerism 
generates for employers and healthy individuals will come largely at the 
expense of unhealthy persons.  The next Part briefly examines possible 
bases for objecting to this discriminatory burden. 
VI. CONNECTING THE DOTS . . . AND MINDING THE GAPS 
This Article’s fundamental focus has been to consider how the law 
addresses the phenomenon that, if permitted, health insurers will be least 
willing to provide health insurance to the people who need it the most—
people with health problems.  As explained in the previous sections, the 
justification for avoiding the risk of covering unhealthy people lies in an 
actuarial fairness vision of health insurance, which permits insurers to 
screen out or charge more to high-risk individuals.  This vision, however, 
conflicts directly with a social solidarity vision of insurance, which 
emphasizes the social good that flows from the spreading of risk across 
the sick and well alike.  By examining a broad range of 
antidiscrimination laws that constrain insurers’ or employers’ ability to 
classify risks on particular bases, Part III demonstrates that our society 
swears no absolute allegiance to principles of actuarial fairness.  Instead, 
we are willing to provide groups with varying levels of protection against 
discrimination, but lack a consistent justification for doing so.  In at least 
some instances, though, the law even protects groups against the 
discriminatory impact of particular coverage packages. 
In the case of health-status discrimination, reforms enacted during 
the 1990s embodied social solidarity goals of increasing the ability of 
people with health problems to afford and maintain coverage, but these 
measures remained limited in scope.  Moreover, laws prohibiting direct 
forms of health-status-based risk classification may have helped generate 
                                                     
 349. A recent report relies on case studies to demonstrate how health insurance problems, 
including high cost sharing, can lead to severe medical and financial consequences for people with 
diabetes.  KAREN POLLITZ ET AL., GEO. UNIV. HEALTH POLICY INST. & AM. DIABETES ASS’N, 
FALLING THROUGH THE CRACKS: STORIES OF HOW HEALTH INSURANCE CAN FAIL PEOPLE WITH 
DIABETES (2005), available at http://www.healthinsuranceinfo.net/diabetes_and_health_ 
insurance.pdf.  The occurrence of preventable complications has serious societal ramifications as 
well.  In March 2005, a federal agency estimated that the United States could save almost $2.5 
billion each year by preventing diabetes-related hospitalizations.  AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE 
RESEARCH AND QUALITY, ECONOMIC AND HEALTH COSTS OF DIABETES (March 2005), 
http://www.ahrq.gov/data/hcup/highlight1/high1.htm. 
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new coverage vehicles that instead discriminate against unhealthy people 
indirectly, by impact.  Part V describes the consumerist trend in health 
coverage and presents evidence that the shifting of insurance risk that 
consumerist coverage mechanisms entail can be expected to 
disproportionately and negatively affect people with health problems.  
These effects are not limited to forcing unhealthy people to pay more 
money, but are likely to include stranding unhealthy people with even 
heavier burdens of ill health. 
My central goal herein has been twofold: (1) to make the case that 
consumerist coverage mechanisms can be expected to mete out financial 
and health disadvantages in a lopsided fashion, with unhealthy people 
feeling the brunt of the disadvantage, and (2) to demonstrate that 
lawmakers have in numerous other instances been willing to intervene to 
protect groups of individuals from discrimination in health insurance.  In 
other words, the Article seeks to show that a problem (the discriminatory 
impact of consumerist vehicles on unhealthy people) exists and can be 
expected to grow, and that our society has been willing to address other 
similar problems in the past.  I recognize, however, that describing the 
greater burden imposed on unhealthy people as a problem depends on 
my own intuitions regarding fairness and that policy prescriptions need a 
basis far sturdier than intuition.  While it is beyond the scope of this 
Article to explore fully the analytical foundations for objecting to this 
unequal burden, I will close by sketching two possible related 
approaches. 
First, as this Article’s title suggests, we might approach the plight of 
the unhealthy with respect to health insurance as essentially a problem of 
discrimination, as that term commonly is used in the context of civil 
rights legislation prohibiting discrimination in employment and other 
contexts.  Indeed, we have seen that some of the existing laws regulating 
health-insurance discrimination are but pieces of larger efforts to end the 
unequal treatment of historically disadvantaged groups and extend to 
discriminatory impacts.  On even brief reflection, however, it seems 
doubtful that a civil rights justification would adequately sustain policy 
initiatives to limit consumerism’s impact. 
Any civil rights law to advance the health insurance rights of “the 
unhealthy” would need to define precisely which persons can claim those 
rights, and this task alone might prove insurmountable.350  More 
                                                     
 350. While this Article has used the term “the unhealthy” as shorthand to describe a large group 
of people who, for widely varying reasons, can be expected to generate large medical expenses, see 
supra note 9, legislation providing legal rights to members of this group would require far more 
definitional rigor. 
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fundamentally, however, it is unclear to what extent the unhealthy have, 
as a group, suffered a history of discrimination by virtue of being 
unhealthy.  Indeed, persons with chronic medical conditions (who are 
likely to constitute a large portion of the unhealthy) are effectively the 
product of modern medical advances permitting people with conditions 
like diabetes, hypertension, and heart disease to live for long periods 
with medical assistance.  Nor is it clear that the unhealthy suffer 
substantial discrimination today in contexts other than health coverage.  
Of course, demonstrating a significant intersection between ill health and 
racial or ethnic minority status could conceivably bolster regulatory 
proposals to eliminate or mitigate the discriminatory impact of 
consumerism, but such proposals would seem to be both under and over 
inclusive.351  Finally, an effort to limit the disparate impact against the 
unhealthy that consumerist coverage vehicles produce would have to 
contend with the assertion that any disparate impact is justified by some 
sort of “actuarial necessity,” akin to the “business necessity” that justifies 
a disparate impact in the employment setting.  In sum, notwithstanding 
the rhetorical value of invoking the civil rights heritage, unhealthy 
people’s current health insurance predicament does not seem at root to be 
a problem of existing social inequality. 
Instead, concerns sparked by the growth of consumerism are more 
precisely concerns that its skewed allocation of benefits and burdens will 
create and aggravate social inequality.352  The objection is essentially that 
schemes imposing financial and health burdens on unhealthy persons, 
while offering financial benefits to healthy and wealthy persons, are 
inconsistent with leading theories of distributive justice.  These schemes 
appear patently inconsistent with Rawls’s “difference principle,” which 
calls for a distribution of goods that maximizes the well-being of the 
most disadvantaged.353  Moreover, consumerist vehicles cannot easily be 
defended against charges of distributive injustice by assertions that the 
financial and health burdens complained of are simply the results of 
                                                     
 351. See Hellman, supra note 128, at 89 (making this point with respect to justifications for 
genetic discrimination laws).  A similar attempt to highlight the overlap between the unhealthy and 
people with disabilities is likely to be fruitless, both because the Supreme Court’s narrow 
interpretations of disability have shrunk that overlap and because the lower courts’ narrow 
application of the ADA to insurance has deflated the law’s significance in that context.  See supra 
Part III.B.3. 
 352. Cf. Glenn, supra note 27, at 298–99 (noting the ability of insurance to create social and 
economic inequalities). 
 353. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 75–80 (1971).  See also NORMAN DANIELS, JUST 
HEALTH CARE 46 (1985) (noting that justice requires the use of “resources to counter the natural 
disadvantages induced by disease”); Korobkin, supra note 184, at 802 (suggesting how Rawls would 
evaluate claims to a positive right to health care). 
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natural endowments of poor health.  Rather, they must be seen as steps 
away from earlier forms of health coverage—the baseline, so to speak—
in which individuals bore relatively little insurance risk for their medical 
expenses.354 
Thus, distributive justice arguments appear to provide a more fitting 
basis for objecting to consumerism’s discriminatory impact on the 
unhealthy, but a number of issues with this approach remain to be 
resolved.  Most prominently, debates about the contours and 
persuasiveness of distributive justice arguments remain contentious.  For 
example, although many would agree that good health is morally 
arbitrary and not somehow deserved, sharp disagreement exists over the 
extent to which justice entitles the healthy to reap financial benefits from 
their undeserved good fortune.355  Furthermore, some would argue that 
justice permits holding individuals personally responsible for the positive 
and negative results of their chosen health-influencing behaviors; in 
other words, some among the unhealthy may deserve their ill health and 
its consequences.356  Finally, even if we could reach some level of 
agreement that the disproportionate financial and health burdens foisted 
on the unhealthy by consumerism are unjust, lengthy conversations about 
the proper remedial steps would ensue.357 
VII. CO NCLUSION 
As employers seek to contain their health-care costs and politicians 
create coverage mechanisms to promote individual empowerment, 
people with health problems increasingly are forced to shoulder the load 
of their own medical costs.  The trend toward consumerism in health 
coverage shifts not simply costs, but also insurance risk, to individual 
insureds, and the results may be particularly dire for people in poor 
health.  A growing body of research lends credibility to the contention 
that unhealthy people will disproportionately pay the price for 
consumerism, not only in dollars, but in preventable disease and 
                                                     
 354. Cf. Orentlicher, supra note 219, at 419–20 (noting a societal choice “to allocate medical 
resources on the basis of wealth rather than medical need of the likelihood of receiving benefit”). 
 355. See Hellman, supra note 19, at 400–02 (contrasting views of Rawls and Nozick). 
 356. Cf. Health Care Study Group, supra note 27, at 520–21 (noting this sentiment, as well as 
the difficulty in applying it fairly and efficiently). 
 357. The classic debate is whether redistributive goals are better advanced through regulation or 
by tax-and-transfer schemes.  See Hellman, supra note 19, at 360 (noting the debate with respect to 
the use of domestic violence information in risk classification).  For a thorough discussion of how 
the debate plays out in the context of genetic discrimination in insurance, see Kyle Logue & Ronen 
Avraham, Redistributing Optimally: Of Tax Rules, Legal Rules, and Insurance, 56 TAX L. REV. 157 
(2003). 
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disability.  In short, consumerist coverage vehicles discriminate against 
the unhealthy by impact, and existing laws protecting against health-
status discrimination do not address impact discrimination.  Although 
some might attempt to justify this impact by invoking the principle of 
actuarial fairness, a review of the various laws prohibiting discrimination 
in health insurance reveals our society’s willingness to elevate other 
social values above actuarial fairness.  This Article calls for more careful 
scrutiny of consumerism’s effects and a sustained dialogue regarding the 
limits a just society should place on the burdens borne by unhealthy 
persons. 
